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

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THE BATTLE OVER BRAINS IN DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION*

JACQUES BARZUN

THE most striking recent fact in educational affairs on this continent is the new concern with the able student. By concern I mean a growing recognition that here is perhaps an opportunity and a duty that are neglected in our present system. It was a good many years ago, of course, that the University of Chicago under Mr. Hutchins instituted a plan of acceleration which enabled the alert student to reach the B.A. in two years. But the tendency of educators was then to discuss this plan as an adjunct to the Great Books, and to consider it, rightly or wrongly, as a piece of anti-American, anti-modern snobbery. Now the movement bears a different character. If you read the report entitled *General Education for Schools and Colleges*, issued by a Committee of the Ford Foundation and published by the Harvard University Press, you will see that the idea of selecting and speeding the bright boy is now held to be a logical part of the general education movement and that it is entirely free of snobbish implications or *recherché* social criticism.

Nor is this all. It is clear that the political state of the world, coupled with the experience of specialized training during the late war, have influenced educators everywhere and made them see that brains are part of the national resources, that they cannot be dispensed with, and that they can be used in many ways not hitherto suspected, some better than others. You remember the innocent surprise of our newspapers ten years ago when they told how even professors could further the war effort. One headline ran: "Seashell Expert Big Help in Okinawa Jump." The next thing was the discovery that experts do not grow on bushes but have to prepare themselves over many years. In other words, the dimension of time is entering our educational thoughts in a fashion exactly reversing the previous trend. Between the creation of the public high school around 1900 and the new outlook of the nineteen-forties, the whole aim of our school plan was to hold the young in school until sixteen. This kept them off the labour market and out of the marriage bonds; it was good—we thought—for their health, morals, and general development. They were treated all alike in the name and for the sake of a common democracy. Now we see that not all boys and girls are cut to the same pattern and that some, whether we like it or not, are called on to play in our national life a unique role which may be decisive. They can play it only if we

*This paper was read at a Summer Session Conference on Education at the University of British Columbia, on August 7, 1953.

train them for it; we cannot train for it any but the gifted; and the gifts declare themselves earlier than we thought.

On this and related points we now have information that was lacking a few years ago and that takes the issue out of the realm of speculation. Just last week, at Aspen, Colorado, I had the good fortune to be asked to sit in upon the sessions of the Fund for the Advancement of Education, a subsidiary of the Ford Foundation. To me the most instructive of the meetings was the one at which members of the Portland, Oregon, school system gave an account of their various attempts to cater for what we agree to call the able pupil. I cannot give you quantitative details, even if it were proper for me to forestall the official report of this careful study. But I may perhaps be allowed to communicate some of the general results that were discussed in my presence.

The most encouraging, and surprising at the same time, was that the special treatment accorded to about one-tenth of the pupils in the chosen schools did not cause any display of snobbery or sulking or jealousy, whether among pupils, teachers, or parents. On the contrary, the effect on the unselected part of the school was that of a challenge, which in at least one instance doubled the number of pupils on the honour roll. The selected group was taken at various ages in the several schools, the youngest being in the fifth grade. Not only did these respond as well as others under the programme of intensified work, but this new goal in life seemed to cure what had been earlier diagnosed as maladjustment. I would ask you to dwell on this for a moment: if those who direct our schools come to think of brainwork as one kind of remedy for maladjustment, the future of intellect is safe. The word "adjustment" is magical, and we may yet rediscover that the play of the human mind and the enjoyment of its products not only lead to but constitute a form of adjustment.

A very desirable by-product of this new awareness of intellectual gifts is that the gap between secondary school and college teachers is beginning to shrink. I say between the teachers; there has never been any gap between the two institutions, since the colleges in their loftiness imposed at will entrance requirements that the secondary schools had to accept. But the teachers are now coming together. In the preparation of the report on general education which I mentioned earlier, five preparatory school men sat steadily for a year with more than five college and university men with no perceptible harm to either party. The college men learned, if they did not know it before, that a college freshman does not belong to a different species from the high school graduate: indeed they are often one and the same person.

This *rapprochement* is being usefully seconded by the Whitney Foundation's John Hay Fellowships, which annually send several score of high school teachers to the universities of their choice for another year of advanced graduate work. I have just had three such students in a Ph.D. seminar of mine, and I can report that they were anything but out of place among the pure scholars who had reached by a different road the dizzy heights where a graduate professor is found teaching. Why has there been this absurd prejudice and separation of functions between the college and the high school? In Europe the teacher in a *lycée* or *Gymnasium* is considered to be as good as the man on the next rung of the ladder: either of them shines or does not shine depending upon his individual merits. And some of the greatest poets, philosophers, and statesmen of modern times in England, Italy, France, Switzerland, and Germany have been for all or part of their lives teachers in secondary schools.

This difference between Europe and the United States takes us back to the question of the talented child and opens up the great abyss of argument about progressive education and the existing elementary schools of the land. You doubtless have heard about, if not read, the full-strength attack on schools made by my fellow historian, Professor Arthur Bestor of the University of Illinois. This attack in the form of a signed statement was launched last Christmas in the spirit of goodwill to men, no mercy to teachers, at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington. Later battles took place here and there throughout the states and I understand that a summary of casualties in book form is about to be published by Professor Bestor.

His argument has the merit of being clear and simple. The modern school, he says, hates brains. It does not teach the recognized subjects—English, history, and mathematics; it sets up all sorts of fancy "real life" curricula in which everything is discussed pell-mell from "dating" to shopping for groceries, calling for a policeman or selecting a dentist. There is no rigour, discipline, or continuity in the programme, little in the teacher's mind, and still less in the pupil's; while outside the school the profiteers of the system escape hard work by conducting studies and surveys about objectives and methods. These studies are couched in unintelligible jargon and have no effect whatever, save to thicken the confusion in the minds of parents, teachers, and children.

On the face of it, the indictment seems factually and morally just. Everyone who reads newspapers and magazines, everyone who has children of school age, has encountered abundant evidence of the

intellectual sins Professor Bestor is protesting against. In rebuttal one might say that every profession has its characteristic nonsense and folly, and that the practice *must* be better than it sounds or it could not go on at all. But this excuse will not do here. We may agree with the character in Shaw's *Major Barbara* who keeps saying to everybody on every subject: "I think there's a certain amount of tosh about it"; but in sampling official literature about education one is inclined to say with Professor Bestor that it is *all* tosh.

It is all tosh, that is, from the point of view of an *intellectual* education. None of it seems likely to do the talented boy or girl much intellectual good after the fourth or fifth grade. All of it must alienate the intelligent young man or woman who feels he would like to be a teacher in the public schools. This last point cannot be put too strongly, and I speak of it with the confidence of one who has again and again seen able, devoted young people who were ready to sacrifice their material interests to a modest teaching career and who shrank back revolted by the kind of "theory" and the kind of "programmes" they were asked to master and carry out. Depending on their fortitude they gave up after three weeks, six months, or ten years—and all with the same feeling in their souls, the same analogy in their mouths: they had had the biggest emetic dose they could stand.

Let me interpose here that I do not share Mr. Bestor's animus and would not sign his statement. And I have things to say about the condition he describes which greatly alter its complexion. But I want to make absolutely clear first that the intellectual revolt—if you want to call it that—against the prevailing school is not affected or hoity-toity or anti-democratic or in any way sinister or snobbish. It is instinctive, visceral, and uncontrollable. The fact that yearly the system diverts the best teaching material from the teaching career gives the opposition the right to be heard and examined. If most of our medical students gave up because they could not stomach the dissecting room, we would grow alarmed and see if we could not make it neater and more sanitary—which in fact was done about a hundred years ago. Hence it seems unwise for the two parties to the present quarrel in education to harden their lines and stop their ears—which they are inclined to do.

For example, it so happened that last December, just before the storm broke, I was asked to talk to an association of school and college teachers of the Northeast on the perennial subject "What Should We Teach?" I tried to show that although I understood the function of the new "core" curricula, there was merit also, for certain pupils especially, in the coherent and consecutive study of branches of learn-

ing. I said that these branches had a consistency and organic life of their own and could not be chopped up and mixed together without loss. My audience was magnanimous and applauded my remarks, but afterwards I was taken aside by a dozen or a score of the listeners who individually shook my hand and complimented me on my "courage." You would suppose I had spoken high treason in the midst of battle. And I must add that the transcript of my remarks, which was to be published in the journal of the association, turned out not to be suitable. All this is very intelligible—it reminds one of human beings—but it is very bad for modern education as a whole—theory and practice, both.

Now let me heap coals of fire on my polite censors' heads by trying to explain how they got into their present frame of mind and why they feel self-righteous in defending their position by arching their backs and playing deaf. If I read history aright, the modern school grows out of two related impulses which were united in the person and in the works of Rousseau. One is the conception of the child as a bundle of possibilities, mainly good; the other is the conception of the state as a democracy of equals. The first, which I may call humanitarian in the special sense of trusting humanity, counting on it to produce a variety of good fruits, led to the emotional reform of the schools. Carried forward by other pioneers up to the late Madame Montessori, this reform was for the first time generalized in the United States. It abolished beating and punishing, recitation by rote, and the so-called discipline that formerly tortured the child even more than beating—by tight clothing, the enforcement of sitting still, having perfect manners, and generally behaving as adults erroneously think that they themselves behave. As against this, we allow a great deal of play, postpone reading and writing until (as Rousseau urged) the experience of things has given concrete meaning to words, and thereafter we try to fulfil the child's needs while drawing him farther and farther into group effort where his wants have to reconcile themselves to those of others.

The patience, the care, the forethought that have gone into making this scheme work on a large scale is an American revolution in itself. It has fulfilled Ellen Key's prediction at the turn of the century that this would be the "Century of the Child," and the whole world admits that however harsh and mechanized life here may be for grown-ups, it is paradise for the young. They have all the rights of new citizens plus those of innocent aliens whom we are trying to acclimate to our difficult world without too great a shock. And for this we lavish equipment and experts. Except in certain backward areas, the school build-

ing is the pride of the township and the school psychologist is the oracle which turns the place into a shrine dedicated to democracy.

Whether in these explicit terms or not, our school teachers know all this; they are the products of an Adjustment philosophy and custodians of the national fund of Emotion. As a result, their own feelings by now instinctively respond to whatever comes in the guise of need, emotion, and adjustment. They see at first hand the personal social consequences of maladjustment, of the parent's ignorance of these principles, and of the difficulty of administering the ideal education of the feelings under lowered budgets and rising school population.

This being so, it is natural that they should view the intellectualist attack as reactionary, uninformed, and impracticable. They have barely time and energy to do all they should in schools as they are, and here are outsiders, who have never faced a single one of their problems, yet who tell them that all the talk about emotions is twaddle, and that the proper duty of the school is to teach subjects, namely: the writing of good English in conjunction with the study of the masterpieces of literature; the outlines of American and world history; and the rudiments of mathematics and science. The words "discipline," "rigour," "mastery" all have that antediluvian touch of Thwackum and Square in *Tom Jones*—and it would be easy to show that that old system, for all its paper excellence, did not work. Rather, it tended to make little liars and cheats, resentful of authority and their elders, and aggressively antisocial through life. In short, for the modern teacher, trained in Teachers' College or its branch houses, intellect comes to stand for whatever is rigid, utopian, and mean.

Final as this seems, it is only half the case on which the defence rests. For the other element in Rousseau's reform is democratic equality. In the United States we have had a democratic school for fifty years. Unlike the government schools abroad, ours were not for an *élite* but for all children. Except for the clientele of a few private schools, everyone went through the same mill; whereas in Europe until the last few years, two systems ran parallel, though both were public in the sense of open to the public. The *lycées* and their counterparts trained less than 10 per cent of the school population; and the other system, the common schools, afforded no preparation toward the higher degrees or the important positions in the land. Here the century of the child has been the century of the *common* child. Over there the centuries have automatically selected the special child mostly on the basis of money and position. It is thus not hard to see why among us the claims of intellect are associated with the claims of privilege. Special treatment, special rights, special groups of chosen people go

against our grain—unless we choose them by a vote, and this itself often hinges on their proving that they are no different from the rest of us.

To this the intellectual party might reply "All right; that is a price we are willing to pay for political democracy. But why don't you adjusters and ministers to needs try to give everyone an inkling of what the world of intellect is about—that is a need too, which some have in greater degree than others, and it is unjust and undemocratic to neglect it merely because it is not universal, like the need for lunch and for love?"

This argument seems to me unanswerable and we shall have to fall in with its dictates—if only, as I said earlier, because of the demands made on our national brainpower by our position and our duties in the world. We cannot afford to waste talent and keep ourselves at a common level of amiable dullness when every "people's democracy" manufactures as many *élites* as it does classes of fighter planes. And ours not being a single-goal dictatorship, it exacts a bigger effort, requiring a general *élite*—or let us rather say a large layer of the population accustomed to using the only all-purpose tool, which is intelligence.

But there is yet one more thing to say on behalf of the compact majority that mans our schools. What they say to the call for brains is: we're not through with the previous job. The nineteenth century plunged us without warning into an industrial culture, and people are still floundering. They may have learned how to turn on the washing machine and drive the car, but they do not know how to live in a world where every act of life requires a technique, and where more and more social duties are asked of them in the name of community welfare. They do *not* know how to shop and choose a dentist. Moreover, the dislocation of mechanization and war leaves them bewildered in their intimate lives. Their relations to others are unsure and full of grief. Therefore, we cannot escape teaching them "dating" and family relations. This is spiritual hygiene, social insurance, and it comes first. Shakespeare will take care of himself—as he has been taking care of himself for three hundred years; whereas Tom and Susie are living now, fretful, ignorant, clumsy, and afraid of life. They cannot concentrate on Shakespeare, but their eyes light up and their minds unfreeze when we begin a round-table discussion about the difficulties at home and in their hearts. If democratic equality implies the continual equalizing of opportunities, obviously, the knowledge of how to use these is part of the equality. There is no use having a free community clinic for eyeglasses if those who need it most don't know that it exists,

or are vaguely apprehensive about what goes on in it. In other words, the connection between our political, social, and economic life on the one hand, and our school programmes on the other is direct and functional, not far-fetched. One might even say the nature of the relation is compulsory, inevitable.

In travelling through three European countries a little over a year ago, I was able to persuade myself that this is so. One is beginning to see in English, French, and German education some of the symptoms hitherto thought of as characteristically American. What an older generation would call "confusion" is setting in. Work is looser. Psychological tests are breaking in; jargon is breaking out. After discussing our respective situations with much frankness, one graduate instructor at a famous German university said to me: "How many of your students' Ph.D. dissertations do you have to write? Since the war these fellows just hand me the materials and expect me to do the rest." I told him I did a great amount of editing, too, and that the war was probably the cause of the students' frantic haste. He said No, the elementary preparation was weak or non-existent in grammar and analysis of thought. France and England betray the same apparent regression, which is noticeable outside the school world, in journalism, in public notices, and government debates. Well, we asked for this: we in the West wanted to emancipate mankind, and we have nearly done it. Nobody should be surprised if it does not speak, write, and act like Lord Chesterfield. Let us rather stay calm and keep on working.

The upshot of these observations would seem to be that in these matters of democratic education the United States is about fifty years ahead of Europe. You must forgive me if I keep talking about the United States: it is the country whose schools I know best, though far from thoroughly. About Canada my information is culpably limited to what I hear from a few friends and to the publications of the Canadian Social Science Research Council, notably the 1945 report, *Scholarship in Canada*, by my friend and colleague J. Bartlett Brebner. In these conditions it would be more than culpable, it would be idiotic, for me to try to include the Canadian facts under any North American generalities, especially since I know some of the historic and linguistic peculiarities which affect your situation. I therefore count on you once again to interpret, rather than accept or reject, the suggestions I mean to make in the remainder of my talk. It is all too likely that I shall be proposing what you are already doing or have just discarded: if so, please consider the bearing and not the words, which you can toss back over the frontier for the use of my compatriots.

At the moment some of my compatriots are deploring what they

call a wave of anti-intellectualism among the population. They observe it and are ready to bow their heads before the storm. I disagree with them about the menace as well as about the measures to be followed. It is quite true that the man of ideas today stands up to be shot at. But this is because he is being listened to. And it is only what he should expect. Free trade in ideas—to use Justice Holmes's phrase—means competition in ideas. The life of ideas is the battle of ideas. Since the Great Depression, ideas have attained a new force in American life and those who are "all for ideas" should rejoice. You may remember Henry Adams's complaint that he had published articles all his life but had received no evidence that anyone had read them. Adams always exaggerated his grievances, but it was doubtless true that in the railroad era no one cared greatly what the non-railroad Adams thought. He should come back today, publish, and wait for the next morning's mail.

He would find, of course, that most of the strangers who wrote to him had misunderstood what he said or failed to meet his points. And he might accordingly join Professor Bestor's crusade for intellectualizing the schools. I believe that the time has come to do something in that direction but that we must proceed cautiously. For I am not "all for ideas." In the first place, I believe that we must not lose the gains of half a century of humanizing the schoolroom. Of what use would an intellectual curriculum be if those for whom it is meant hate it, and learn to hate intellect at the same time? By such a policy we would catch not the best minds, but the careerists.

In the second place, I believe that a knack for ideas is a gift like any other; it is not a universal power like breathing or digesting. And herein lies the great argument which we must use in liberalizing the modern school till it takes brains in its stride. The school, as we know, gladly accepts musical or athletic ability, leadership or a head for figures. To these tangible talents it has always given special treatment; around these interests, school activities are organized and supported out of public funds. Nobody has ever said this was undemocratic. No one expects the crippled or weedy child to make the team. The radio club does not let in the boy who cannot master the Morse Code, and everyone understands why the shy boy with thick glasses does not get to be president of the senior class. Indeed, I have heard of shop teachers discriminating against clumsy boys and not letting them use the expensive precision tools. One need not condone this practice to understand the feeling behind it. As regards familiar and especially physical powers the public understands that there can be no claims, no rights except those of ability. You do not get your turn at leading

the band if you are deaf to music. Let us then establish the category of brains on the same basis. If it offends the parents to discover that their child is not an intellect and cannot go forward at the accelerated pace or in the separate section, let us invent some jargon to conceal the fact that it is a matter of brains. Now or never is the chance for educational gobbledygook. Let us say that intellectual children are mavericks, and that so-and-so, having a high mavericity index, has been put under the new programme.

In that programme, the work in standard branches or subjects can be carried on under far better conditions than in a mixed class. This is not disputable—it is only a special application of the principle that the one-room school house is inefficient. Our mavericks will then study what Professor Bestor and his supporters want them to. They will go faster, and they will safely pass through what I think is the artificial time of trouble created by our present system, namely the last two years of high school. It is then that the average well-endowed child begins to get bored, to hate learning, and to pick up bad habits, moral and intellectual. Coming to these grades earlier, the pupil will not have the sense of marking time; by the age of sixteen he will be propelled into college, and there his energies will be sufficiently taxed to keep him out of mischief. The advantage of such a time-schedule as regards the draft and the beginning of professional training is obvious. Nor will it work any disadvantage upon the slower maturing, who often catch up or outstrip the precocious.

Both groups, however, as well as those who will not go to college at all, must continue to form part of the same student body and share the remainder of the curriculum, that is to say, the courses designed to help personal and social adaptation. No amount of intellect, no amount of algebra or American history, will supply the want of information or right feeling about these essential functions of the man and citizen. As to this, nothing is clearer than the experience of the French *lycée*: the forcing of the mind from the tender age of seven produces callow and unbalanced young philosophers of seventeen who are often prigs besides. In Germany likewise, according to the best opinion, the separation of the *Gymnasium* from the rest of life, contributed to the inner strain and political immaturity of the whole nation. There must be no such separation in our schools. Our citizenry is one and various, not two and distinct. There must be no handicaps given or taken in the public preparation for life and its opportunities. Indeed, it is on that ground and that ground alone that the plea for the recognition of brains must be granted: it is a minority interest, and we merely say that it is time it were put on a par with football,

playing the trombone, being Queen of the Junior Prom, or obtaining a radio operator's licence in the "ham" class. If it is argued that special teaching for the able is expensive, let us remember how much we spend on backward children. The only difficulty in our path, really, is to come to see the bright child as no less interesting than the retarded.

By working in close co-operation with the colleges the high school teachers can bring about the change gradually. It is a question of seizing administrative chances, explaining to the public as one goes along, and arguing the theory from a common democratic ground, not from a non-existent superior platform. In these matters, the state of the colleges is on the whole satisfactory. The victory of general education is hardly contested and it signifies the very same thing that I have just outlined: general education is, if you like, the core or adjustment curriculum expressed through the subject-matters of history, literature, philosophy, and the sciences. The problems dealt with are no longer how to choose a dentist but how to choose a congressman or a good book. The able young men are then ready for a beginning of specialization and genuine learning in their last two college years.

Here, too, there is little to desire changed, except perhaps a greater pressure to be put on the best minds by the best teachers, for their mutual satisfaction. But what comes next—the year of the Master of Arts degree, which owing to our state bonuses teachers hanker for; and what of that second degree of tested endurance, the Ph.D., which is getting to be required even for teaching in junior and teachers' colleges? I believe that in Canada this problem does not beset you because your system was differently organized from the start and your teaching personnel being smaller, you can rely on individual recommendations and records. But perhaps you will allow me to say a few words on this, my concluding item, both because I believe it the logical ending of my remarks, and because we in the United States face an immediate and alarming prospect. In less than ten years, if the statisticians are right, the American college population will nearly double. The teachers in the lower and high schools are already swamped with this mounting wave of youth, and any hope of dealing with it intelligently and decently depends on the supply of teachers that we can muster between now and 1965. Any additional hope of reinstating a suitable kind of intellectual training in the schools necessarily augments the predicament. It is a vicious circle: we need the trained to do the training—and unless we can break the ring somewhere we might as well resign ourselves to an educational recession throughout.

I am convinced that the break must come in graduate instruction.

I have not the time and this is not the place to show cause by fact and argument. Let me only say dogmatically, as one who works inside the machine, that American graduate instruction today is largely outmoded and irrelevant. At its best it is very fine, but the fineness unfits it for what it mainly has to do—produce scholarly teachers. What it does produce is degree-holders who are not even pseudo-scholars but imitation mandarins, by which I mean people who have crammed enough to get the post, and then are confronted with a host of problems that no one prepared them for. They improvise their way out of the difficulties and as they do so they send up another generation of eager minds to be half-heartedly processed in the same way. Meantime, the laws of the land prevent the graduate student who is a born teacher from exercising his talents in the lower schools; he cannot get certification and he is in part unfit. So he adds to the competition for college jobs; and there—as we all know—nobody but supermen and paragons are wanted. We have dearth below, oversupply above, and nowhere a rationally contrived scheme of functions, training, and degrees that might deserve the name of teaching profession.

It is no accident that in elementary and high schools too few teachers know how to make interesting and valuable the academic subjects that they do teach. It is no accident that the young dislike these subjects. It is no accident that when these worthy but ill-equipped teachers come to the graduate school for a salary-raising M.A., they are lost and, too often, cynically used for the fees they bring in. But they are lost in such large numbers that the standards—those invisible entities that keep collapsing and have to be raised, like fainting damsels—standards, I say, go down. The M.A., even the Ph.D. is granted, though it represents only drudge work. The graduate professor groans and solaces himself with a few choice students who will carry on his kind of work. The long and the short of it is, a great fraud has been perpetrated without anybody's really intending it. In other words, the modern graduate school is the exact inverse of the modern lower school. It is all brains of a specialized kind—or hopes it is; and it neglects all else. It lacks the conception of the teaching scholar, barely admitting the use of the scholarly teacher. "Let the teachers' college do it," say the academic *élite*, and then turn about and denounce the doing—the purpose of which, as I have shown, they fail to grasp.

The remedy in its large outline indicates itself; the graduate school, whose student body is 90 per cent teachers or intending teachers, must respond to the real demand and not to an imaginary one. It must adapt its knowledge and wisdom to the needs of teachers after finding out what those needs are. This will not diminish scholarship and intel-

lect; it will progressively augment them, from below, while eliminating make-believe and the taking of money under false pretenses. Nor will this change of heart be competition set up against the teachers' colleges, since these have their hands full and the graduate school is already patronized *en masse* by teachers of every kind. With our elementary and high schools deliberately making a place for specialized academic brains and the academy taking cognizance of the art which communicates the fruits of research, we will perhaps have, at last, a *system* of democratic education.

LETTERS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1911–1914: THE FRENCH WRITER IN A WORLD CRISIS*

JOHN C. CAIRNS

FEW things change faster and more regularly than fashions in history. Among historians the study of international events leading up to 1914 has long since passed out of vogue. A second war and the shadow of a third have shifted attention to what seem to be the more urgent problems of democracy and dictatorship, capitalism and communism, America and the Soviet Union. The glittering lost world of European emperors, cultivated ambassadors, and diplomatic intrigue has receded almost from memory. The superheated scholarly debates of the twenties and thirties on the never-never issue of war guilt find now only the tiniest echo in the corridors of the great universities and historical association meetings. Of the guilt for the second war discussion may seem unnecessary or superfluous; for the possible third, still somewhat premature; for the first, virtually academically absurd. Yet in the study of the coming of that great and dreadful First World War and of the national societies which brought it about lie interesting and important truths about the nature of Western civilization. And not least of them are those concerning national groups and their relationships to the process of making international policies.

This paper attempts to show by reference to a single nation what was the relationship of the man of letters to the overriding issue of war and peace in the years when nineteenth-century Europe approached its end in the beginning of those world-wide struggles which were to mark the terrible course of the twentieth. It is concerned with a small group of significant literary figures on the French scene, such as Romain Rolland, Anatole France, Charles Péguy, and Maurice Barrès. The years under discussion, 1911–14, were a last period of hope and crisis before the storm broke. Then republican France, which had ben created out of defeat at the hands of Bismarck's Prussia in 1870–1, aroused herself to the growing threat from Wilhelm II's clanking, expansionist, ill-directed empire, and lesser nations chose sides with the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente, or looked the other way and held their breath. Amidst the noisy preparations for war in every quarter of the continent, the voices of the intellectuals could be heard. In France their debate was as acute as anywhere else, and if among the literary "maîtres de l'heure" only a minority spoke up, what they thought and had to say was neither unrevealing nor

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unimportant. "The essential function of the intellectual *élite*," wrote the French theoretician Paul de Rousiers on the eve of the war, "is to see things as they are."[1] How far these great men of letters, as a part of that *élite*, measured up to the injunction will be seen.

I

In modern France the paths between journalism and politics have been well travelled and worn. Bureaucracy and literature have many times drawn on the same sources. More especially is this true of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and literature. This union, however, never meant that questions of external policy found their way easily into poetry, the novel, or the theatre. Naturally the man of letters, even if closely connected with practical affairs and dependent upon them for his livelihood, scarcely made of them the end of his art. He had indeed, as Léon Daudet once remarked, "a much more developed sense of his place in society and of its independence than, for example, the doctor."[2] Certainly in the critical years from 1911 to 1914 the literary intellectuals demonstrated this sense of their position and independence. But it was also true that increasingly with the descent to war they demonstrated a real interest in the fateful trend of international politics—however varied and detached this might be. "Leaving aside pure aesthetics," wrote Régis Michaud, "and art for art's sake, French literature in that period [1870–1914] was largely the product of historical events."[3]

Beneath the surface of what in retrospect and nostalgia appeared to be the last Golden Age, Europe was shifting angrily. Paul Hazard said that the French nation had begun to choose what it must do and what ideas it must accept as early as 1900. He said that people came then to see that certain ideas might be fine and generous, but that they were also out of harmony with the times. Ceaselessly on the eastern frontiers, in Africa, and in the Near East the threat from the German Empire appeared to be growing. Hence there was registered in the world of letters a very definite change of spirit. And yet, continued Hazard, there were no hard and fast categories, no real schools: the individual was supreme. Hostile or indifferent to politics on the national level, the young and the no longer young writers came to be concerned with French problems and with finding a cure for what was widely regarded as a new "decadence." Following the lead given by Bédier, Lanson, and Bergson, they tended to participate in the general

[1]Paul de Rousiers, *L'Elite dans la société moderne, son rôle* (Paris, 1914), 208.
[2]Léon Daudet, *Etudes et milieux littéraires* (Paris, 1927), 172.
[3]Régis Michaud, *Modern Thought and Literature in France* (New York, 1934), 4–5.

"mêlée des idées." With the new century a reaction had set in against the rarefied intellectualism of the post-1870 years when patriotism had fallen to its nadir in the disillusionment of overwhelming military defeat and institutional revolution. Now the time had passed when a writer like Rémy de Gourmont could remark that he would not give the little finger of either hand for Alsace-Lorraine because he needed one to write and the other to flick the ash off his cigarette.[4]

And yet it was nevertheless true that those who troubled themselves very seriously with the affairs of the world were few; those who did so in any important way, a mere handful. Moreover, the men who were mentally or even actively involved in the problems of the time never saw eye to eye on politics, whether internal or external. Daniel Halévy, for instance, showed his essential contempt for politics by voting only once in his life before 1919, while Maurice Barrès sat—however silently—in the Chamber of Deputies. And although all of them linked it intimately with the international politics of the great Powers, they were profoundly divided in their views of the contemporary European crisis. Thus the years following the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed a struggle between those who approached the problems of the western state system from a primarily nationalist point of view and those who sought to encourage thought and action on a wider plane. Inevitably, perhaps, the dynamics of the crisis into which Europe had worked itself favoured the arguments and activity of the former.

The writers discussed here could scarcely be forced into an arbitrary classification, but it is possible to see a deep cleavage between the ideas of Anatole France and Romain Rolland on the one hand, and those of Maurice Barrès or Charles Péguy on the other. The first two, however different they might be, preached a doctrine of international *détente*. The latter two advocated what must be called a militant "forward" policy for their country, which did not, for many and complex reasons, place the simple maintenance of peace before all other things. Even this generalized attempt at a classification, of course, tends to obscure similarities and dissimilarities. In his own way Péguy was at least as convinced a socialist as Rolland ever was. Between the narrow irredentism of Barrès and Péguy's noble search for an ultimate justice there was a vast, unbridgeable gulf. Perhaps, too, it is doing some violence to all of these men to strip away their words on the international order, on war and peace, from the totality of their thought

[4]Paul Hazard, "L'Ame française à la veille de la guerre d'après une récente publication," *Revue internationale de l'enseignement*, LXXIV (1920), 265–8; Jean-Marie Carré, "Littérature et actualité," *French Review*, XIX (1946), 208. On the revolution in French intellectual life *circa* 1910, see Ernst R. Curtius, *Die literarischen Wegbereiter des neuen Frankreichs* (Potsdam, 1920), 17–41.

and writing. But on these matters their views are on record; they are positive, and it is these and not the whole man that are in question. More than that, if the twentieth century has learnt anything at all, it is that there is a case to be made for holding the artist, the intellectual, responsible for his attitudes toward and effect upon the society which he serves and which also serves him.

II

Looking back many years after the turmoil had passed away, Rolland could say that he had never mixed in politics at all before 1914. "Until that time," he wrote two decades after the outbreak at Sarajevo, "I was permeated with the ideology of my time and class, . . . the ideology of abstract man, detached (then they said liberated) from the contingencies of political and social life. It would not have seemed worthy for a writer to have concerned himself with it." Such a statement cannot, however, be taken quite at face value. In fact, Rolland had devoted years to what was perhaps the central problem of French foreign policy, the German question. True enough, he did not touch upon it directly and politically. He filled no official office; he served no government. But even the romantic and foggy pages of his vast *Jean Christophe* must have earned the strictures of the critic Julien Benda, attacking as early as 1912 (long before he achieved fame with *La Trahison des clercs*) "the eternal pretension of mystics to be *at the same time* doctors, . . . of those who worship to be at the same time those who understand, . . . of those who act to be at the same time those who explain."[5] If, then, any writer could make the claim which Rolland made for himself, it was not he but Benda.

Indeed, such ill-defined humanist values as Rolland subscribed to awoke no response in this critic of the intellectuals. This man was little troubled by the day to day business of the external world. He revolted against what he called "the fury of the irrational and the instinctive" in those famous "professors of action," Barrès, Péguy, or Georges Sorel. In his view, mankind was divided into two equally necessary but entirely distinctive categories, perhaps what the Germans call *Tatmenschen* and *Denkmenschen*, and he believed that their confusion would be disastrous to each of them. The man of letters was ill advised to try to cross the line. Yet Benda admitted that on at least one occasion he himself had betrayed his values. He had not always been "a perfect intellectual" before 1914.[6] Certainly, however, he had never shown an active interest in political affairs that was in any way comparable to

[5]Romain Rolland, *Quinze ans de combat (1919–1934)* (Paris, 1935), v; Julien Benda, *Le Bergsonisme, ou une philosophie de la mobilité* (Paris, 1913), 101.

[6]Julien Benda, *Un régulier dans le siècle* (Paris, 1937), 51, 147; Benda, *Précisions (1930–1937)* (Paris, 1937), 29.

that of a writer like Anatole France. For France took a passionate interest in these things. Internationalist, socialist, and patriot, the critic of diplomats and foreign ministers and that capitalist economic structure which he condemned for giving them their being, he thought and said a good deal about the world around him. He prided himself upon his knowledge and analysis of the practical world; his judgments were direct and unsparing.[7] But in the long run, for all his thought and study, Anatole France totally misjudged the state of Europe. Like most of those about him, he knew in reality very little of the forces at work. The war, when it came, was to prove him to have been vastly wrong.

But it was never the peculiar mark of the literary intellectual to be cautious in discussing the complexities of foreign affairs. For the ways of international diplomacy, Péguy, for example, had no great respect at all. In his mind it seemed clear enough that war was the great and final settler of disputes. He said one had only to look toward the trouble-racked Balkans, caught up in revolution against Turkish rule and civil war before 1914, to see this point illustrated. His friends and critics afterward hastened to explain that judgments upon Péguy here ought not to be hasty. He and his disciple, Ernest Psichari, they said, were never concerned with the political power, international station, and military strength of France, but only with her destiny and spiritual reality, what Jacques Maritain termed "the *miracle très replié* that lives in her." This was true. But the truth of the statement could not disguise the plain fact that for Péguy and Psichari the way to their spiritual journey's end lay across the rough uncompromising wastes of politics, diplomacy, and war—at least in part. Searching for some vague and mystic personal fulfilment in the African desert, after the surrender by France in 1911 of a part of her equatorial territory to Germany in return for a free political hand in Morocco, the young officer Psichari wrote to Péguy that "we should not have to be given too much free rein in order to go to Tchad and take back my beloved Sangha from the Prussians."[8] The statement was typical enough. Psichari served in the army, and whether he liked it or not the army dealt very much in earthly power and shed human blood for earthly ends. All that, and Psichari's recognition of it, could never be argued and explained away.

Or there was Barrès, incomparably less complicated in his ambitions,

[7]Maurice Gaffiot, *Les théories d'Anatole France sur l'organisation sociale de son temps* (Paris, 1928), 223, 236, 238–9, 243 ff.; Paul Gsell, *Les matinées de la Villa Saïd, propos d'Anatole France* . . . (Paris, 1921), 244.

[8]Charles Péguy, *L'argent (suite)*, vol. XIV of *Œuvres complètes de Charles Péguy* (Paris, 1916–44, 146; Jacques Maritain, preface to A. M. Goichon, *Ernest Psichari, d'après des documents inédits* (Paris, 1925), 21–2; Psichari to Péguy, January, 1912, quoted by Henri Massis, *Notre ami Psichari* (Paris, 1936), 86.

far more directly critical of the failure of French literature to concern itself with the dominant political problems of the time. To him the Moroccan negotiations of 1911, by which Germany and France had settled their African conflict peacefully after leading Europe to the brink of war, spelled out two vital requisites for the country: "Revision of the constitution and preparation for war."[9] With Barrès there were no very subtle mystical overtones. What he demanded was nakedly evident. That was his particular distinction. But, in fact, he was little different from the others. None of the writers here considered was able to approach the difficulties of policy and diplomacy as problems of practical statesmanship. Impatient or contemptuous of the daily diplomatic round, their minds worked tangentially, and, as it were, upon another plane.

No one swept aside the complications of the western state system more readily, completely, and unthinkingly than Rolland. No one was to reveal himself with the coming of the war more nearly totally confused by the whole subject. Unerringly, as he liked to think, he had sped to the heart of the matter by erecting what he called his "span over the Rhine connecting Germany and France and showing them to be complementary." He had tried to demonstrate to his generation that in reality there was no international problem at all unless it was that universal problem of human beings learning how to know and love one another. "My poor dear fellow," Olivier cried to Jean Christophe, "what do you know of France? . . . You haven't seen a single Frenchman. A group of debauchees, a few beasts of pleasure, who are not even French, men-about-town, politicians, useless creatures, all the fun and flimmery which passes over and above the life of the nation without even touching it. . . . You do not know the people, you do not know the *élite*. . . . I do not blame you: how could you? Why, France is hardly at all known to the French. The best of us are bound down and held captive to our native soil." And yet it was all too obvious, as Rolland's critic Daniel Halévy put it, that such extraordinary people as Olivier and Jean Christophe were nothing but pale, idealized replicas of their fellow nationals, incapable of building a new and peaceful Europe.[10] Dreams and sentimental idealism were the foundation beneath Rolland's passionately unreal analysis of international politics. " 'Ah!' Olivier would sigh. 'How difficult it is to understand each

[9]Maurice Barrès, speech in the Chamber of Deputies, December 6, 1911, in Barrès, *Mes cahiers* (Paris, 1929–50), IX, 212, 218; Pierre Moreau, *Maurice Barrès* (Paris, 1946), 163–4.

[10]Romain Rolland, *Péguy* (Buenos Aires, 1946), I, 121; Rolland, *Jean Christophe*, translated by Gilbert Cannan (New York, 1910–15), II, 391; Daniel Halévy, *Péguy and the Cahiers de la Quinzaine* (New York, 1947), 95.

other!' 'But is it necessary always to understand each other?' Christophe would ask. 'I give it up. We need only to love each other.'" Inevitably Rolland hated all that was represented by people like Barrès and the literary clique surounding *Action Française*, Charles Maurras, Léon Daudet, and their friends. War, Rolland wrote in his journal in August, 1914, was in fact the bankruptcy of all civilizations, and the word *patrie* simply "a blood-stained idol." War, he noted again in the famous open letter to Gerhart Hauptmann that same disastrous month, "springs from the weakness and stupidity of nations. One cannot feel resentment against them for it; one can only pity them." What particularly shocked him, he said, as the summer lights went out all over Europe, was the degree of unanimity for war which he observed, or thought he observed, in every nation. "An epidemic of homicidal fury which started in Tokyo ten years ago," he wrote, "has spread like a wave and overflowed the whole world. A sort of demoniacal irony broods over this conflict of the nations, from which, whatever its result, only a mutilated Europe can emerge."[11]

Thus the rebuffed, disillusioned intellectual came to take his exalted stand "above the battle." But a critic who so fiercely attacked the bankruptcy and weakness of men and nations marching off to slaughter each other might first have taken the trouble to make certain that his own record had been unwaveringly pacific before challenging the massed intelligence of a continent. This, in fact, Rolland could never have done. His record here was not unbroken. As Georg Brandes pointed out at the time, "Even Romain Rolland approved of war and awaited it with confidence." Possibly this was an overstatement, but there was an element of truth in the severe indictment. It was to be buried and lost sight of by the later writings and actions. Only in the correspondence with his friend Louis Gillet, published some thirty-five years later, did it come to light. "Yes," Rolland had written on July 30, 1914, "the spirit of insolence and depredation of the two German monarchies calls for punishment. Will it come? I hope so, not only for France, but for Germany herself whose best idealistic forces are crushed."[12] If this, to put the best possible construction upon it, was

[11]Jérôme et Jean Tharaud, preface to Romain Rolland, *De Jean Christophe à Colas Breugnon: pages de journal . . .* (Paris, 1946), 19; Romain Rolland to Louis Gillet, July 19, 1912, *Correspondence entre Louis Gillet et Romain Rolland: Choix de lettres établi par Mme Louis Gillet et Mme Romain Rolland* (Paris, 1949), 253; journal entry of August 3–4, 1914, quoted by P. J. Jouve, *Romain Rolland vivant, 1914–1919* (Paris, 1920), 46, 49; Rolland to Gerhart Hauptmann, August 29, 1914, in Rolland, *Above the Battle*, translated by C. K. Ogden (Chicago, 1916), 20; article in the *Journal de Genève*, September 15, 1914, *ibid.*, 43.

[12]Georg Brandes, "The Fundamental Causes of the World War," in *The World at War* (New York, 1917), 37; Rolland to Gillet, July 30, 1914, *Correspondence*, 286.

no more than a momentary slip, it was at the very least questionable to what extent Rolland had ever attempted to think through the problems of nationalism, war, and peace. Between the two worlds of fictional dreams and international politics the artist might not so happily and simply voyage. At all events, the gentler spirits of Jean Christophe and Olivier seemed momentarily to have expired in the heat of the July crisis, only to be born again from the olympian heights of neutral Switzerland, "au dessus de la mêlée."

More of a patriot and less of an easy optimist, Anatole France knew that the quarrels of Europe were not so simply transcended. This much, however little he comprehended the real course of events, was plain. Believing that war and religion were the two paramount calamities responsible for most of mankind's unhappiness, he refused to admit that any whole people deliberately wished to fight another. Not men but capitalism was to blame for war. That nations had the right and duty to defend themselves he never doubted. But all his former illusions concerning the universal benefits derived from war had been sloughed off. Gone, too, in these years just preceding the first war were older dreams that mankind might improve its fate by improving itself. Peace, in his view, was to be had only through a new order of things, a new science, new economic necessities. The new society would impose peace as the old had inflicted war. But he knew that all this would not come about tomorrow. Contemporary France he attacked as being run by immoral capitalists, peopled by a race of thoughtless children. He said once to Paul Gsell that he did not believe the *bourgeoisie* would ever succeed in winning over the "good people" of France to their chauvinist position; but for the most part his outlook was utterly gloomy. For mankind as a whole he expressed "a little admiration and much pity," but he could not feel sure that other beings might not rise out of "the ashes and ruins of what once was man and his genius."[13] Thus the socialist outlook appeared to offer no short-term comfort and not even a long-term certainty of better things to come. True believers, however, like Lucien Herr, the scholarly adviser and friend of Jean Jaurès, clung to their dogmas and simply denied that war would be permitted to break out.[14] Lacking this inner faith of the librarian of the Ecole Normale, Anatole France, who knew relatively little and probably cared not very much more

[13]Gsell, *Matinées*, 249–50, 258, 259–61; Gaffiot, *Les théories d'Anatole France*, 223, 229 ff., 252 ff.; Anatole France, speech at the Trocadéro, reported in *Humanité*, June 29, 1911; Anatole France, *The Revolt of the Angels*, in *The Works of Anatole France*, translated by Frederic Chapman (London, 1908–28), 215–16.

[14]Article in *Parti Ouvrier*, May 27, 1890, reprinted in Lucien Herr, *Choix d'écrits* (Paris, 1932), I, 20.

about the difficulties and intricacies of politics among the nations, saw only catastrophe approaching in a European battle. If Rolland was horrified by 1914, Anatole France was only confirmed in his misgivings.

Other writers in France were far better adjusted to the realities of the international breakdown. The philosophies of Paul Bourget, Psichari, Péguy, or Barrès differed completely from those of the idealists who became so bitterly disillusioned by humanity. To Bourget it was clear that the restoration of his country to her former place in the world could bring back the brilliant era which had ended with the collapse of the Second Empire, and that if Frenchmen had the will, this restoration was possible. More plainly, Barrès demanded a return to the old martial spirit and an intensified preparation for war: the military ideal was the sole measure of a people. On the other hand, in Psichari's mind this military ideal invoked by Barrès appeared to have been sublimated to the point where it existed for itself alone. The military *mystique* became necessary to a nation even it if was opposed to the principles on which that nation had been founded. "The day when we lose our fine foolishiness," he wrote in 1913, "we shall not be worth very much, and this whole people will suffer from our particular downfall."[15] But for all the mysticism involved here, this was the voice of the soldier, not the philosopher-citizen. It was evident that the ideal could not live quietly and alone. Without a constant rededication in battle even a military ideal must die.

Literary men of this stamp were prone to strip war of its less pleasant, more obvious aspects. They were pleased to reveal it as a crusade in the cause of a vanquished people or a purified ideal; or, as in the case of Péguy, of both. Péguy knew that war was not made by capitalists and governments alone. He knew and said that it came out of the people. Both Benda and Rolland, his critics and admirers, remarked that the disembodied spirit of war, the ideal of discarnate militarism, was foremost in Péguy's thought. But Rolland also noted that Péguy invariably "succeeded in making heaven march with *his* land, *his* country, *his* passions."[16] In him the military ideal was so wedded to the conception of a Franco-German war that the ideal could not meaningfully be considered apart from the international reality. More-

[15]Paul Bourget, speech at Vesanet, June 1911, in Bourget, *Pages de critique et de doctrine* (Paris, 1912), II, 151; Maurice Barrès, address to Leaguers, Invalides, November 15, 1911, *Mes cahiers*, IX, 208; article in *Gaulois*, June 1, 1912, *ibid.*, 309; see also a letter to students of the Lycée Janson de Sailly, March 10, 1913, *ibid.*, X, 66; Ernest Psichari, *L'appel des armes* (Paris, 1913), 198–200, 202–3.

[16]Julien Benda, *La Grande Epreuve des démocraties: Essai sur les principes démocratiques, leur nature, leur histoire, leur valeur philosophique* (Paris, 1945), 106: Rolland, *Péguy*, II, 170.

over, if this had not been the case, there would have been no point to Benda's charge that although they served France well, the group around Péguy and his bookshop on the Rue de la Sorbonne would be severely judged and found wanting by intellectual history.

The differences marking off these groups of writers from each other, then, were real and important. And where for Rolland or Anatole France the idea of peace was the primary consideration, for Barrès or Bourget it was the idea of France reborn to greatness in a struggle with evil. Only Benda carried to its extreme the cult of a disembodied idea. "What matters to me," he would write many years after the war, "is not a few human lives. It is the triumph of a principle."[17]

III

Apart from this high priest of disinterested intellectualism, remote until the last hours of the peace from European problems, all these writers came to centre their attention on the capital matter of relations with the German Empire. Their appreciation of the complications of the rival alliance systems, however, was the slightest. For Rolland all the tragedy of this prolonged antagonism was implicit in the ignorance of the two peoples of one another. He thought the Alsace-Lorraine issue could be argued equally well on either side. For the Germans he could feel no hatred; other peoples had done as bad or worse, and France herself would not have been more generous in victory. Yet it seemed to him that this tragic conflict would drag on forever and the flower of European civilization be swallowed up in it. To his mind it seemed clear that this one territorial, and indeed all problems would be dispelled, were the peoples given a voice. How to give them that voice was the eternal, unresolved puzzle. All that was certain was that until it had been solved, the peoples would be only "the unthinking echo which casts back the snarling cries of the Press and the defiance of their leaders, and swells them into the *Marseillaise* or the *Wacht am Rhein*."[18]

Like the pacifists and internationalists, the militants reduced all international politics to the German problem. None was more forthright than Barrès. Some of his commentators have ingeniously tried to show that actually he had always wished to avoid poisoning Franco-German relations, and had hoped for a secret accord. But if ever there was a time when he distinguished between Germany and Prussia, that time lay still in the future. France, he said in the troubled summer of 1911, was committed to "the eternal struggle of Germandom and the

[17]Benda, *Un régulier*, 50, 147.
[18]Rolland, *Jean Christophe*, II, 320–4, 326, 435–6, 447, 448, 449.

Latin world. It is a conflict of feeling and thought: laws, religions, histories and philosophies oppose one another. It is also a battle between man and man." The lost provinces were always the issue. "You know," he told an audience in Metz that same summer, "that in France we are profoundly divided on all subjects. . . . But if it is a question of you, there is only one feeling, a single voice, one people." That Alsace-Lorraine must return he never doubted. The peace was merely "a forty years armistice." What he feared most for France was a reorientation of her policy toward *rapprochement* with Germany. His public life was dedicated to the proposition that France would never forget and must one day claim her own. He could understand no other point of view, no other programme. Seeing Jaurès lying dead by an assassin's bullet on the eve of war, he reflected only that "he had a voice strong enough to have given the lead to an era, but he thought and acted under foreign influence. He believed he was defending the French working class, but he had shut himself up in German thought." For Barrès there was no other meaning in this now extinguished life. The man's patriotism he had not doubted, and because of it, he told Maurice Paléologue in July, 1913, he did not attack Jaurès. "In my opinion," he added, "Jaurès is a bishop who took the wrong road, and that is what compels him to keep very bad company." Patriotism was not enough. It would never restore France. In a certain sense, then, it was true, as Albert Thibaudet put it, that the war of 1914 was Barrès' war.[19] For him the recovery of the greatness which fell so far in 1870–1 had always been the alpha and omega of a realistic foreign policy. And such a policy could only end in war.

The war of 1914 was not on that account any the less Péguy's war. The first Moroccan crisis of 1905 had awakened him to the German threat. He was in no sense depressed by it. From then until the coming of the war he campaigned against the external danger and the internal weakness with the cry, "We are . . . a sacrificed generation. We have been constantly betrayed by our masters and our leaders. At no price will we suffer our children to be betrayed in their turn by the same

[19]François Duhourcau, *La voix intérieure de Maurice Barrès d'après ses cahiers* (Paris, 1929), 193, 194; see also Sylvia M. King, *Maurice Barrès: La pensée allemande et le problème du Rhin* (Paris, 1933), 267. Cf. Henri-L. Miéville, *La pensée de Maurice Barrès* (Paris, 1934), 148; Barrès, speech at Nancy, June 24, 1911, *Mes cahiers*, IX, 125–6, and speech at Metz, August 15, 1911, quoted by Victor Giraud, "M. Maurice Barrès. II, En attendant les barbares," *Revue des deux mondes*, January 15, 1922, 343–4; also his articles in the *Echo de Paris*, September 1 and 15, 1911, quoted by Giraud, *ibid.*, 344–5; Barrès speech in the Chamber of Deputies, December 6, 1911, *Mes cahiers*, IX, 214. The reflections on Jaurès are in *Mes cahiers*, XI, 188–9; Maurice Paléologue, *Journal 1913–1914: Au Quai d'Orsay à la veille de la tourmente (1er janvier 1913–28 juin 1914)* (Paris, 1947), 169; Albert Thibaudet, *La Vie de Maurice Barrès* (Paris, 1921), 285.

masters and leaders." His own warfare with the anti-militarist elements in France was unrelenting and violent. His famous strictures on the Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale were largely irrational and personally motivated. These schools and the scholars in them, such as Lucien Herr and Ernest Lavisse, he took as the symbol of all he loathed in the Third Republic: its sickly pacifism, its attachment to German scholarship, and not least its slighting of himself. Over against them he set up the ideal of military France, young, vigorous, dedicated to the pursuit of order and justice. "Whether the Sorbonne wills it or no," he wrote, "it is the French soldier who measures its ground. It is the French soldier and the 75 cannon and temporal force that have staked out, that have measured, that measure constantly the amount of land where French is spoken. . . ."

Contemporary pacifism and socialism Péguy declared to be in the service of German imperialism. Free speech in time of peace he would never deny, but "In time of war there is only one policy, and that is the policy of the National Convention. . . . It is Jaurès in a tumbril and a roll of drums to cover that great voice." Time and again he called the socialist leader a Pan-Germanist. For Péguy, Germandom was symbolical of evil everywhere in the world, and the lost provinces were the symbols of a great betrayal and of an imminent justice. "The root of my thought on the question of Alsace-Lorraine," he said, "is that I am not angry with the Prussians for having taken them. I am angry with those miserable Frenchmen who betrayed them." Moreover, he objected to the lyrical terms in which the provinces were spoken of. The question was not to speak of them but to free them. And this could never be done peacefully.[20] In the state of pre-1914 Europe, as Péguy saw it, the search for justice on the international level could be carried through successfully only by a just war.

It was evident, then, that with their eyes fixed firmly upon the humiliation of 1870–1 or some utopian city of brotherly love, the literary intellectuals had little hard thought for the international role of the French state. Rolland prided himself on escaping the mental paralysis induced by the national cult. His thought on the outbreak of the First World War, he said, was for the cause of civilization, not for France alone. And this being the case, he could scarcely have troubled himself greatly about so insular a matter as French policy. Daniel Halévy remarked that Rolland produced nothing but dreams, reflecting "the after-glow of the much-loved, still near nineteenth century. He awoke memories and echoes of Michelet, Ruskin, Tolstoy, striking chords of sincerely moving quality. He stirred the ashes of a

[20]Péguy, *L'argent (suite)*, 69, 70, 73, 78, 93, 119, 120, 129, 153, 209.

tired hearth and made one last flame to flicker." But if Rolland awoke memories and echoes of that century, it was with the ideals of another that he liked to identify himself. "I was a good European," he wrote toward the close of his life, "a republican with advanced Socialist sympathies, an internationalist at heart, and, as they said in the eighteenth century, a 'citizen of the world.' "[21]

It was the failing of men such as Rolland, or even Anatole France (who may indeed have had a "profound grasp of economic conditions and the events of universal history,"[22] but who certainly misjudged the world around him) that they were incapable of relating, or unwilling to relate, their hopes and visions to the unavoidable exigencies of the European scene. On the other hand, their criticisms of those writers who saw the world very differently were in large part justified. That Péguy and Barrès confused France with civilization and grew narrower and more militant in their purposes as they advanced toward 1914 could not be doubted. Thus the final failure of those few literary intellectuals who identified their themes most closely with the Franco-German quarrel was to deal with it primarily as a problem to be solved either by a complete, unhistorical, unreal break with an inescapable past, or as a spiritual abstraction, a worldly manifestation of a cosmic struggle, involving an ineluctable fatality. The French nation as a political entity among other political entities grouped in a system susceptible to organization by negotiation had little or no meaning for them.

IV

All of them understood that a great European war was approaching. At least, they came to believe in its approach, some fearing it, some quite frankly hoping for it. Perhaps some of them, like Rolland, had never really pondered what war would mean until it was upon them. Yet Rolland's mind was filled with a brooding fear. "I have written," he said at the conclusion of *Jean Christophe*, "the tragedy of a generation which is nearing its end." He felt that the whole world was waiting for the inevitable. Rule everywhere was by the mediocre; only a Napoleon could have saved the peace. "The force of the human mind was in other things. So there was nothing to be done but to trust to the declivity down which they were moving." Publicly he later chose to ignore having shared this deeply pessimistic conviction. "It is not,"

[21]Rolland's journal entry of August 3–4, 1914, quoted by Jouve, *Rolland*, 46; Halévy, *Péguy*, 95, 100; Rolland, *Péguy*, II, 67. The autobiographical sketch is in Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycraft, eds., *Twentieth Century Authors: A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Literature* (New York, 1942), 1195.

[22]Hedwig Hintze, "Nation et humanité dans la pensée des temps modernes," *Revue d'histoire moderne*, II (January-February, 1933), 2.

he wrote to Hauptmann, "that I regard, as you do, war as a fatality. A Frenchman does not believe in fatality. Fatality is the excuse of souls without a will." But fatality was also the ultimate conviction of souls without the power to arrest events. And such souls belonged to French men of letters in the last futile years of the peace.[23]

This sense of total hopelessness was shared finally even by Anatole France. The years when he had praised war as the sole reconciliation between man's innate brutality and the ideal of justice were behind him. Now he spoke against the extension of military service in France, attacked the capitalist creators of war, set aside even his faith in a socialist economic revolution, and suggested that human history had run its course.[24] It almost seemed as if the international idea had been found wanting without ever being tried, that only the military, national, French ideal successfully responded to the challenges of the European crisis. The prophets of a better world were retreating in despair. Only those who could look catastrophe in the face and not be appalled, accepting it as a necessary trial, were in harmony with the spirit that was abroad in the France of President Raymond Poincaré. They were the real "maîtres de l'heure."

Such were Barrès, Péguy, Psichari. Whether or not they placed action before understanding in their scale of values, they wished for, and in the event they welcomed, the opportunity for action against Germany. For them the tension and uncertainty of the armed peace were painful. "I shall never resign myself," wrote Barrès, "to the fact that after 1871 France was not constituted like a Sparta, subordinating everything to the recreation of her glory and territory." He said no responsible man would state that he wished war, but in fact his own speeches and writings demanded just this, with fire or a simulated note of the tragic. Those who knew him well had no doubt where his train of thought finally led. "In the ardour of his Lorraine nationalism," commented Paléologue, the brilliant and enigmatic political director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "he wishes war because he sees in it the sole means of regenerating France and recovering our lost provinces." Equally convinced of the approach of war, Paléologue did not, however, feel it either possible or necessary to make the conduct of policy more enterprising and daring. Barrès agreed: their functions were different. Paléologue at the helm could not afford to display bad seamanship, but "I have given myself the task of keeping public

[23]Preface to *Jean Christophe*, III, 348, 470–1; journal entry, *De Jean Christophe à Colas Breugnon*, 68–9; *Above the Battle*, 20.

[24]Victor Giraud, "M. Anatole France," *Revue des deux mondes*, November 15, 1913; France, *Revolt of the Angels*, 215–16; see Jacob Axelrad, *Anatole France: A Life without Illusions, 1844–1924* (New York, 1944), 391.

opinion healthy." This self-imposed responsibility ended in August, 1914, and the circumstances were probably better for France than Barrès could have hoped. As Thibaudet remarked, "That was the destiny he dreamed of, toward which his winding paths led him. The man of letters became *l'homme drapeau*. The whole of France was a *bastion de l'Est*. Poincaré donned again the cap with oak leaves, and Barrès assumed spiritual power." In fact, of course, it was not in Barrès' nature to permit himself openly to display this triumph. He played his part quietly to the end, recording in his journal with a characteristically romantic flourish, "Head up high, jaw thrust forward, somehow in good heart, we are entering the tragic region."[25]

More mystic yet more direct than Barrès, the young Psichari drove toward a similar goal, convinced that his generation was destined to rescue France and civilization, finding glory and *revanche* along the way. "It seems to me," he wrote to Henri Massis in 1913, "that the young people sense vaguely that they will see great things, that great things will be done by them. They will be neither dilettantes nor sceptics. They will not be tourists through this life. They know what is expected of them. . . . It seems to me that all the traits you note must one day lead us to military glory and, to speak plainly, to a *revanche* from which we must never shift our attention." Bitterly he assailed the Republic for its crimes against patriotism and the army, arguing relentlessly for a return to more martial ways. War was the core of his *mystique*, the Franco-German struggle merely the frame within which he acted out his part. And finally he saw it all come about as he had hoped. "We are certainly going forward to great victories," he wrote to his mother a few day before his death in August, 1914, "and I repent less than ever having desired the war which was necessary for the honour and greatness of France. It has come at the right time and in the right way. May Providence not abandon us in this great and magnificent adventure."[26] War had always been the necessary fulfilment for himself and his country. He had never thought to clothe it in other than military terms. In this respect he differed from Paul Bourget, who maintained that war and military servitude were no religion but rather the penalty for living this earthly life. "A law as

[25]Entry for the period September, 1911, to January, 1912, *Mes cahiers*, IX, 194; entry for the period April to August, 1913, *ibid.*, X, 171; Maurice Barrès, *La Colline inspirée* (Paris, 1913), 365; Paléologue to the Countess Murat, March 10, 1913, and Murat to Paléologue, March 30, 1913, in Paléologue, *Journal 1913–1914*, 73, 85; Albert Thibaudet, *Les Princes lorrains* (Paris, 1924), 120; Barrès, *Mes cahiers*, XI, 96.

[26]Two letters from Psichari to "Agathon" (Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde), quoted by Victor Giraud, "Ernest Psichari," *Revue des deux mondes*, June 15, 1917, 893; Psichari to Massis, July 9, 1911, Psichari, *Lettres du centurion* (Paris, 1947), 147; Psichari to his mother, August 20, 1914, *ibid.*, 317–18; Daniel-Rops, *Psichari* (Paris, 1947), 187.

mysterious as it is universal," he remarked to Emile Boutroux early in 1914, "wills that war, this bloody trial, be the inevitable form of that constraint which individuals, like nations, must suffer" in a world which was a jungle and where all men were hunters and hunted.[27] A philosophy as fatalist and as war-seeking as Psichari's, Bourget's was far cruder and far less profoundly rooted in the spirit. It was utterly remote from the complexities that moved the mind of Péguy.

The reasons why Péguy sought war have been endlessly debated. Emmanuel Mounier said he was no militarist but a man influenced by his service, the pomp of public display, the idea of the army as free from monetary corruption, by the love of order, offence and victory, by a hatred of parliamentarism and a pacifism which placed peace before justice. Perhaps it was true that the issue of peace or war was "merely incidental" to the problem of justice in his private world, and that if he advocated a just war, he nevertheless wished for the war to end all wars.[28] But it is clear that Péguy said many things and that they need not and cannot all be reconciled. "We are leaving, soldiers of the Republic," were his words that final August, "for the general disarmament and the last of wars. We have not sinned. We have not failed." But not so many years before this he had celebrated death for the things of the earth, for land, hearth, and home, "provided it was in a just war." Perhaps not the last of wars, but the just war in the just cause was his primary concern. Certainly he admired struggle for itself. Yet it seems untrue, as some have argued, to conclude that neither victory, defeat, nor determined purpose worried him—for he had qualified struggle with the phrase "for the safety of all." Nor could it be said that in his mind human conflict was a simple act of the Christian faith, because he had written

> Heureux qui sont morts pour des cités charnelles
> Car elles sont les corps de la cité de Dieu.[29]

Yet, as Romain Rolland pointed out, it was the essence of Péguy's thought to unite order, grace, and freedom, the Christian destiny and the destiny of France.[30]

[27]Conversation of January 22, 1914, quoted by Albert Feuillerat, *Paul Bourget: Histoire d'un esprit sous la troisième république* (Paris, 1937), 307–8.

[28]Emmanuel Mounier, in Mounier, Marcel Péguy, and Georges Izard, *La Pensée de Charles Péguy* (Paris, 1931), 160 n. 2, 176; Sister M. Francine Zeller, "Charles Péguy, a Crusader for Justice in Peace and War," *French Review*, XVIII (October, 1944), 38–47.

[29]Letter of August, 1914, quoted by Mounier, *La Pensée de Péguy*, 160 n. 2; Péguy, *Eve*, vol. VII of *Œuvres complètes*, 161, 162, 165; Péguy, *L'argent (suite)*, 34; cf. the views of Benda, *La Grande Epreuve*, 106, and André Rousseaux, *Le Prophète Péguy (introduction à la lecture de l'œuvre de Péguy)* (Neuchâtel, 1942–5), II, 286 ff.

[30]Rolland, *Péguy*, II, 81, 171; see, for example, Péguy, *Le Porche de la deuxième vertu*, vol. VI of *Œuvres complètes*, 405.

Doubtless an ultimate justice in the City of God was the real goal, but Péguy saw the road leading across the temporal trials of the chosen French people. He had long since concluded that the political and military struggles with their neighbours were but a stage on the journey to the heavenly city of justice. Sustained by the certainty that the mission of France was not unblessed, heartened by what he took after 1911 to be "a profound and violent French renaissance," he watched matters develop with a certain calm. "I do not see things blackly," he told Joseph Lotte in September, 1912. "What is bad is parliamentarism; but parliamentarism doesn't spoil all. People have been working hard for five years. Right now we have a quite remarkable Ministry [that of Raymond Poincaré]. In no other European country will you find so many men of front rank."[31] War was coming, as Halévy put it, and increasingly Péguy longed for it. Only this overdue and necessary conflict with Germany could bring justice, resurrection, and glory once more to the land of France, which was, as he quite simply put it, God's Eldest Daughter. Secure in this faith, he left the Rue de la Sorbonne, marched eastward as a common soldier, and gave up his life in September, 1914.

> Heureux qui sont morts dans les grandes batailles
> Couchés dessus le sol à face de Dieu.[32]

The conclusion is inescapable that among the men of letters the movement was toward the strong nationalist viewpoint when foreign affairs were in question. Julien Benda watched with a kind of horror while "the fury of the irrational and the instinctive" was translated from Henri Bergson's class-room in the Collège de France into the literary world, which then proceeded to dedicate itself to the cult of the French soul and French "truths." In fact, the Dreyfus Affair as a literary debate was not so much forgotten as merged in and overshadowed by the bitter dispute of which Alsace-Lorraine had become the dominant symbol. The critic Victor Giraud said he did not think the importance of the provinces for either the older or the younger generation could be exaggerated. "Those who began life as I did," wrote Bourget, "at the time of the terrible disaster, hear always in their ears the sound of German sabres dragging over the cobblestones of our streets." Certainly in the calculated morbidity with which the

[31]Péguy, *L'argent (suite)*, 183, 224; conversation with Joseph Lotte, September 28, 1912, in Péguy, *Lettres et entretiens* (Paris, 1927), 163; cf. Wallace Fowlie, *De Villon à Péguy, grandeur de la pensée française* (Montreal, 1944), 92; Henri Massis, *L'Honneur de servir: Textes réunis pour contribuer à l'histoire d'une génération (1912–1937)* (Paris, 1937), 4.

[32]Halévy, *Péguy*, 257; Roger Secrétain, *Péguy, soldat de la vérité* (Paris, 1944), 182; Péguy, *Eve*, 162, 408.

provinces were surrounded every reference was virtually a call to action. A fantastic romanticism settled down upon them. "This cemetery," declared Paul Acker early in 1914, "does not, like other cemeteries, contain lifeless bodies, but all of lost Alsace and all the crumbled greatness of France." In short, forty years of silence and brooding retirement were drawing to their close, and French literature heralded the renewed contest by celebrating the virtues of the West defending its culture against the Barbarians.[33]

Some like Octave Mirbeau might not believe in the coming of war, but they were not many. "It seems to me," remarked Paul Hervieu to Maurice Paléologue, "we are going there on the run." For his part, Louis Gillet was scandalized by the spectacle of Frenchmen debating whether or not to increase the period of military service from two to three years. Germany he loved with all his heart, he said, but the long armed peace was too much to be borne any more. Therefore he would be "awfully happy to go and fight her." He thought idealists like Jaurès were fine and noble, and he felt a keen sympathy for those who sought to hold back with mere words the forward march of the world's destinies. But peace would never be preserved by generous ideas. The world had to be delivered from the Germans. The gentlest artists, far removed from the intricate confusions of international politics, knew that.[34] Thus there arose a chorus for one decisive liberating war when the right time should come.

Undoubtedly many writers were swept along in the nationalist upsurge originating in the great metropolitan press, in Parliament, and in the government-sponsored "renaissance" of the last years of the peace. Most of them can have had no idea what the violent dislocation of the armed peace would finally mean for their country. Some few may have been prepared for a lengthy war, but where the younger military men were preaching the virtues of lightning attack and a decisive first battle of encounter no literary man was in a position to

[33]Benda, *Un régulier*, 136; Benda, *La Trahison des clercs* (Paris, 1927), 118; Victor Giraud, *Les Maîtres de l'Heure, essai d'histoire morale contemporaine* (Paris, 1911–14), II, 313, 314, 320; Giraud, "La Question d'Alsace Lorraine dans le roman français contemporain," *Revue des deux mondes*, November 15, 1914, 212–28; Bourget, *Pages de critique et de doctrine*, II, 36; Paul Acker, "Une ville Alsacienne: Wissembourg," *ibid.*, February 15, 1914, 920; André Suarès, *Essais* (Paris, 1914), 14.

[34]Octave Mirbeau in September, 1912, quoted by Etienne Chichet, *Quarante ans de journalisme: Feuilles volantes* (Paris, 1935), 166–70; Paul Hervieu in conversation with Paléologue, March 4, 1913, Paléologue, *Journal 1913–1914*, 68; Gillet to Rolland, June 1, 1913, August 1, 1914, *Correspondence*, 261, 287–8. See, for example, the anti-German remarks of the painter Lucien Simon to André Gide in January 1912, Gide, *The Journals of André Gide*, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York, 1947–51), I, 313; or the views of Claude Debussy in 1913, Oscar Thompson, *Debussy, Man and Artist* (New York, 1937), 224–25.

calculate effectively the possibilities stretching ahead. Not many in any walk of life foresaw the character of twentieth-century wars of attrition. Some writers took the attitude expressed by a young intellectual to Julien Benda: "War, why not? It would be entertaining."[35] Thoughts and motives, here as always, must have been confused. Any analysis inevitably stops short of the ultimate. What fired the mind of Paul Bourget was not the same thing as that which kindled the crusading flame within Ernest Psichari. All roads might lead to Rome, but the points of departure were vastly different, and in the long run every route was unique.

The one property common to all these writers was a small body of knowledge concerning politics among the nations. It was neither detailed nor exact. It had filtered down to them through untold newspaper and personal reports; it was the product of guesswork, superficial observation, partisanship, and wilful distortion. It did not exclude a great deal of truth. But the secrets of embassies, courts, and ministries were as inaccessible to Anatole France as to Charles Péguy. Most probably it was the vaguest of sentimentalities which propelled Romain Rolland across the stern realities of the forty years' quarrel; and the intellectual's barely conscious hope of a front seat at Armageddon,[36] as much as anything else, that sustained Maurice Barrès in his ceaseless vigil on the eastern approaches.

V

Plainly French foreign policy was not founded on such subjective principles of thought and action as these men possessed. But how far did they influence contemporary thought in France? How great was the impact of their views on the inevitability or the desirability of war? At most, they were limited to an indirect power over the minds of people and government. Stephen Zweig told Rolland in 1912 that he had done more to bring French and German youth together with his *Jean Christophe* than all the societies and diplomats put together. But it was a fact that Rolland himself felt more at ease beyond the borders of France than within them, and he was better appreciated outside of his native land. It is virtually impossible to measure the repercussion of any one writer on a generation. Anatole France's pessimistic views were the very negation of all the official high optimism of the Poincaré period, yet he was very much read among the younger generation. The brooding *belliciste* Barrès was called "the god" of the youthful *élite*

[35]Benda, *La Trahison des clercs*, 215.

[36]See the remarks of Max Ascoli on this phenomenon, *Intelligence in Politics* (New York, 1936), 13; also Franz Schoenberner, *Confessions of a European Intellectual* (New York, 1946), 70.

that went to war in 1914. Péguy and Charles Maurras were placed in the front rank of popularity, and Henri Massis said that it was the soldier Psichari who gave meaning to "an age without an horizon and without honour."[37]

Massis's judgments, however, have not always gone without challenge. The inquiry into the political and social views of educated youth which he and Alfred de Tarde undertook in 1912 was scarcely representative, and its conclusions were far more militant than warranted.[38] Looking back, many years after the war had been fought and won, one of those who had been young before the storm could not recall the total predominance of the military note. Life had not been all one long pilgrimage to the black-draped Strasbourg statue in the Place de la Concorde. "No," wrote Jean Guéhenno, "if I think again of those pre-war years, I find in myself no feeling that disaster is coming. . . . Not for a minute did we have the idea that we could be those who soon must die."[39] Evidently not all the youth of France was moved by the mysticism of Psichari to march in the national parade. And yet if Guéhenno and his friends had no premonitions of disaster, it was because there were few who saw the terrible connection linking war and disaster. No one, however young and thoughtless, on the other hand, could have failed to see the shadows on the land and hear the approaching thunder. Certainly no one who exposed himself to contemporary literature.

So far as international affairs were concerned, then, two main currents ran through the literary life of the French Republic before 1914. Their precise strengths will never be known. But it is sure that the stronger stream flowed toward the militant nationalist position. These men of letters were deeply divided and in no way adequately informed about the international role of France. They were inclined to judge external affairs from subjective, doctrinal positions. For the most part,

[37]Open letter from Zweig to Rolland in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 22, 1912, quoted by Marcel Doisy, *Romain Rolland, 1866–1944* (Paris, 1945), 43–4, and cf. Curtius, *Die literarischen Wegbereiter*, 79, 257, 262; Rolland to Gillet, July 9, 1911, *Correspondence*, 249. On the popularity of these writers, see Miéville, *La Pensée de Barrès*, 14; Randolph S. Bourne, "Maurice Barrès and the Youth of France," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXIV (September, 1914), 394–9; Gaston Choisy, "Etudiants français et étudiants allemands: Ce qu'ils lisent," *Correspondant*, CCXII (September 10, 1912), 885–6; Albert Garreau, *Barrès, défenseur de la civilisation* (Paris, 1945), 16–17; Thibaudet, *La Vie de Barrès*, 282–3; Massis, *L'Honneur de servir*, 15, 159; Massis, *La Guerre de trente ans: Destin d'un age, 1909–1939* (Paris, 1940), 7; Jean Guéhenno, *Journal d'un homme de quarante ans* (Paris, 1934), 126.

[38]Agathon, *Les Jeunes Gens d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 1913), *passim*; see the later judgment of this work by Massis, *L'Honneur de servir*, 3–21, and by Jacques Chastenet, *Une Epoque pathétique: La France de M. Fallières* (Paris, 1949), 346–47.

[39]Guéhenno, *Journal*, 124–25.

they had no understanding of the enormous forces working in the western state system. And in the long run they were carried along by the impetus of events they barely understood. In a spirit of despair, bitterness, hatred, or impatience, they prophesied and awaited the war they had come to regard as inevitable.

Writing in late 1913, Victor Giraud rejected criticisms of the literary intellectuals on other than literary grounds. Politics, he said, could concern them only accidentally, and it was not their ideas on politics which should be judged. If this were so, then they belonged to a rare and privileged body of men whose irresponsibility as members of an advanced society had few parallels. But if they were accountable, and if it was indeed, as De Rousiers had argued, the function of the intellectual "to see things as they are," then it must be concluded that these men failed to think through in any serious way the problems of international politics. In their several ways they helped to prepare a great nation psychologically for a struggle which may indeed have been thrust upon it. Pierre Lasserre argued that they had greatly contributed to the eventual victory.[40] This was so. In the light of 1914–18 such a service was quickly seen and appreciated. Another question, however, might have been put concerning their role before 1914. To it no satisfactory answer could have been given. How this struggle might have been avoided they had not had the slightest concrete notion. Where to look for alternatives to the deadlocked alliance systems they did not know. In this, of course, they were no different from the vast mass of their contemporaries in every station. But many of them came to rationalize the approaching collapse of the international order in the name of civilization and the resurgence of France. A great and tragic sense of having lost all control over the issue of war and peace, if not of the national destiny, characterized almost all the literary intellectuals while Europe was still at peace and the die not cast. And from them in part this sense of fatality must finally have communicated itself to the people, waiting patiently for some unknown fate to scatter their lives across the battlefields of an old continent.

[40]Giraud, *Les Maîtres de l'Heure*, II, 323; Pierre Lasserre, *Cinquante ans de pensée française* (Paris, 1922), 53–4.

A MIRROR FOR SCHOLARS

MILLAR MACLURE

Doctus eras Graece felixque tibi fuit Alpha, at fuit infelix Omega, Cuffe, tuum. JOHN OWEN.

THE history of the Elizabethan age is like an illuminated manuscript: each chapter begins with the bright capital of some great name—of one who sacked a Spanish town, or wrote a great poem, or founded a great house—and the whole is a collection of "success-stories," pendants to the glory of the Queen. Yet there were two professions in which few Elizabethans achieved success, learning and arms. Lances and letters combine in the ideal of the courtier, in Sidney, in Ophelia's remembrance of the untroubled Hamlet; but the England of Elizabeth offered small rewards to either the academic or the soldier. "The greatest Schole clarkes," said Sir Humphrey Gilbert, "are not alwayes the wisest men," and men of the world from Cecil to Osborn set down the same advice for their sons. Learn only what you can use, they said; the rest is lumber. Nicholas Carr in one generation and Robert Burton in the next complained bitterly of the small encouragement offered by English patrons and English presses to works of pure scholarship, leaving "many flourishing wits smothered in oblivion, dead and buried." As for arms, the Norrises and Vere achieved glory under incredible difficulties, but in general the "policy" of the Queen and Cecil made it impossible to make a military reputation in the Low Countries, while bogs and kerns conspired with incompetence to deny success in Ireland to all but Mountjoy.

"Greatness will have the victory. Scholars and martialists (though learning and valour should have the pre-eminence yet) in England must die like dogs and be hanged." So Henry Cuffe,[1] sometime Pro-

[1]Sources for the life of Cuffe are numerous but fragmentary. The following are by Cuffe, or attributed to him: (i) *The Differences of The Ages of Mans Life: Together with the Originall Causes, Progresse, and End thereof* (1607) [I have used the Harvard College Library copy, autographed "J. Donn"]; (ii) "Aphorismes gathered out of the liffe and end of that most noble Robert Earle of Essex in the liffetyme of Queene Eliza. not long before his death by his Secretary M Cuffe sometyme fellow of Merton College in Oxon," Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 1327, ff. 58–60; (iii) "The Earl of Essex his buzze, made on his decayed estate by Mr. Henry Cuffe his secretary," Hist. MSS. Comm., 6th Report (1877), 459a; (iv) a Greek epigram (signed "H. C.") in William Camden, *Britannia* (1590), sig. A6v; (v) letters to Jean Hotman, in *Francisci et Joannis Hotomanorum patris ac filii . . . epistolae . . . Amstelaedami . . .* M.DCC. Cuffe's will is printed in *Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England*, ed. John Bruce, Camden Society, o.s. LXXVIII (1861). The apocryphal[?] dying speech is in Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 1327, f. 55b. In addition to the *DNB* article, and frequent allusions in the Calendars of State Papers and the Salisbury Papers, the following sources are essential: William Camden, *The History of the Most*

fessor of Greek in the University of Oxford, and secretary to Robert, second Earl of Essex, is reputed to have spoken on the scaffold. The speech is apocryphal but characteristic. "A man he was of exquisite learning," said Camden, who knew him well, "and of a ready and fluent wit, but turbulent and perverse."[2] Students who have found in the marginalia of Gabriel Harvey the constant passion of a scholar's worldly ambition will see in Cuffe a Harvey who ventured into the world of affairs, and failed. He might be said to have listened to Harvey's complaint and advice:

> Common Lerning, & ye name of A good schollar, was never so much contemn'd, & abjectid of princes, Pragmaticals, & common Gallants, as nowadayes; insomuch that it necessarily concernith, & importith ye lernid either praesently to hate yr books; or actually to insinuate, & enforce themselves, by very special, & singular propertyes of emploiable, & necessary use, in all affaires, as well private, as publique, amounting to any commodity, ether oeconomical, or politique.

Cuffe was a scholar, and he wished to "make a shining figure in the world," but he hitched himself not to a star but to a meteor, and that was the end of him.

At Oxford, where he was first scholar and afterwards fellow of Trinity, he showed great promise, excelling in Greek and in disputation. His letters to Jean Hotman, the distinguished French scholar in the entourage of Leicester, display, through the encrustation of conventional compliment and allusion characteristic of such learned correspondence, a genuine love of scholarship and the society of humanists. But they also give evidence of a perturbed spirit; Cuffe emerges as the frustrated academic. He is beset by troubles; the impious and the illiterate are exalted above the deserving. Trinity is γυναικοκρατούμενον. This discontent was aggravated by "a certain hastiness of temper," a sharp coarse wit, which lost him his fellowship.

> The Founder [of Trinity], Sir Thomas Pope, would, wheresoever he went a-visiting his friend, steal one thing or another that he could lay his hands on, put it in his pocket, or under his gown. This was supposed rather an humour than of dishonesty. Now Cuffe upon a time, with his fellows being merry, said, a pox this is a poor beggarly College indeed, the plate that our Founder stole would build such another. Which coming to the President's ears, was therefore ejected.

Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth (1688); Thomas Fuller, *Worthies of England*, ed. P. A. Nuttall (London, 1840); T. B. Howell, *A Complete Collection of State Trials* (London, 1816), I, 1412ff.; Robert Watt, *Biographia Britannica* (1789), IV, 550; Anthony a Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses*, ed. Philip Bliss (London, 1813); *Reliquiae Wottonianae* (1651).

[2]Fuller (*Church History*, IX) gives a similar estimate of Father Robert Parsons: "a man of daring, and undertaking spirit, and of a nature turbulent, and seditious." Indeed Cuffe and Parsons were both kin to Alcibiades; clever, balked, and therefore dangerous.

Cuffe's academic career was not, however, seriously disturbed by this episode. The new Warden of Merton, Sir Henry Savile, that "magasine of all learning," offered him a tutorship, where he profited by the excellent discipline and prosperity of that foundation under Savile's direction, becoming fellow in 1588, and in 1590 Professor of Greek in the University.

Cuffe's attachment to Savile was apparently deep and sincere; he left him £100 in his will, beseeching his old friend and benefactor to remember him charitably; indeed it is likely that his years at Merton were the happiest of his life. Some fruits of his scholarship and scholarly associations survive: a commendatory epigram prefixed to Camden's *Britannia*; an acknowledgment by Columbanius of his assistance in preparing an edition of Longus' "elegant pastoral romance." When the Queen visited Oxford in 1592 he was chosen to deliver a Greek oration to her at Carfax, and was respondent in the disputation held in the common hall at Merton, on the (for him) ironically prophetic theme: *An dissentiones civium sint utiles Reipublicae*. Burghley and other members of the Council were present on this occasion, but not the Queen. The entertainment included a panegyric upon Essex.

It was probably on Savile's recommendation that Cuffe entered Essex's service as one of his "secretaries," at some time between April, 1594, when he was chosen junior proctor of the University, and May, 1596, when in a letter he announced himself "heartily addicted" to his master's affairs. At this time Essex employed a set of secretaries, including Edward Reynolds, Henry Wotton, and Anthony Bacon, who were chiefly engaged in collecting political intelligence from abroad. Cuffe was thought useful, we are told, because he was "a great philosopher" who could "suit the wise observations of ancient authors to the transactions of modern times." Certainly in the "Aphorismes" on the career of Essex which are attributed to Cuffe there are injunctions to "reade the life of Seianus" and draw the appropriate lessons. But this is wisdom after the event; Cuffe did not remember Sejanus soon enough.

It is not as a political theorist that he first appears in the correspondence. He accompanied Essex to Cadiz in 1596, and at the Earl's direction wrote a laudatory account of the action, which was to be printed anonymously "to stop all vagrant rumours," as Essex put it, and to be translated into French and "sent to some good personages in those parts." This design was blocked by the Queen, and all Cuffe had to show for the voyage was "a distemper and some accidents of a tertian." We find him next on the continent as a sort of foreign correspondent and unofficial diplomat. He was in Florence from late in

1597 to early in 1598, and from there sent to Reynolds a variety of political news and gossip. He was back in London by July, 1598, and later that year attended Southampton in Paris. In April, 1599, he set out for Ireland with Essex.

Discomfort and disappointments were his companions on that ill-fated enterprise. He was not happy in his association with the wild young gentlemen who followed Essex's fortunes: Sir Anthony Standen wrote to Reynolds that "Mr. Cuffe's brain-pan [was] wonderfully shaken by the importunity, or rather sauciness, of the undiscreet martial sort." He was a fox among dogs, and as the summer passed his hopes dwindled. On August 4 he wrote to Reynolds: "I am sometimes threatened by his Lordship to be sent into England, there to argue and apologize for his virtue and true worth against those who so maliciously and sycophant-like detract from his honourable and noble endeavours. The times are so bad and the humours surly with you there, that I fear rather than wish the journey. Notwithstanding *jacta est alea*. I would rather lose with him than gain with his opposites." Later that month he took Essex's dispatches to London, and behaved "very wisely" in setting forth his master's Irish courses "to her majesty's better satisfaction." The Queen's "better satisfaction" was short-lived. In September, Essex, dusty, defeated, and desperate, hurried home to the royal presence. So ended the first phase of Cuffe's labours in the great world.

It was a critical time for him, as for his master. He had had a mixed experience. The Italian letters show an almost naïve pleasure in "affairs"; the Oxford scholar fairly wallowed in appointments, ceremonies, intrigues. It is pleasant to be in the know, to step in the chambers of the great, but the price of this pleasure is strain and danger. Essex seems to have inspired among those closest to him sentiments divided between intense loyalty and vivid exasperation. Cuffe felt both. He was taken captive by the magnificence and dismayed by the incompetence of his master. Camden remembered his complaint that Essex "carried his love and hatred always in his brow, and could not hide it." Among Cuffe's motives in serving Essex, his own ambition was prominent; by the summer of 1599 he must have realized, with growing bitterness, that only by the most unremitting pressure, and in spite of himself, could Essex be made great enough for a man to be great beside his chair.

From September, 1599, to August, 1600, Essex was either in confinement, or ill, or both. How did Cuffe spend those months? Did he brood continually over plans to restore, even to extend his master's fortunes? In July, 1600, Sir Henry Bromley wrote to him as to the

prime mover in the cause. But it is possible that it was during this time that he wrote his book, *The Differences of the Ages of Mans Life: Together with the Originall Causes, Progress, and End thereof.* The title-page gives the date of composition as 1600; it is likely that Cuffe worked up the treatise out of his commonplace-books during the early months of 1600, when Essex's affairs were at a virtual standstill.

The *Differences*, of which Donne possessed a copy, appeared in 1607, dedicated to Robert Lord Willoughby, Beare and Evesby by a certain "R.M.," into whose hands the manuscript had come "*ut e naufragio tabula*," and who gave it to the press "whole and intire . . . without anie purloining, or imbeazeling, a sincere transcript from the first originall, which I am informed was his own." "R. M." heaped together sundry flowers from *his* commonplace-book in his account of the author:

> A coyner it had, whome Fame hath reported (for my selfe did never, *de facie*, knowe him) as skilfull a Master in this trade, as our shoppes have brought forth anie. Who though hee verified that ancient by-word, that φυσειεμεγάλαι are ὀπικίνδυνοι, yet hath he washed off from the walls of Lycoeum, that blacke aspersion of Petronius: *Ego arbitror adolescentulos in scholis stultissimos fieri, quia nihil eorum quae in usu habemus, aut audiunt, aut vident.*

The treatise, which was reprinted in 1626 and 1640, is neither attractive nor important; it is a conventional exercise upon a commonplace theme. It is moreover painfully over-organized, even for a work in the scholastic tradition, and yet woefully inharmonious and lopsided. Cuffe does not at once descend to the heart of his subject; he does not reach it until page 113, where he announces: "Now come we to that we first and principally intended, to shew the differences of mans ages, and the causes thereof, together with their severall and singular properties, wherein we will deal the more sparingly by reason of those doubts and difficulties removed in the former part of the treatise, so that we shall not neede to digresse into any by-controversies but keepe a direct and a straight course." The "doubts and difficulties" arise from contemplation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, which is refuted at length in the long opening section, a discussion which in effect reproduces the argument of Saint Bonaventura against Averroes. All this is relevant, Cuffe argues, because a consideration of the ages of man's life must begin from this apparent truth, "*that man hath an appointed time of being, which he cannot passe*"; man, in a "well knowen comparison," is "the Epitome of the whole world, Lord of the creatures . . . for there is nothing in the vaste compasse of this universall circumference, whose likenesse and lively

representation we have not summarily comprised in man, as in a most perfect compendium and abridgement."

Is man, then, subject to death, the end of nature? He must be, for death is a condition of the Fall, a fact "altogether unknowen unto the Gentilish Philosophers, yet is its consideration in part Philosophicall." Further, there are "artificiall" reasons: man is made up of matter and form, and is destroyed by nature's "insatiable appetite of receeving new formes"; he is corrupt by reason of "contrarietie in the compound of the elements" and disproportion of the four primary qualities; impurity of outward nourishment gradually taints "that naturall ingendred humidity" which generates and sustains his existence. The length of man's life is much decreased from the first ages of the world, when men were less tainted by corruption, and were granted by God "a longer continuance, for revealing of many hidden mysteries, especially in Astrologie; for the course of many of the celestial bodies could never have been learned, no not so much as in any mediocrity, had not God given some of them at least six hundred yeares to live in, in which time, the great yeere as they call it, is fulfilled and perfected."[3] The causes of long life are various: balance of the primary qualities, moderation of our affections, abstention from "Venery, deaths best harbinger," and outward causes, "such as bee the influences of the Stars." These "influences" are real, but limited; celestial bodies have no direct action upon "the reasonable soule of man, which is immateriall," but they have "singular and especiall operations upon our bodies."

After these demonstrations and proofs, Cuffe turns to the proper subject of his book, which he condenses into eight pages. There is nothing new in those eight pages. Various classifications of the ages of man, from Aristotle, from Pythagoras, from antiquity generally, are given, and the correspondence of those ages (e.g., childhood, youth, manhood, old age) with the proportions of the elemental qualities, with the seasons of the year, and with the influences of the planets. To this is appended "the exposition of some few problems incident to the Treatise," in other words, a set of conventional *problemata*. Of Cuffe's thirteen problems nine are on the subject of the constitution and habits of infants; for example, why do we cry at our first entrance upon the world (discomfort of birth, cold, hunger); why children have such short memories ("the braines too great humidity"). The other four deal with old age; one of them barely merits quotation: "Whence is it that old men are commonly so jealously suspicious? The

[3]The reference is to Josephus, *Antiquities*, I. Donne found the conceit attractive: see *An Anatomie of the World: The First Anniversary*, ll. 112–20.

cause is their incredulity & hardnesse of beliefe, which it selfe also proceedeth from their much experience of mens wilie practices."

The treatise ends with a renewed defence of the apparent disproportion of its parts: "Thus have we briefly runne over the diversities of mans ages together with the true causes and properties of the particulars, having premised the determination of those usually incident controversies for our better and more direct proceeding in the principall treatise: not as *Prolegomena* or preface to the purpose, but as things essential and of the substance of our matter. . . ."

> The baser sort I care to please no more,
> One if I please, enough is me therefore.

He doth protest too much. The work was rounded off in haste, no doubt of that. Yet in small space he contrived (as Bacon said of his masters the schoolmen), "out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit [to] spin out unto us . . . laborious webs of learning." He stuffed his margin not only with Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Scaliger, but also with more esoteric sources, as "friar Ferus," Fernelius, and Bewaldus "an old Grammarian." It is clear that he wrote not merely as a private exercise but to enhance his reputation as a scholar. Like Harvey, Cuffe believed in "insinuation."

Essex in the summer of 1600 was not the heroic and confident leader of 1596. He was by turns intemperate and depressed, his will blunted by bad health and worse fortune. Of all those about him only Cuffe had the determination and skill to plot a course for the future. He perceived the Earl's weaknesses, and worked upon him stubbornly and boldly. A piece of doggerel, "The Earl of Essex his buzze, made on his decayed estate by Mr. Henry Cuffe his secretary," perhaps gives some hint of his contemptuous importunity. A work of some 90 lines, it ends:

> Five years twice told with promises perfumed
> My hope-stuff'd head was cast into a slumber,
> Sweet dreams of gold I dreamed, and then presumed
> Amongst the bees though I was in the number.
> Waking I found Hive hopes had made me vain,
> 'Twas not Tobacco that [had] stufft my brain.

"Cuffe [says Camden] did so sharply tax him as low-spirited and faint-hearted . . . that the Earl was displeased with him, and commanded his Name to be striken out of the list of his Servants: which notwithstanding Merick his Steward (who was secretly of the same opinion of Cuffe) did not doe, for Fear lest out of Stomach and Revenge he should joyn with his Adversaries against him."

When Cuffe heard that he was dismissed, "in a private Chamber [he] was stricken therewith into a Sound almost dead to the Earth, as if he had fallen from some high steeple, such Turrets of hope he had built in his own Fancy." It was a bad moment; he had gone too far. What "secret ambitious ends of his own" did he see destroyed in a word? He protested to the Council later that he had nothing to avenge: "In myne owne private fortune I professe with all thanckefull acknowledgement that I never receaved the leaste injurie, eyther at the handes of any of her majesties most honourable privie councell, nor any other person of qualitie about the courte, but contrary wise many honourable favours." When the verdict of treason was pronounced at his trial he asserted: "Heretofore in the course of my private state, things went so smoothly with me as I could desire; my religion was always sorting to the profession at this day."

Against these asservations must be set Wotton's conviction that he was dangerously ambitious, and perhaps Coke's statement at his trial that he should be Speaker of a post-rebellion Parliament. His career was by 1600 so deeply involved with Essex's fortunes that there was no other chance of his making the place in the world of affairs of which he had apparently dreamed. When he was by the intercession of Southampton restored to Essex's favour, this Thersites accordingly "sung the same Song in his Ears more boldly than before. 'That he had betrayed his Cause by Confessing. . . . He should resolve upon somewhat worthy of himself, for the perfect Recovery of his lost Reputation and Liberty, for the delivering of his Friends from Slavery, and the Kingdom from the corrupt Managery of certain persons.' " These were shrewd arguments, for nothing was so likely to move Essex to action as a reminder of his obligation to his followers, or the spur set to his distrust and hatred of Cecil. From adviser Cuffe graduated to promoter, and though it seems likely that he was less concerned than Anthony Bacon in the complicated correspondence with James VI, he was the architect of the plans for the rising. He protested at his examinations that he "never persuaded any man to take up arms against the queen, nor entertained any disloyal thought against her," but he appears in a very sinister light in his conversations with Sir Henry Nevil, whom, as a discontented servant of the government, he sought to draw into the conspiracy. He spoke darkly of "a change" and of Essex's restoration to greatness, and then more openly of a plan to go to the court. He even promised Nevil the secretaryship should the Earl's projects succeed. During these conversations he was often moody. "When he seemed to despair," said Nevil, "he would break out into words of heat and impatience, and upon one occasion re-

peated this verse: '*Arma tenenti, omnia dat qui justa negat.*' He spake very big."[4] The tag from Lucan, as Fuller observed, "proved his neck-verse."

In the last desperate silly moves of the game Cuffe was not prominent, a fact which he did not fail to emphasize at his trial. He seems to have been the only one of Essex's retainers who did not cross the river to hear *Richard II* on Saturday afternoon, February 7, 1601; he was not present at the conference in Essex's bed-chamber that night with Blunt, Davies, and Meyrick. He spent the fateful Sunday in his room among his books, and remained there until he was swept into the net with the rest.

"All that day," he recalled, "I bewailed the deplorable Condition of the Earl; and that was all I did." He must that day have ranged all the landscape of misery, disappointment, and despair. His "turbulent and mutinous spirit" baffled, his ambitious designs cut off in an abortive gesture, he must have cursed his day, and cursed his master. Though he had himself told Nevil that the majority of the London aldermen were for Essex (presumably because Essex favoured Puritan lecturers as they did), the attempt by way of the City must have appeared to him then (as it did later if the "Aphorismes" are his) as madness. "In stirringe the bodye of State, it is madnesse to beginne with the wealthy."

But his was a tough spirit, and he bore himself through the inevitable *dénouement* with his usual self-sufficiency. Essex, reduced by the prickings of his conscience and the ministrations of the Reverend Abdy Ashton to a self-torturing delight in confession for confession's sake, was brought face to face with Cuffe on February 21, and said: "Hen. Cuffe, call to God for mercy, and to the Queen, and deserve it by declaring truth, for I, that must now prepare for another world, have resolved to deal clearly with God and the world, and must needs say this to you, that none hath been a greater instigator of me than yourself, to all these my disloyal courses into which I have fallen." To this Cuffe "made no other reply, than by complaining of his lordship's inconstancy, and betraying his most devoted friends." There is in this answer all his contempt for weakness, his bitter disappointment. He had been let down. A career had opened before him, and now at the end of the way glowered the executioner. He determined to do what he could to save himself. On the same day as the confrontation with Essex, the Council submitted to him a list of interrogatories, in his answers to which he sought to minimize the revolutionary nature of the

[4]Apparently he had begun to wear a sword. See "A Satire: to Sir Nicholas Smith," a poem once attributed to Donne, in *The Poems of John Donne*, ed. H. J. C. Grierson (Oxford, 1933), 371–5.

conspiracy, and couched his reply in a note of conventional piety and penitence. Faced with Coke at his trial, however, he allowed free rein to the sharp wit, the defiant intelligence, and the surly competence that had distinguished his whole career.

> To Cuffe [Coke] said, that he was the arrantest Traitor that ever came to that bar; he was Poly[pragma] the very seducer of the earl; and since he was a scholar and a sophister, he would frame him a syllogism, and bad Cuffe deny what part he could. The syllogism was this, "Whosoever commits rebellion, intends the queen's death; but you committed rebellion: *ergo*, you intended the queen's death."
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> To this Cuffe replied:
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> But whereas your argument, Mr. attorney, is this, That whosoever intends treason, and the same is acted afterwards by others, there the intender as well as the actor is a traitor; but I intended treason, and others acted it; *Ergo*, Mr. Attorney, it is not your *major* that I deny, because my lords the judges have determined that; but I deny your *minor*; for if the thing intended was the going to the court, yet the thing acted was the going into London.
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> "But Mr. Attorney taking him short upon his own confession concluded him a traitor."[5]

Cuffe proceeded to excuse his conversations with Nevil, asserting that his more dangerous remarks were instructions from Essex, and that his missions to Nevil were in part at least prompted by an "ancient familiarity and love" between them, for the delight they took together "in conference of learning, and discourse of travels and states."

When adjudged guilty, he took another tone. He "confessed the jury had done but right," requested the company of some divine for the comfort of his soul, begged that he might not be drawn and quartered "for favour's sake unto learning," and concluded: "Alas! it was my too much love unto my master that brought me unto this; but as that the earl, my master, said, now the scales were taken from his eyes, and he saw his faults; so do I, but too late."

This is the official version, of course; the arch-plotter is presented to the public and to posterity in the light most flattering to the wisdom of the Council. These speeches breathe a fragrant repentance which, one feels, is scarcely characteristic of the speaker. Yet the shadow of a fearful death was on him, and his humility during his final confinement impressed the Lieutenant of the Tower. In his will—not a valid in-

[5]This is the account in Howell, *State Trials*, I, 1443. Camden, who was present, has an abbreviated version of the exchange: "Hereupon the Queen's Atturney-general argued syllogistically; and Cuffe answered so acute and Logically, that Cecyl said he was a subtile Sophister: but Anderson, Chief Justice in the Court of Common Pleas, waxing angry, and crying out that both of them made but foolish Syllogisms, sharply urged against him the Statute of Treason made in the Reign of Edward the Third." *Elizabeth*, 626.

strument, since his goods were forfeited to William Killigrew, groom of the Privy Chamber—he made his peace with the world and his worldly estate. It was no small estate; the bequests total over £2000, including £500 "conscience-money" to Sir Henry Nevil "from his poor distressed friend, whose exceedinge greife it is, that he hath by his late maisters commandment been an occasion of his trouble"; and the bequest to Henry Savile mentioned above. Perhaps during those last days he jotted down the "Aphorismes" which go under his name. There is nothing startling in these sentences—Cuffe's mind, though well ordered, was not inventive—but there is much wisdom after the event. He discusses the unstable condition of the favourites of princes, and of those who, like Essex, draw to themselves too much of the "general love"; he remembers the lessons of Sejanus and Absalom. "Judge not of felicity before death," he concludes.

Subdued he may have been, but he was stubborn to the last. Before his execution at Tyburn on March 13, he made his last *apologia*, and pertinaciously clung to the quibble upon which he based his defence at his trial. He had no part in the insurrection as it actually developed, he reiterated, and was innocent of any intent to harm the Queen. "The plot itself," he went on, warming to the familiar theme, "which never came into execution, but was long in projection, consisted of two parts, the intention and the means how to accomplish it." Here he was interrupted by Lord Grey, who told him that this was no time for logic, and that he abused his good parts in so seeking to justify himself. As nevertheless he continued, protesting his loyalty to the Queen, Meyrick, who was executed after him, broke in and "advised him to spare a discourse, which however rational was not very seasonable." Meyrick was a bravo, and never disputed at Oxford.

Cuffe was thirty-eight. That is too young for a scholar to die. His name served for a generation or so to point a moral or adorn a tale. Francis Osborn pointed the moral: "Mingle not your interest with a great man's, made desperate by debt, or court-injuries, whose breaking out prove fatal to their wisest followers and friends; averred in the last earl of Essex but one, where Merick his steward, and Cuff his secretary, tho' of excellent parts, were both hanged." Aubrey adorned the tale, improving on the contest of syllogisms: "Cuff was a smart man and a great Scholer and baffled [Coke]. Said Cooke, *Dominum cognoscite vestrum*. Cuff replied, My Lord, you leave out the former part of the verse, which you should have repeated, *Actaeon ego sum*, reflecting on his being a Cuckold." He will escape oblivion so long as scholars (and romancers) busy themselves with the riddle of his master's character and fate. Poor Cuffe, he almost exists at second hand: his name on other men's title-pages and buried in their prefaces; a

translation from the Greek (into Latin) of Gelasius Cyzicenus' *De rebus gestis in sancto consilio Nicaeno*, "The Earl of Essex his buzze," the "Aphorismes," all "attributed" to him; his words at the great crisis of his life edited for propaganda purposes; even his book a posthumous transcript by a next-to-anonymous hand. It is somehow appropriate that when in 1607 the printer Burby took over from Martin Clerke the copyright of the *Differences*, the entry in the Stationers' Register should call it "a booke of nobodyes [doing]."

It was his ill fortune to have come to maturity just at the wrong time. In the *mêlée* of Reformation controversy and place-seeking, or later, in the troubles of the sixteen-forties, he might have succeeded in leaving a larger mark upon the history of England. What Sir Henry Wotton called "the setting age" of Elizabeth was a waiting time, and Cuffe could not or would not wait. He belonged to a generation of malcontents; his life illustrated the complaints in the "Parnassus" plays of the "thwarted destinies" of scholars. Many of his contemporaries existed on what Burton called "falconer's wages" as pamphleteers and minor secretaries, or, disappointed curates, printed sermons against simony, usury, and the fatness of the pursy times. The more devout and reckless of the Catholic younger sons, the "expatriates" of their time, set off for Rheims and Rome, hungry for power or an imagined martyrdom. Cuffe was denied these splendours and miseries. He was one of those who are destined to be the captives rather than the commanders of circumstance. No fate more certain than this for the scholar; the scholar exploits ideas but not himself, and his intellect, though it may be powerful, is rarely supple. He comes to take his own powers for granted, and accordingly he may be either humble or arrogant, but he is not often simply clever. The most brilliant "braintruster" is usually the victim of the professional politician, for in such a contest the syllogism is a poor weapon against the shield of self-righteousness, the lance of innuendo, and the sword of influence.

Cuffe had a narrow intellect, a sanguine temperament, and a poor grasp of political realities. He was therefore the perfect servant for Essex, who time and again refused the alternatives of caution and machiavellianism, preferring the grandiose scheme prosecuted with naïve incompetence. Both were victims of their philosophy of action; neither the scholar nor the soldier can by nature or training comprehend the great virtue in statecraft of simply doing nothing, of waiting for your opponent to overreach himself by exasperated activity. This lesson the Queen had mastered almost from childhood, and she, not Cecil or Ralegh or Cobham or anyone else, was their enemy. That Cuffe dared even to consider dictating terms to her is his best claim to our remembrance.

GOLDWIN SMITH, LIBERAL

ELISABETH WALLACE

BORN in 1823, in the third year of George IV's reign, Goldwin Smith lived to see the accession of George V in 1910. He could remember, as a small boy of nine, the excitement created by the disputes over the First Reform Act, and as a ten year old the abolition of slavery. His memory went back to the days when the stocks and the curfew were both common, the night-watchman still called the hours through the streets, and the morning fires were lit in the bedrooms with the flint and steel of the era before matches. In after years he liked to recall the fact that he had heard Addington, prime minister of England in 1802, talk of Pitt, and that the Duke of Wellington, who lived in the next parish, had long been familiar to him as a neighbour. He lived to deplore the hazards created in Toronto by the influx of horseless carriages into the once peaceful streets.

Within Goldwin Smith's memory England was transformed from an aristocratic society to a modern democracy and her working people from an uneducated mass to literate voters. He was in his forties when Disraeli declared, "We do not . . . live—and I trust it will never be the fate of this country to live—under a democracy." Disraeli's disapproval might of itself have been sufficient to ensure Goldwin Smith's undying devotion to the democratic cause. The final transference of power from the monarchy and aristocracy to the cabinet, Commons, and electorate, the development of a highly organized modern party system and of a professional civil service, the growth of socialist thought and the rise of the labour movement, all took place during his lifetime. The change in public opinion may be illustrated by contrasting the *Saturday Review*'s comment in 1856 that "To a great extent, every Liberal is now a Conservative" with Sir William Harcourt's dictum in the nineties that "We are all socialists now." The Whig supporters of the 1832 Reform Act and the Liberal upholders of the Lloyd George budget of 1909 stood on very different ground. That Goldwin Smith found himself unable to move with enthusiasm from the one position to the other, and that in some respects his liberalism became outdated, is scarcely cause for wonder. Throughout his life he looked for progressive improvement, not regeneration, hoping much from gradual reform, little from violent revolution. He died four years before the outbreak of the First World War, content to describe himself as a liberal of the old school, the last of the Philosophical Radicals, and to rest with the judgment of posterity his claim to have been all his days on the side of liberal progress.

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Goldwin Smith once commented that his political consciousness was rather early awakened. It did not slumber until his death at the age of eighty-six. He supported the repeal of the Corn Laws, but was too young to take any real part in the contest. One of the prime movers, in the eighteen-fifties, for reform of Oxford University (where from 1858 to 1866 he was Regius Professor of Modern History), he was perhaps more responsible than any other single individual for the eventual abolition, in 1871, of religious tests at the universities. A member of the Church of England, he yet believed strongly in the separation of church and state, considering their union a patent injustice, which made the church political, without making the state religious. The most brilliant exposition of the Little Englanders' belief in colonial emancipation was given in the letters which he wrote for the *Daily News* in 1862–3, and which he later published in book form as *The Empire*. These imperialist or anti-imperialist views, which were broadly those of the Manchester School, are too well known to need elaboration here.

During the early stages of the American Civil War he was one of a small group of Englishmen—among whom were Bright, Cobden, John Stuart Mill, and Leslie Stephen—who strongly supported the cause of the North when majority opinion in the country, led by *The Times*, was warmly in favour of the South. Goldwin Smith spent the last three months of 1864 in the United States, travelling and lecturing and trying to persuade Americans that the hands of all Englishmen were not against them. Shortly after his return to England, Cobden wrote to John Bright, "Goldwin Smith says he has come back a confirmed radical and free churchman, and less impatient because more assured of liberal progress. . . . His pen is a power in the State."[1] For the next half century it was to remain a power in three countries—Great Britain, Canada, and the United States—all of whose politics he attempted to guide through the remote control of the press.

The American characteristic which struck him most forcibly in the eighteen-sixties was that which had so impressed De Tocqueville thirty years earlier, namely the widespread belief in equality and the relative absence of class divisions. The equality which he had in mind, and which he considered the real essence of democracy, was not that of intellect, wealth, or influence, but of status in the community and the right to consideration, equality in the sense of negation of privilege. Social equality was unpopular with later nineteenth-century English-

[1]Letter of January 16, 1865, written two and a half months before Cobden died on April 2, 1865; quoted in John Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden* (14th ed., London, 1910), 927.

men, who, as Matthew Arnold remarked, almost made a religion of inequality, a fact to which he attributed England's lack of civilization. Lord Beaconsfield, Sir Erskine May, and Robert Lowe were all its vocal critics, while Gladstone rightly pointed out that there was no political idea which had had less influence on British political institutions than the love of equality. The love of freedom itself he thought scarcely stronger in England than the love of aristocracy.[2]

Goldwin Smith was not the man to be perturbed by unpopularity. He told his fellow-countrymen that a man must go to America to appreciate what a sense of security really free institutions gave, to know not only general prosperity but the blessing of living in a state of equality instead of a society of extremes, and to understand the strength of a government which no one wished to subvert, because it was the government of the whole people. He was critical of the American system of an elective presidency and judiciary, but on the whole considered the country's local institutions the soundest and best that could be found anywhere, and he was filled with admiration for the political intelligence of her people. American respect for law and for intellectual distinction both impressed him. His republican sympathies were apparent in his comment that in the United States the greatness of a nation was substituted for individual greatness, a community for a king and his subjects, and attachment to the common good for loyalty to a crown. American political institutions seemed to him to result from and to reflect the national character even more than they moulded it. His belief in the separation of church and state was apparent in his conclusion that "not democracy in America, but free Christianity in America was the real key to the study of the people and their institutions." Since democracy, like all political arrangements, dealt with the shallower interests of man, he thought that deducing from it the more fundamental parts of the character of the people was reversing the proper order of causation.

No less apparent was the true Manchester School enthusiasm for laissez-faire in his conclusion that "Not the special form of the government, but the comparative absence of necessity for government, is the thing to be noted and admired, politically speaking, in the United States. The proper sphere of government is compulsion. The necessity for it in any given community is in inverse proportion to the social virtue and intelligence of the people. . . . It is destined to decrease as Christianity increases, and as force is superseded by social affection, and spontaneous combination for the common good. The more a

[2]Matthew Arnold, "Equality," *Fortnightly Review*, XXIII (March, 1878), 313–34; reprinted in Arnold's *Mixed Essays* (New York, 1899).

community can afford to dispense with government, the more Christian it must be, and no great country has yet been able to dispense with government so much as America."[3]

Goldwin Smith's attachment to free trade was reflected in his opinion that Peel, Bright, and Cobden were the three men who had done most for the English people in the nineteenth century. His inclination to assume a certain divine merit for what he believed in, and his tendency to interpret history in the light of the present were both illustrated by his comment in an essay on Pitt that "in the mind of Pitt, as in that of Adam Smith, as in that of Cobden, as in the counsels of Providence, free trade was connected with a policy of peace and goodwill among nations."[4] Despite this comprehensive tribute, Goldwin Smith was not a free trade purist, though he never altered his opinion that it was, as a rule, the dictate of plain common sense. He was, he said, a moderate free trader, who believed that there might well be practical exceptions to a practical principle. Fiscal and economic questions seemed to him matters not of inflexible law, but of expediency, to be settled in accordance with the merits or the particular case. He did not assume the absolute truth, as immutable principles, of either free trade or protection. Both, he thought, were alike out of the question on the North American continent under the circumstances which prevailed toward the end of the nineteenth century. Consequently he was quite prepared to grant, in a country like Canada where he made his home after 1871, that there might be something to be said for a temporary tariff to foster the development of young industries. But he never lost faith in commercial union, which he believed to be the logical prelude to the political union between Canada and the United States to which both Bright and Cobden had looked forward, and whose advent Goldwin Smith himself had foretold since the early eighteen-sixties. Hope deferred brought neither disillusionment nor doubt as to the rightness of his views. In 1902 he was still prophesying that the winter of protection on the North American continent was breaking up and that the spring of free trade was at hand.[5]

Like most other men Goldwin Smith was both more radical and

[3]*The Civil War in America, an Address read at the Last Meeting of the Manchester Union and Emancipation Society* (London, 1866), 11; *Oxford Chronicle*, July 21, 1866: report of Goldwin Smith's address to the Oxford Reform League; "The Experience of the American Comonwealth," *Essays on Reform* (by various authors) (London, 1867), 235–7; "The Aim of Reform," *Fortnightly Review*, XI (March, 1872), 243–64.

[4]*Three English Statesmen: A Course of Lectures on the Political History of England* (revised ed., London, 1868), 122–3, 143.

[5]June 20, 1879, to G. W. Curtis (University of Toronto Library collection of unpublished Goldwin Smith letters); letters of March 25, 1874, in the Montreal *Witness*, of November 2, 1882, in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, of July 27 and September

more optimistic, doubtless more radical because more optimistic, when he was young. In the first flush of his enthusiasm for the United States, in the eighteen-sixties and seventies, he was inclined to compare all things American with those which were British very much to the disadvantage of the latter. To President White of Cornell he wrote from England on February 14, 1874: "I prize my connection with Cornell all the more when I come into contact with this odious Plutocracy, with its colossal selfishness and rottenness and its State Church hypocrisies. What Carthage may have been we cannot tell, but since Carthage such a domination of wealth has not been seen. The Tory victory involves no great change. It is little more than a substitution of Plutocrats calling themselves Conservatives for Plutocrats calling themselves Liberals. But the great combination of the rich against the labouring classes is more marked and more hateful. . . . I see the faults and dangers of democracy; but I wonder every day how anyone can live in the Old World who has once known the New." As Bagehot remarked, Goldwin Smith was "no unfavourable judge of anything American."[6]

His enthusiasm for the political institutions of the United States led him to argue in favour of fixing by law both the duration of parliament and the time for elections in British countries. In later years he consistently minimized the importance of the distinctions between cabinet and presidential government, probably because their significance was commonly stressed by opponents of his favourite project of union between Canada and the United States. His approval of the cabinet system was in any event modified by his deep mistrust of parties, for he saw clearly enough that cabinet government necessarily rests upon party alignments. Although he realized the weaknesses of checks and balances he was convinced that democracy needed some bridle. The American safeguards of the separation of powers, the presidential veto, an indirectly elected Senate, and a written constitution interpreted by a Supreme Court, he contrasted with the defenceless and perilous position of Great Britain, with no bulwarks

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13, 1887, and of February 24, 1888, in the Toronto *Mail*, and of April 23, 1895, in the *Globe*.

Cobden's prophecy of the ultimate union of Canada and the United States, at least "for all purposes of free intercommunication" was made in a letter of March 9, 1848, to Senator Charles Sumner, quoted in J. A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden* (New York, 1919), 339–40. Goldwin Smith commented on Cobden's attitude in an article on "Peel and Cobden," *Nineteenth Century*, XI (June, 1882), 869–89. John Bright wrote in glowing terms of "one vast confederation . . . one people and one language and one law and one faith, and over all that wide continent the home of freedom and a refuge for the oppressed of every age and clime,"—a vision calculated to appeal more forcibly to the Manchester Liberal than to the French Canadian.

[6]Preface to the second (1872) edition of Bagehot's *English Constitution*.

against revolution but an ancient and powerless monarchy and a doomed aristocracy. The only really effective conservative check in the United Kingdom to his mind was the non-payment of members of parliament, and this he foresaw would not last long. He concluded that England needed a written constitution, interpreted by a court of law, since informal traditions and understandings might be adequate as long as government was vested in statesmen with similar ideas who walked in ancestral paths, but did not command the same respect under totally different social conditions.[7]

The power of an American president, he noted shrewdly, was greater than was commonly supposed, and if the constitutions of England and America were compared with regard to their substance, instead of their form, it would be found that that of England approached more nearly to an aristocratic republic and that of the United States to a popular and elective monarchy. In Great Britain democracy had penetrated unawares beneath the mantle of the old feudal constitution, although people still fancied that power continued to reside in its monarchical and aristocratic forms.[8] There is a suggestion here of the distinction made by Bagehot some fifteen years earlier between the dignified and efficient parts of the constitution, and more than a suggestion of his famous comment that "a republic has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a monarchy." Goldwin Smith was convinced that among progressive nations hereditary government had had its day, and that election had become the only solid foundation for government, and the only real source of authority.

For the occupants of thrones, as involuntary captives, he felt a certain sympathy, but for the aristocracy he had no good word to say. It had become, in his eyes, merely a privileged class, subjected to the corrupting influences of luxury, wealth, and a social position assured without exertion. Nor was he prepared to marvel, with Matthew Arnold, that human beings in a position so false should on the whole be so good. Since public virtue was not hereditary, he saw no reason why titles should be. The British aristocracy struck him as the most formidable existing enemy to human progress and happiness, and his vitriolic attacks on the institutions of the governor-generalship and titles in Canada sprang from his conviction that "colonial flunkeyism" in the New World was little short of a crime. Surely, he suggested, in a letter to a friend, there should be some limits to the fatuous worship of people who, as Macaulay said of George III, had "no merits but

[7]"The Canadian Question," *The Independent* (New York), February 23, 1888; "The Organization of Democracy," *Contemporary Review*, XLVII (March, 1885), 315–33; letter to the *London Advertiser*, February 8, 1895.

[8]*The Civil War in America*, 54; "The Conflict With the Lords," *Contemporary Review*, XLVI (Sept., 1884), 13–21.

abstinence from adultery and a preference for roast mutton."[9] For the House of Lords, as it was constituted, he had nothing but criticism, until it eventually in part redeemed itself in his eyes by rejecting Home Rule for Ireland, Asquith's "socialistic" legislation, and the Lloyd George budget.

His conviction that election was the only solid foundation for democracy did not blind him to the dangers of popular government. The self-worship of the sovereign people he found odious, and he constantly pointed out that democracy, like other forms of government, had its own special vices, being beset by corruption, by popular passion, by the ostracism of merit, by the oppression of classes not numerically strong, and above all, by faction, which in good eighteenth-century style was his common term for party. It would be difficult to say which he detested more, aristocracy or the party system. His violent attacks on party can be best understood in the light of the fact that the first half of his life was lived before any real organization of parties on a national scale had developed. In the eighteen-eighties Sir Henry Maine, in a cursory discussion of their role in popular governments, linked together as twin phenomena party and corruption. Lord Acton considered that Goldwin Smith, for all his vehemence against parties, had, if anything, understated the case against a system whose effects on the elected were no less disgraceful than on the electors, and which taught honourable men to say what they knew to be false and to advocate what they believed to be wrong. His proposal for the abolition of party, however, struck Acton as chimerical.[10]

It was Goldwin Smith's contention that parties were justified when there were real issues of principle to divide them, but that in the absence of such issues, as for instance, in Canada, the system degenerated into a mere struggle for power between the ins and the outs. He thought the ordinary voter incapable of deciding upon the general policy of the country, since he had not the leisure, even if he had the knowledge and ability, to make an adequate study of the complex questions placed before him. The elector, transformed from a subject to a participant in sovereign power, found himself reduced to voting a straight party ticket. Nowhere but in politics, Goldwin Smith argued, was it proposed to thrust upon men responsibility of which evidently they could make no intelligent use. The theory that people were divided by nature into Conservatives or Liberal might best, he thought,

[9]Letters to G. W. Curtis, December 2, 1876, and July 3, 1877 (University of Toronto Library collection of Goldwin Smith letters). Cf. also his *Three English Statesmen*, 49.

[10]Review by Lord Acton of Goldwin Smith's *Three English Statesmen* in the *Chronicle*, August 31, 1867, reprinted in Acton's *Essays on Church and State* (London, 1952), 406–10.

be relegated to the sphere of comic opera, since the shades of temperamental differences, both political and otherwise, were numberless. In a sense there were as many natural parties as there were individuals, the same man being quite likely to be conservative on one question and radical on another, and the young being, as a rule, more progressive than the old. Burke's famous definition seemed to Goldwin Smith to read like a satire on actual parties. He only wished that Burke had had an opportunity to attend an American national party convention.

The theory that the sovereign people would elect the best men was, he contended, an illusion, since even in the improbable event that they were willing to do so, the best men would not allow themselves to be elected. Among other things, they could not afford it. Yet Goldwin Smith was never reconciled to the payment of members in Great Britain, thinking this merely an invitation to those who desired public office for the wrong motives, though after living in Canada he came regretfully to the conclusion that in a frontier community, where there was no leisured class of wealthy men, some payment was necessary. On the question of party, as on other issues, he found the role of a destructive critic easier and more congenial than that of a constructive reformer. He had no more practical solution to offer for the ills of the party system than to recommend that it be abolished, that the members of the legislature be elected like those "of any other board," and that they should then be allowed to nominate certain of their own body to serve as an administrative council. Many of his friends, as well as his opponents, argued with him concerning his stand against parties, but they all had the same experience as Bryce, who declared that he was never able to extract from Goldwin Smith, for all his political acumen and mastery of history, how democratic government could be carried on without them.[11]

Despite his fears as to what might be expected of the ordinary voter, in his early days he took an active part in the agitation for extending the franchise which preceded the passage of the Second Reform Act, with the result that he was denounced by Lord Elcho, during a parliamentary debate, as "an advocate of republicanism" whom it was strange to see holding a professorship at Oxford. Goldwin Smith repudiated as unjust, and ultimately as revolutionary, the doctrine which sentenced to perpetual exclusion from political rights five-

[11]James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (London, 1929), I, 138, note 1. Some discussion of Goldwin Smith's views on parties may be found in his article on "The Organization of Democracy," and in the *Proceedings* of the Canadian Club (Toronto, 1904), reporting an address delivered by him to the Canadian Club on February 8, 1904.

sixths of the English people. He saw no remedy for the class government which England had in the mid-nineteenth century save one which was truly national, and saw no foundation on which a truly national government could be based save the votes of the nation. He called, therefore, for a free parliament, arguing that those who thought that a fair distribution of political power would result in anarchy, and that order could be secured at the expense of justice, vastly underrated the good sense of the ordinary man.

The reasons for Mill's opposition to the secret ballot he could not comprehend, nor had he any faith in proportional representation, which he thought apt to result in "torpid compromise." An educational test for the franchise, however, seemed to him indispensable, and he criticized Disraeli's Second Reform Act, as it finally passed, on the ground that it was a stroke of party strategy, intended to "dish the Whigs" rather than to improve the government of the country, and likely to arrest progress by swamping intelligence. Similarly he criticized the Third Reform Act, partly because it enfranchised the illiterate, and partly because of the great increase of power which it gave to the Irish vote. In later years he argued that it was desirable that every one who was at all capable of using it well should have political power. But he did not think it desirable that people totally incapable of making a good use of power should possess it. "If government of the people is to be government of ignorance and irresponsibility, it will fall. To stand, it must be government by the intelligence of the community in the interest of the whole." He agreed that every man had a natural right to justice and fair treatment. But the idea that he had a natural right to political power, regardless of whether there was any chance of his using it for the benefit of the community, or of whether he knew anything about the question on which he was to vote, ought in Goldwin Smith's opinion to be "relegated to that limbo near the moon to which reason has now sent the Jeffersonian generalities of the preamble to the Declaration of Independence." University representation, such as existed in England and was suggested in Canada, he consistently opposed, believing that while if the universities were worth anything they would make their influence felt in politics, it was yet undesirable that they should be directly involved in party struggles. Theirs, he thought, should be neutral territory, and a serener air.[12]

In an unguarded moment he had signed Mill's petition for extending

[12]Letters to the *Daily News*, May 6, 1865, and September 24, 1866; "The University of Oxford," *Lectures on the Study of History* (2nd ed., New York, 1865), 257; "Is Universal Suffrage a Failure?" *Atlantic Monthly*, XLIII (Jan., 1879), 71–83; *Bystander* (Oct., 1889), 18; *Weekly Sun* (Toronto), May 27, 1903, and January 27, 1909.

the terms of the Second Reform Act to give women the suffrage. Of this early indiscretion he later, like Bright, bitterly and publicly repented. He gave as one reason for his change of heart on the subject that he had not then "seen the public life of women in the United States," and that he had since discovered that the most sensible women of his acquaintance viewed the prospect of the franchise with great mistrust. He believed that women would not be improved by politics, nor politics by women. Women, he remarked, had already invaded some of the male professions, and intended to invade the rest. They had usurped man's headgear and ulster, had made their way to the smoking-room, and had mounted the bicycle. He deplored the fact that political parties were prepared to make capital out of the revolt of woman, and he warned the Conservatives that the most active female politicians were sure to be radicals. The Conservative women, he prophesied, would stay at home. Even worse, the political woman would be an authoritative radical, prone not only to sentimental, but to arbitrary legislation. Women, he argued, were not an unrepresented class, but a sex, whose interests were completely identified with those of their husbands, brothers, and sons. Moreover, government rested ultimately on force, and force was male. This argument that government rests in the last resort on force, in contradistinction to T. H. Green's contention that will, not force, is the basis of the state, recurs in many of Goldwin Smith's writings, although on occasion he argued that in the New World at least the only conceivable basis for government was the national will. Yet he was troubled by the consideration that it was government by the reason rather than the will of the people which was really needed, and that this popular representation could scarcely be trusted to ensure.

When in 1889 a proposal to give the vote to unmarried women property owners was being considered by the British parliament, Goldwin Smith wrote *The Times* asking, "To the denationalized factory hands, the ignorant farm labourers, and the rebel Irish, if you add the irresponsible emotions of the woman, what sort of a constituency will you have and in what hands will England be? "On this the *Pall Mall Gazette* commented: "Burke refused to draw an indictment against a nation, but Mr. Goldwin Smith has grown so hardened to drawing indictments against Ireland that he now thinks nothing of impeaching one half the human race."[13]

[13]*The Times* and the *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 3, 1889; "Female Suffrage," *Macmillan's Magazine*, XXX (June, 1874), 139–50; "England Revisited," *ibid.*, LIV (Oct., 1886), 401–12; "Conservatism and Female Suffrage," *National Review*, X (Feb., 1888), 735–52; "The American Commonwealth," *Macmillan's Magazine*, LIX (Feb., 1889), 241–53; "Woman's Place in the State," *The Forum*, III (1890), 515–30.

His attitude towards democracy was analogous to that of Mill and Bagehot and Maine. Like his illustrious contemporaries he believed that democracy was inevitable, and that it was, on the whole, good. Yet his intellectual approval, like theirs, was tempered by the conviction that it had its perils which required appropriate safeguards, and by forebodings which he could not repress as to the outcome of government by collective mediocrity. Of all despots the worst, he thought, was a despotic assembly. Democracy he upheld; but demagogism, to which he considered all public bodies liable when prizes were available for unprincipled ambition, he deplored. The day came when he declared that the most remarkable example he knew of the difference between demagogism and liberalism was "the once almost seditious and now tyrannically Tory [Toronto] *Globe*."[14] Mill himself was not more distrustful of the tyranny of majorities. Was their right, asked Goldwin Smith, divine? Were people in conscience bound to allow themselves to be voted to perdition? And what exactly was this people, whose worship had succeeded to the worship of kings, and was too often no less abject and no less subversive of political virtue? "On the lips of demagogues it means the masses without the classes, that is, without the education and intelligence."[15]

He was also at one with Mill in his belief that constitutions are not made, but grow, and that if they are to be strong and win respect, they must be developed by a nation out of its own circumstances and character, not imposed upon it from above. "Free institutions," he wrote in 1890, "will not make free natures, and small is the number of those who are by nature free. Most of us crave for a sheepfold and a shibboleth." Happily, he concluded, political institutions killed as seldom as they cured. And if he could on occasion be scathing concerning the shortcomings of the ways in which free institutions actually worked, he yet believed profoundly in the greatness of the statesman's task. "If public life is the noblest of all callings," he more than once declared, "it is the vilest of all trades."[16]

Notwithstanding his fears about the various defects of democracy, Goldwin Smith yet thought it better than the alternatives of government by hereditary right or by sheer force. If we despair of democracy, he asked pertinently, whither are we to flee? Democracy was on trial. It was an experiment which the world could not help making, when despotism and feudalism had become outmoded, an experiment which

[14]Letter to G. W. Curtis, June 3, 1881 (University of Toronto Library).
[15]"The Political Crisis in England," *Essays on Questions of the Day* (Toronto, 1893), 113–22.
[16]"On the Foundation of the American Colonies," *Lectures on Modern History*, delivered in Oxford, 1859–61 (Oxford, 1861), 19–20; *Bystander* (Jan., 1890), 109.

promised the hope of far better things to come, but one destined to be an arduous undertaking, both for his own and for succeeding generations. The nineteenth century, which had seen the birth of democracy, seemed to him, despite all its blunders, shortcomings, and disappointments, incomparably more fruitful than any preceding century, both in real progress and in the increase of real happiness. Among the chief causes of the advent of democracy he considered the development of industry and popular education, but to these he thought there must undoubtedly be added the influence of Christian beliefs on society and politics. It seemed to him both foolish and dangerous to take a ballot box for a universal regenerator, but no less foolish or dangerous to adopt Carlyle's hero worship and take a man for a god. He borrowed a phrase from Carlyle's own vocabulary in describing the doctrine that might makes right as "an everlasting lie." His inquiry as to what were the distinctive marks of the bell-wether and how people were to be sure that the god was not false, apply even more aptly to the twentieth century than to his own. That democracy, in its current form, would prove the last birth of time, he thought unlikely. The real task of statesmen was to enlighten it and if possible to organize it in such a way that the governing power should not be mere will or emotion but the reason and conscience of the community. A democratic government of passion, like that of the Jacobins, seemed to him of all tyrannies the most intolerable. Unless power was combined with a sense of duty it could only do harm, whether it was held by a tyrant or a mob.[17]

As he grew older, Goldwin Smith's hopes for democracy became somewhat dimmer and his fears of its possible excesses more lively, though he still liked to quote Bacon's maxim, "That which man changes not for the better, time, the great innovator, changes for the worse." When in 1893–4 he paid a seven months' visit to the United Kingdom, journalists asked him to comment on his impressions of the changes which had taken place in the British political scene since he had last been in England. The monarchy, he replied, had almost ceased to exercise any real political force, and the House of Commons had taken unto itself not only all the legislative power but also the virtual appointment of the executive. The majority in the Commons had become not only radical but revolutionary, responsive to the will

[17]Review of "Carlyle's Early Kings of Norway," *Nation* (New York), XXIII (Sept. 21, 1876), 184–5; *The Conduct of England to Ireland, an Address delivered at Brighton, January 30, 1882* (London, 1882), 3; *The Week* (Toronto), October 30, 1884; "The Moral of the Late Crisis," *Nineteenth Century*, XX (Sept., 1886), 305–21; signed editorial, "Is Democracy Dying?" *New York Sun*, August 18, 1895; "Chief Justice Clark on the Defects of the American Constitution," *North American Review*, CLXXXIII (Nov., 1906), 845–51.

of the wage-earners who, having secured political power, were now inclined to use it to effect industrial and social change. Lord Rosebery's ministry he described as "a Home Rule and Socialist Government." He was scandalized by the Newcastle Programme of 1891, while the Eight Hours Act and the Employers' Liability Bill both seemed to him an interference with liberty of contract. Next, he feared, would come old age pensions. Though the party from which such measures emanated retained the name of Liberal, he held that it was, in truth, no longer Liberal, but socialistic. Members of parliament hardly kept up the pretence of voting according to their conscience, but obeyed the dictates of the caucus, till they were reduced to the status, not merely of delegates, but of political messengers. The members of the House of Lords at least had not sold their political souls to Mr. Schnadhorst or the Irish. Lacking any effective check, he feared that an English parliament might overnight change fundamental institutions, dismember the realm (i.e., grant Irish Home Rule), or pass sweeping measures of agrarian confiscation.

What struck him most in England on his return to it after several years' absence was the decline of the landed gentry, once a great power in the country, but now impoverished, and the advance of semi-socialism. An old Liberal like himself found "quite a different set of principles attached to the name from those in which he was brought up. Then we wanted to restrict government to its necessary functions, and leave the rest to individual initiative and decision. Now the tendency is greatly to enlarge the sphere of government, and extend it even to private and domestic matters. It may be, of course, that they are right and I am wrong, but all I want is that if they are going to place all these matters in the hands of 'government,' they should tell us what their government is to be."[18]

The return to power of the Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith ministry in 1906 was not calculated to allay Goldwin Smith's fears. In private letters to friends he advocated "a general combination of Moderates to make head against Socialism and revolution." He thought Asquith able, but his party no longer entitled to style itself Liberal when it was in fact a jumble of liberalism, Home Rule, radicalism, labourism, and socialism. The Lloyd George budget was both socialistic and political. In a letter to Lord Channing, speaking of Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, he said, "I can conceive nothing worse befalling the country than its getting into the hands of such

[18]Interview with Goldwin Smith in the *London Illustrated News*, March 24, 1894; "The Impending Revolution," *Nineteenth Century*, XXV (March, 1894), 353–66; "Problems and Perils of British Politics," *North American Review* (July, 1894); letter to *The Times*, April 22, 1895.

men, with an infuriated Socialism behind them. The certainty that they would presently share the fate of the Girondins would not be a great consolation."[19] Views enunciated at the age of eighty-six are not considered opinions, and should not be taken too seriously. Goldwin Smith's were certainly startling. His dislike of old age pensions, of the budget, and of Lloyd George and Churchill as people led him to offer the amazing advice, for a student of British constitutional problems, that the Lords should save the country by rejecting first the old age pensions bill and then the budget. It also led him to the even more extraordinary suggestion, in 1910, that the country should be saved by rallying the nation around the king. Fortunately he did not live to see the passage of the Parliament Act.

If Goldwin Smith was unable to agree with L. T. Hobhouse that socialism was the spiritual heir of liberalism, there was one liberal tenet from which he never deviated, a passionate belief in liberty, above all in freedom of opinion. Whole-hearted devotion to independent thought inspired his long career as a writer and was the major reason why he prefered the profession of a journalist to that of a politician, which he was frequently urged to adopt. He did not think it possible to be at the same time a journalist and the holder of public office, and he was by temperament far too much of an individualist ever to have been a good party man. One of his chief counts against parties was that they required great repression of individual opinion. A born controversialist, he never lacked convictions, nor suffered from doubts as to their rightness. Controversy did not seem to him an evil when conducted temperately. And in John Morley's opinion no one—not even Dizzy himself—was Goldwin Smith's equal in pungent controversy, nor could anyone write more perfect English. Discussion, he argued, was the only guarantee against the possible bad consequences of human speculation; since it was therefore necessary, it should not be condemned as offensive. The day, he hoped, would soon come when there was general agreement that liberty of opinion was the most precious of all liberties, and that complete freedom of discussion, "unchecked by threats either of faggots or of frowns" was the only conceivable guarantee of any kind of truth. In the democracies of the New World, he once remarked, where to be in a minority was perdition, political courage was not a common virtue.[20] The courage to be in a

[19]Letters: to Lord Channing, dated October 11, 1909, to Sir Robert Mowbray, March 7 and October 8, 1906, and January 11, 1907, and to General J. H. Wilson, June 15, 1908 (copies of all these are in the unpublished Goldwin Smith Papers, Cornell University Library).

[20]*Rational Religion and the Rationalistic Objections of the Bampton Lectures for 1858* (Oxford, 1861), v–vi; *Bystander* (July, 1880), 389; *Canada and the Canadian Question* (Toronto, 1891); *Weekly Sun*, August 4, 1898; John Morley, *Recollections* (London, 1917), II, 334.

minority, frequently a minority of one (for he had a genius for espousing unpopular causes), and yet to avow one's faith openly, was a virtue which Goldwin Smith himself possessed to a high degree. He was never afraid to say what he thought was true.

Journalism was his chosen calling because he believed that parliaments were losing much of their importance, and that the real theatre of deliberation was being transferred to the press and periodicals, where the great questions of the day were virtually settled. This view he supported by pointing out that parliamentary speeches largely reproduced arguments already heard outside the House, and that parliamentary divisions were chiefly notable as an index of public opinion. How far the process might go, with the spread of education, and what value parliamentary debates and division lists would in the end retain, he was not prepared to prophesy. But he thought it incontestable that the press, rather than parliament or the platform, had become the real forum of public debate, and that a good article or letter was worth as much as a good speech. This belief he certainly practised, as an effective and inveterate writer of letters to the press, as a brilliant essayist, and as probably the last of the great pamphleteers. He was ready to admit that as society advanced it might demand some political guidance more responsible and more philosophical than that of the anonymous journalist. But in the latter half of the nineteenth century, at any rate, he had no doubt that the journalist reigned supreme, and that his pen had superseded, not only the sceptre of the monarch, but the tongue of the parliamentary orator. The formation, through the press, of the public opinion which the parliamentary vote merely reflected, seemed to Goldwin Smith a more important task than that of the member of parliament. Consequently he considered it essential to preserve responsible and independent journalism.[21]

His willingness to practise his precepts was illustrated when the *Weekly Sun*, in which he held a controlling interest, lost half of its circulation almost overnight, because of its outspoken opposition to the Boer War, at a time when the Dominion was in the first flush of war-bred enthusiasm, fanned by almost every other journal in English-speaking Canada. When a critic (Sir John Willison) charged him with "persistent assertion of unpopular opinion," he retorted, "without 'persistent assertion of unpopular opinions,' to what would the world have come? We might now be worshipping Thor and Woden. No opinion could be more unpopular in its day than disbelief in witchcraft."[22]

[21]"The Moral of the Late Crisis," 315–21; letter to G. W. Curtis, June 6, 1879 (University of Toronto Library).

[22]Letter to *Weekly Sun*, May 6, 1903. Cf. also "The Study of History," *Atlantic Monthly*, XXV (1870), 44–56; "The Machinery of Elective Government," *Nineteenth Century*, XI (Jan., 1882), 126–48.

Goldwin Smith clearly wore his liberalism with a difference. A Little Englander, he yet looked forward to the coming together of the English-speaking peoples of the world in a wider and freer union than that of the nineteenth-century British Empire. An adherent of the Manchester School, he yet voted for Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy. An advocate of colonial emancipation, he was a violent opponent of Irish Home Rule. A Liberal Unionist, he was a bitter critic of absentee Irish landlords and preached incessantly that dependencies were destined to become independent. Nothing ever convinced him that Home Rule would be good for Ireland or that independence within the Empire was seriously possible for Canada. He believed in an extended franchise, but not for women; he supported the removal of restrictions upon trade union activities, but abhorred strikes and class bitterness; he favoured the free development of creeds and cultures, but deplored those of French Canada. There was truth in a contemporary critic's description of him as "an arrested Liberal." A Peelite at heart and the last of the early Victorians, his liberalism seems to have been arrested about the time when he left England in 1868, to make his home on this side of the Atlantic. He was then forty-five, an age at which most men's opinions have become set. Sceptical and somewhat gloomy by temperament, his cynicism was developed by first-hand contact with the less attractive side of North American democracy, though at the same time he was quick to admire its virtues.

Goldwin Smith described himself to a friend, in the eighteen-seventies, as a republican. Certainly he went farther than most Liberals in his detestation of the aristocracy and in the remarkably low value which he set upon the retention of the monarchy. Ten years later he thought he deserved the name of radical, but protested that no Conservative could be more opposed to revolution. He wrote with a touch of wistfulness in 1890 that "a loyal Englishman and a Unionist who is not a jingo, a Liberal who is not a Socialist or Revolutionist, is now a nondescript, for whom hardly any haven of refuge is open in the press." "An old-fashioned Liberal," he later lamented, "who is satisfied with political and social justice, national independence, and the full measure of individual liberty consistent with law, finds himself out of touch with his age and regarded as a political and social mastodon." An English reporter's description of him in 1907 as "a well-known exponent of Canadian Conservative opinion," must have been equally startling to Goldwin Smith and to Canadian Conservatives. But he was pleased when, two years before his death, a friend spoke of him as one who had kept the traditions of the old Radicals. An old Radical,

he affirmed, was his right designation, and the one he meant to give the porter at the gate of heaven.[23]

His comment that most people were conservative on some points and radical on others applied with peculiar force to himself. And he had a genius for being radical on matters concerning which most Canadians were conservative, and conservative where most Canadians were progressive. His aversions were many and his enthusiasms few. Yet by the end of his days, after experiencing years of being one of the most unpopular men in Canada, he had finally won the whole-hearted respect of his adopted country (where he occupied a position midway between that of an oracle and a censor), although it almost always refused to follow his advice. His influence—and want of it—was indicated by the saying that there were three parties in Canada: the Liberals, the Conservatives, and Goldwin Smith. No one ever denied his courage or his complete integrity. What he lacked was sound judgment and the admittedly rare capacity for sympathetic understanding of a point of view which he did not share. He was a true son of the home of lost causes. As for loyalties, those which imperialists thought impossible seemed common sense to him. Time has justified his belief that loyalty to Britain and to English traditions is compatible with the conviction that the days of a dependent colonial empire are numbered.

To the charge that he was a false prophet, who invariably espoused the cause of the underdog and the losing side, Goldwin Smith countered with equanimity that he was content to await the verdict of history. He pointed out that he had supported the repeal of the Corn Laws, the extension of the suffrage, and university reform. He had advocated the disestablishment of the Irish Church, the legalization of trade unions, and the extension of colonial self-government. He had defended the side of the North against the South in the American Civil War and had attacked the part played by England in both the Crimean and the Boer Wars. He admitted that his views concerning the future destiny of Canada had not been vindicated, but contended that the subject was not yet settled. Somewhat surprisingly he added that he was always for Canadian nationality, and the trend was in that direction.[24]

In a letter to a friend, written a few years before his death, he ad-

[23]Letter to G. W. Curtis, May 7, 1879 (University of Toronto Library); "The Invitation to Celebrate the French Revolution," *National Review*, XI (Aug., 1888), 729–47; letter to the *St. James Gazette*, June 4, 1890; *Weekly Sun*, September 10, 1902; an interview with Goldwin Smith, *Sheffield Daily Independent*, August 16, 1907; letter to the *Manchester Guardian*, February 3, 1908.
[24]Interview with Goldwin Smith, *World* (Toronto), November 14, 1903.

mitted the justice of a comment recently made about him by the Canadian correspondent of *The Times*, to the effect that an old man was apt to cleave to his old ideas. "My old ideas," Goldwin Smith observed, "are that morality is the foundation of the State, that a free commonwealth is better than an empire, that unnecessary war is crime and folly, and that a great industrial nation, dependent for its supplies of food and raw material on importation from abroad, is specially interested in the maintenance of peace. A tidal wave of the opposite sentiments just now prevails. But I am old enough to have stood more than once on the dry shore where a tidal wave has been."[25]

[25]Letter to Mr. John Ogilvy, vice-president of the Dundee Liberal Association, published in the *Manchester Guardian*, March 31, 1902.

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE ON THE CULTURAL OUTLOOK

S. BASTERFIELD

THE scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wrought a great change in the outlook and mode of thought of the educated mind. While the Greeks were the real founders of science, their genius was mainly philosophical and mathematical; and though they were bold thinkers and speculators, they were not fully aware of the necessity for careful and thorough observation or experimentation. Not that observation and experiment were foreign to Greek science. Aristotle was a remarkably accurate observer in biology, though not much of an experimental physicist. Archimedes was both a mathematical and an experimental physicist of high quality. Furthermore, astronomers such as Hipparchus and Ptolemy were patient and persistent observers of the motions of the heavenly bodies, the interpretation of which gave them wide scope for the application of their unusual mathematical ability. It remains nevertheless true that, by and large, the Greek mind did not attain to scientific maturity. Its chief defect was its failure to recognize the need for complete and accurate observation of relevant facts in selected fields of inquiry, and for verification of deductions from principles too frequently assumed to be self-evident. Their nature philosophy was thus of a rationalistic type largely based on *a priori* principles, although taking some account of empirical data that appeared to fit into the accepted scheme.

The Middle Ages, dominated largely by a theology which had incorporated elements of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy and science, inherited this rationalistic attitude to the world of nature. The sphere of human knowledge was finite. Its content was partly revealed through the sacred writings of Judaism and Christianity, and partly achieved by reason working from what was already known from the writings of the great secular teachers. It was a closed system which could be elaborated in more detail but which could not be modified in its essential structure. There was no real provision for the accommodation of new facts which might accrue from the independent observation of nature unbiased by prepossessions of conservative and orthodox interpretations.

It is not necessary here to analyse the conditions leading to the great revolution or to seek the causes of the growing intellectual discontent of the fifteenth century and the new craving for the experimental exploration of nature. The fact must be noted, however, that the scientific achievement of a century and a half from 1543 onward was

incomparably greater and more significant than that of the whole of the ancient and medieval periods. It is of especial interest to note how the problem of knowledge took on a new lease of life and how a new approach was developed. For centuries the main emphasis of the way of knowing had been on the process of deduction from accepted premises, usually in the form of *a priori* propositions, and mathematics was the prototype. With the rise of experimental science, the emphasis was directed, especially through the writings of Francis Bacon, to inductive reasoning or generalization from observational and experimental data with a resultant statement of principles which summarized and co-ordinated selected phenomena, thus making the world more intelligible. Inductive logic was hailed as the chief instrument of the natural sciences, the new organon, to replace the old Aristotelian logic condemned by the new philosophy as useless in the business of discovery. Bacon's exposition of the inductive method was doubtless timely, but greatly overrated, and he failed to realize that contemporary scientists were using methods which involved both induction and deduction in measures dependent on the type of problem being studied. Galileo, who was in many respects the greatest power in the whole movement, combined an experimental survey of the problem of falling bodies with a mathematical analysis that led him to his first fundamental generalization. It was the hypothetico-deductive method of Galileo that really launched modern physics on its spectacular career, and it probably represents scientific method at its best.

Descartes, the second distinguished exponent of method, as a mathematician, stressed the deductive process of reasoning from first principles intuitively discerned. He felt that all sound knowledge should be built upon mathematical lines and that clear ideas could only be initially obtained by doubting customary convictions and authoritative dogmas and starting from the basic assumption of the relation of thought to being. He deduced the external world from his proof of the existence of God in purely rationalistic fashion, while the empiricist Bacon planned all knowledge to start from the sense data provided by the operations of the external world which was itself taken for granted. In a sense the work of these two was complementary and exercised great influence on the subsequent development of scientific thought. In particular, three points may be noted.

Both of these men professed emancipation from the bondage of ancient and medieval thought, Bacon especially deriding the barren results of Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy. Descartes, as a result of his systematic doubting of all previous knowledge, especially such as he had acquired from the schools, held all ancient learning to

be of little significance. "His wisdom," as W. Wallace has said, "grew mainly out of his own reflections and experiments."[1] He read little of the work of others. He was preoccupied with his observations of nature and his reflections on both physical and human nature. In his physiology, as in his cosmology, he made up in imagination for his lack of knowledge of fact. He was the exemplar of the scientist who regards learning and the heritage of past thought as of minor importance and scarcely worthy of consideration. This is an unmistakable mark left by Descartes on the outlook of many of his successors.

Bacon, further, in his vision of the future of the world under the sway of science, extolled the scientific method as the only way to the conquest of nature with its untold possibilities of wealth and power for mankind. His vision came to be accepted by many of his followers as the goal and purpose of science. The scientific outlook was to be forward, not backward. The past was dead and its wisdom obsolete. The brave new world was to be scientific, and knowledge would be built up on a broad basis of observation and experiment. This too has become the mark of a type of scientific philosophy.

Finally the Cartesian dualism of the *res extensa* and the *res cogitans,* or the splitting of the world into mind and matter, became accepted as an obvious common sense truth. Man himself was a mind shut up somehow in a material body—the ghost in the machine as Professor Ryle puts it—through the medium of which he observed the external world of matter and motion. To the scientist, the external world was the real world, independent and self-sustaining, and unaffected by the *res cogitans* except in so far as the latter could be regarded as reacting to the impressions it received from the movements of the *res extensa.* The metaphysical difficulties of this situation were not generally appreciated. What might be called the inner life of the mind was largely ignored by the scientist, who was inclined to dismiss it, if not as illusory, as something for the philosophers and theologians to worry about if they so desired. The important point is that in the subsequent history of scientific thought we find this kind of belief pretty firmly ingrained, with the consequence that science and philosophy drifted steadily apart and the scientist became largely indifferent to the humanistic values.

Yet in spite of their boasted claim to freedom from the dead hand of the past, it is evident that the impress of the great system of medieval thought was not erased from the minds of these two so easily as they imagined. It reveals itself in their presuppositions and modes of argument, and serves to show how hard it is to escape the moulds of thought

[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th ed., *s.v.* "Descartes."

into which one's fluid mind is apt to be run in early life. Whitehead has said that "Galileo owes more to Aristotle than appears on the surface of his dialogue; he owes to him his clear head and his analytic mind."[2] The same may be said perhaps of Bacon and Descartes and all their spiritual descendants, who often pride themselves on having achieved emancipation from a past of which they are generally ignorant. It has been the Leibnitzs and Whiteheads, the Goethes and Cassirers who have best known and understood the past, who have been most completely at liberty and have realized most fully the nature of man and his world.

Despite the rationalism of Descartes, which was essentially in the scholastic tradition, science was a movement of revolt against rationalism and a swearing of allegiance to "irreducible and stubborn facts," to use a favourite phrase of William James. This was evident in the Baconian method with its tedious mechanical sorting and classifying of facts as a necessary step to the formulation of a law or principle embodied in the examined data. To many the watchword of the new movement was "facts not principles," and even now, assertive practical men talk as if the great virtue of science lies in gathering facts and more facts. What science, of course, is really concerned with is the relationship of facts to theoretical ideas. This is what was new at the opening of the modern period. There was a growing desire to widen knowledge of the world by a more searching examination of data, but it was balanced by an equal determination to understand facts and give them meaning by relating them to theoretical principles derived by the synthetic activity of human reason. In other words, while the scientific movement was a revolt against a type of rationalism that cramped the free constructive activities of the mind, it was not a revolt against reason as such in favour of intuitionism or an irrational emotionalism. It was a recognition of the wider powers of reason and a demand for a fuller rationalism unstarved by timid authoritarian inhibitions. It was a call to new adventures in thought, adventures such as those that had set Greece on the intellectual pinnacle of the ancient world.

The great physical synthesis of Newton which crowned the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, was a brilliant example of the new approach to an interpretation of nature. It not only enlarged man's vision of the physical universe and emphasized its unity, but it brought to him a new understanding of his own powers and his relation to the universe around him. It is true that he was demoted from the centre of the old Aristotelian universe, but he began to realize that his own

[2]*Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge, 1928), 15.

significance was not necessarily correlated with size or position in time and space. He was bound to be the centre of his universe whatever his location. The important thing for him was to view and understand his universe by as many avenues of approach as possible. It was inevitable that there would be conflicts between the old and new views, with the new often running to extremes and going beyond rational bounds in excess of enthusiasm over its achievements. A strong anti-metaphysical and positivistic bias was set up as a partial consequence of the Newtonian synthesis. Newton aspired to keep his science free of metaphysical ideas, though he was not altogether successful in this. He was not averse to metaphysical speculation in some fields since he was an ardent theologian and a believer in revealed religious truth. It is one of the ironies of the history of scientific thought that the mechanistic or mathematico-physical method of Newton became transformed in the minds of some of his successors into a mechanistic philosophy that proclaimed a rigid determination for nature and man alike, and displaced the Deity from his seat on the circle of the earth. The inexorable fate of Greek drama appeared in a new guise but many of the new fatalists did not realize the anomaly of a mechanistic metaphysic springing from a non-metaphysical or positivistic science. The mechanistic doctrine came to be widely applied biologically and sociologically and has persisted in many forms to the present time.

Critical philosophy in the classical tradition repeatedly attacked the fallacy of mechanistic materialism, but science had virtually said good-bye to philosophy at the revolution, and accepting the dualism of Descartes with special emphasis on the *res extensa*, turned away from the strictures of the philosophers with a shrug of the shoulders and plunged into research in the many newly opened fields. Yet there was a hidden assumption and a haunting question at the back of the investigator's mind. How can there be a science of nature, a way of knowing, and a coherent body of knowledge of the outside world? In spite of the appearance of "irreducible stubborn facts" and of many disconnected sequences of events, must there not be some sort of order in nature if science is to be something more than a phantasy? If science has real meaning, does it not imply that nature is intelligible? Is mind merely weaving a story for its own amusement, or is it really discovering something about an outside world? And if so, must there not be some kind of rapport, as Leibnitz suggested, between mind and the world of things outside? Whether they recognize it or not, scientists have always proceeded on the belief that there is an order in nature and that they are really discovering something about nature, including man himself. In other words, scientific investigation necessarily involves

assumptions and presuppositions which can only be described as metaphysical. It is the epistemological problem, of which science has, in the last half century, become increasingly aware, that drives it back inexorably to the house of philosophy for additional resources.

Science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries went its way largely without reference to philosophic criticism and without much self-criticism or reflection on its own methods. The concrete results of investigations in astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and geology, aided by the powerful instrument of mathematical analysis, piled up with astonishing speed, and psychology, economics, sociology, and politics—fields of human study generally held to be philosophic and essentially autonomous—began to feel the influence of scientific methods and concepts and to discard *a priori* approaches to their problems in favour of more empirical or *a posteriori* methods. Psychology, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, broke from the philosophical group and proclaimed its independence as a natural science, seeking to establish itself on a basis of experimental study of human and animal behaviour.

Furthermore, the far-reaching and profitable applications of the physical sciences to industry and commerce impressed the public mind and shaped its outlook in a way unsurpassed by any previous human activity. While scientific principles and methods were actually of real interest to few men, the tangible material results of their application to many phases of life were appreciated by all. Science meant chiefly applied science, new inventions and devices that created new industries and aided existing ones, or that made life easier and more luxurious and entertaining. The demand for more science in the educational programme, and especially with reference to the growing scope and power of technology, was met rather slowly, but with increasing enthusiasm, by legislative and executive authorities. Supremacy in technology became a goal of almost fierce international competition because it foreshadowed enormously important consequences in world trade and ultimately in political power. Pure science was a necessary study in the training of the technologist, but it was generally forgotten that it had a status and dignity of its own as a branch of human intellectual activity. As for the humanities and the cultural outlook traditionally associated with them, one can only say that they were steadily pushed aside and their values discounted heavily in comparison with those of science. The exaggerated importance attached to applied science led men to measure civilization more and more in terms of machines and manufactured products, and to separate religion, art, letters, and philosophy and the whole world of spiritual values from what seemed

to be the more real world of material things. The fact that science itself belonged essentially to the world of the spirit and represented man's creative activity, just as did literature, art, and music, was commonly overlooked. Instead of science being seen as an important aspect of human culture in the sense that it contributed to a deeper and wider understanding of the world, it was being regarded merely as a technique of discovery and invention, something alien or even hostile to other intellectual activities. It made a highway for itself often with ruthless disregard for paths already laid down by other travellers and adventurers in the exploration of the universe. Here was a new example of man at war with himself, of the house divided against itself.

During the nineteenth century the wide acceptance of the biological doctrine of evolution led to serious conflict between science and Christian theology, though some moralists and sociologists saw in it the basis for a philosophy of human progress in which the advance of humanity to a higher plane of life was assured with a minimum of effort. In the minds of many it is now assumed that this conflict between "religion and science," as it is popularly called, has been resolved by mutual concessions. It is occasionally said to have become a matter of mere historic or academic interest, but one may say, perhaps with more confidence, that the gospel of evolutionary moral progress has doubtful status after the world-shaking experiences of the past forty years.

II

The net result of the trends I have outlined is, I think, that the general cultural outlook has become distorted; it has a wrong perspective. While it is undoubtedly true that the advance of science has widened the outlook of the better educated by opening new prospects of the world (in other words, it has made for a richer culture), it has had the effect at a lower educational level of narrowing the vision and catering to a largely adolescent attitude towards the world. The unprecedented success of technology, the anticipated power over nature, and the vast wealth from natural resources, have dimmed the vision of moral and aesthetic values to such an extent that while we pay lip service to the latter as a matter of custom and tradition, we regulate life essentially by material values and those activities to which applied science so obviously ministers. It is questionable whether, at the level of general education, science has had the desirable effect of enriching the mind with respect to the nature of the world and of man. Few trouble to understand the nature of scientific thought. It is rather the by-products of science that are played up in newspapers and popular

books, and so science appears as a sort of glorified magic that will show us endless miracles and soon give us the answers to all our problems. It is not understood as a constructive activity of human thought and imagination, to be related to other human activities and set in a context of historical development. It is the great enchanter waving a magic wand rather than the torch-bearer throwing light along a difficult and dangerous road.

The average fairly well educated person has generally an intelligent interest in industry, commerce, and public affairs, but little understanding of the common daily phenomena of nature. To him, science usually means engineering, agriculture, medicine, radio and television, weather forecasting, and so forth. He is likely to be pre-Galilean or Aristotelian in his general understanding of the physical world and is apt to think and talk in appropriate terms. It is a melancholy reflection that while the product of modern education has lost the richness of the older humanistic cultural outlook, he has failed to enlarge his world by even a moderate understanding of science. He seems to exist disoriented in a buzzing world of inventions and gadgets for every conceivable operation under heaven, and to talk a jargon that he fondly hopes has meaning while he is carried along willy-nilly by the swirling tide of events. The impact of technology has dazzled and bewildered him; he has not an adequate understanding of fundamental science to cope with it, but neither has he a steadying sense of the spiritual values which are the only stable foundation of a good life. Religion is no longer a matter of sincere belief in a coherent body of doctrine and still less of personal experience and spiritual fellowship. It has become mainly a social activity and a community enterprise centred in a church—a highly conventionalized and over-sentimentalized performance. A final indication of a lack of inner resource and spiritual maturity is the extravagant addiction to sport and entertainment that characterizes modern life.

If this sketch is even approximately true, it would suggest a serious lack of balance and a deficiency of important elements in general education. One would expect that with all the advances in educational theory and practice of the past century, a much more satisfactory cultural level would have been established. Frankly, I feel that the results are disappointing. There seems to be a general impatience with culture, both humanistic and scientific. Much was hoped from the introduction of the sciences into school and university curricula. The pursuit of science has indeed tended to a neglect of the humanities, but the sciences have not made good the loss of cultural values which the humanities have always stressed and aspired to create. The humanities,

of course, ought not to have been displaced, but the sciences should have taken their place along with the older disciplines in an endeavour to enlarge the whole sphere of cultural values. This may have been the intention of some theorists, but the realization has fallen short of the ideal. Science as a subject in the educational curriculum has become mainly a stepping-stone to some kind of applied professional activity. It is seen in terms of specialized training rather than in terms of education. At the high school level, where the cultural value of scientific study should be kept to the fore, the chief interest seems to be in cramming a mass of undigested and unco-ordinated factual material into adolescent minds, either for routine examination purposes or as a directive towards a practical vocation. This is sometimes referred to as relating science to life.

I hesitate to speak of specialized or honour science courses in universities because while the cultural aspect of scientific study is prominent in some courses and appeals strongly to certain students, too often the technical aspect is mainly stressed and honour students are likely to finish up as trained and competent technicians rather than as educated men and women. In graduate courses the situation may be still worse, because the more intense specialization often begets the narrowed interest and warped vision that are the marks of the uncultured. Notwithstanding the remarkable level to which theoretical science has attained in this century, I fear that our industrial civilization may almost merit the sardonic description of the Romans given by Heiberg in his account of the decline of ancient science: "The Romans with their narrow rustic horizon, their short-sighted practical sobriety, had always in their heart of hearts that mixture of suspicion and contempt for pure science which is still the mark of the half-educated—and sometimes bragged of it."[3]

This is not to suggest that pure science should be taught without reference to its applications. It would be ridiculous and practically suicidal. But science should be primarily studied for its own sake as a sphere of human intellectual activity and regardless of its utility in a practical way. At the same time, it should be noted that the applied sciences, because of their basic human interest, can be presented in a liberally educative fashion, so that technically trained people may not necessarily be doomed to rank as uncultured. The sciences are all the work of human thought and imagination, and symbolize the blood, sweat, and tears, the defeats and victories of many centuries of genius.

The sciences began as humanities. They can and should be brought

[3]J. L. Heiberg, *Science and Mathematics in Classical Antiquity* (Oxford, 1923), 80.

back into the family of liberal studies and be allowed to add their rich quota to the cultural heritage of this and future generations. These great bodies of knowledge should not be detached from the structure of culture and treated as if they were an extra-human revelation. Their authority is only the usual authority of human thinking, balanced and disciplined, about problems of man's activity and his relation to nature. The sciences can and are being brought into closer relation with other fields of human thought, so that new syntheses of knowledge may emerge from time to time. Moreover, wherever it is feasible, methods of inquiry and interpretation which have been successful in the natural or physical sciences are being followed in studies of human activity which were formerly thought not to be amenable to such methods. So we have the social sciences, a whole group of studies about man himself, yielding new understanding of human nature. It can be readily understood that because of the complexity of the problems studied, relevant facts are not so easily selected, generalized, and interpreted as in many problems of physical science. But there is no one rigid scientific method. While there is a general type of approach to problems in the various fields of natural science, there is also great flexibility in the actual specific methods in any given case. It is easy to oversimplify the picture of scientific method and to be unduly dogmatic as to how things should be done. There must always be a stern regard for adequacy and accuracy of relevant data, for cautious generalization, for logical deduction, and for critical interpretation of conclusions. The problem of verification of hypotheses is bound to be difficult in the field of social science, and hypotheses are likely to be more metaphysical than in the natural sciences. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw a line between science and metaphysics in the advanced consideration of scientific methods.

Whatever differences between the natural and social sciences it may be wise to stress, the latter seem to be an important liaison group of studies between the natural sciences and those literary and philosophical studies usually called humanistic. I feel bound to protest against the playing up of the supposed incompatibility and antagonism of the sciences and the humanities. It is historically unjustifiable and is, I believe, apart from the Baconian and Cartesian influences, mainly due to the results of applied science and a consequent undue exaltation of material values. In spirit, science is akin to the humanities in its love of truth and its recognition of what is of permanent value in human life. It is unfortunate that science has suffered some perversion and become separated from the cultural ideal of learning for its own sake, that is, for the richer understanding of man and his universe.

All lovers of learning should be concerned about the need for healing the breach of misunderstanding which divides the world of the mind into two pseudo-hostile camps, or at least into two sections that have become indifferent to each other's interests.

Possibly one way of considering the situation is to view it in the light of the complaint that science is too impersonal, or as it is sometimes put, dehumanized. This impression is, I believe, partly the result of scientific method, especially in the investigation of external nature where it is imperative that, in order to arrive at reasonably objective conclusions, personal bias, feeling, and desire must be carefully eliminated. But this sort of restriction is operative in other fields even when human activity itself is being assessed. The historian, in dealing with historical events, is frequently in the paradoxical situation of realizing sympathetically the motives and human impulses exhibited in a given situation, while at the same time he must be detached and objective in his judgment. He has to be both humanistic and scientific. And this suggests how science may be rehumanized if there is any ground for the criticism of science suggested above. I believe it was William James who once said that any subject could be humanized by considering its history. There is no doubt that the growing interest among scientists and others in the history of the sciences is bound to result not only in a better understanding of science itself, but also in a clearer view of the relations of science to other activities in the historical context. Historical studies then can be an important aid in realigning science with the humanities and leading to a new humanism. Those who are familiar with the work of both the European and the American schools of the history of science know what a splendid contribution is being made to the cause of a rehumanized science, and incidentally, of a unification of knowledge.

Again, the estrangement of science from philosophy which was intensified through the rapid developments of the nineteenth century, is showing signs of being overcome by advances from both parties. Since the beginning of this century, the theory of relativity and the opening up of the strange new realm of sub-atomic phenomena, have compelled scientists to revise many fundamental concepts and to abandon the naïvely realistic philosophy of science prevailing for the most part during the nineteenth century. Science has found it necessary to join hands with philosophy in seeking to justify the meaning and validity of new concepts, so that scientists and philosophers are finding a common interest in bringing new life into the field of epistemology. Scientists are realizing the importance of a more critical examination and a sharper understanding of scientific method, while

philosophers are becoming more concerned about fundamental science and are trying to relate scientific concepts to more general philosophic or metaphysical ideas. This co-operation is bound to benefit both groups of thinkers and should be another potent factor in bringing the sciences into closer relationship with the humanities. There is probably a stronger inclination among scientists at this time to get away from the purely technical aspects of the physical sciences and see science as an aspect of human thought about a reality to which there are many approaches. They feel the need for a grasp of the historical and philosophic development of science in order to understand its cultural meaning.

This is not merely a need of the scientists. The time seems ripe for a new general synthesis of knowledge so that a higher level of liberal culture may be reached. Speaking more particularly of the place of science in a new synthesis, I would not urge that we should all try to become experts in the natural and social sciences in order to understand the nature of science. But I do believe that educated people should have a more intelligent appreciation of the meaning of science and its methods, and the importance of relating science to other departments of knowledge. Too many people look upon science as an alien power within the gates threatening the existence of civilized culture. It may become so if the untutored mind continues to see it only as a means to gain power and material wealth. Men can sell themselves to the devil and prostitute science to the most evil purposes. We may decline into a technological barbarism with the eclipse of those moral and aesthetic values for the realization of which prophets, poets, and artists have striven through the centuries. Let us no longer think of the humanities versus the sciences, but rather of the humanities including the sciences, when we ponder on a philosophy of education aiming at genuine culture. A balanced philosophy means a broad general understanding of the world of men and things, keen moral and aesthetic insight, ethical idealism and some sense of the worth and dignity of all human life. This is humanism. It is an old ideal of education, but it is the only one fit for a civilization worthy of the name.

A LEGAL READING OF CHAUCER'S *HOUS OF FAME*

R. J. Schoeck

ONE of Chaucer's early works, *The Hous of Fame*, generally dated about 1375–9 during Chaucer's years as controller of the customs, is in the words of a recent literary historian "a badly proportioned, incomplete, and utterly delightful poem."[1] Most scholars, not knowing the occasion and intention of the poem, have felt much of this dissatisfaction with the form of the poem, yet nearly all have felt the utter delight of Chaucer's playfulness.

If one took Chaucer seriously, the division into three books with all the epic machinery of invocations, proems, and the like would indeed be top-heavy. In the first book (to summarize the action as briefly as possible), the poet dreams he is in the temple of Venus, and when he steps out of doors he sees flying toward him a great eagle that shines like gold. This eagle seizes him and carries him into the air. The second book tells of the eagle's flight, and the contrast of the eagle's talkativeness—he familiarly calls the poet Geoffrey—with the poet's speechlessness—for he answers only in monosyllables, "Yes" or "nay" and "well"—is comedy indeed. The third book, in which the eagle sets the poet down outside of Fame's house, takes us only to the point where he is about to hear an announcement from "a man of gret auctorite" and there the poem ends, or breaks off.

Some scholars have doubtless taken the poem too seriously in seeing it as an allegory of the poet's life or as a conventional love vision. Those who have attempted to solve the problem in terms of the news which is about to be given by the "man of gret auctorite" have not been successful in persuading their colleagues. I offer this summary of previous interpretations not to minimize the work of Chaucer scholars more learned than I but to suggest that there may be something external to the poem which modern readers lack, and that this is the reason why the poem has kept its secret forever: (in Coghill's words) "for Chaucer's courtly audience it was probably an open secret, an occasional poem of which they knew the occasion." And so I think that the original setting of Chaucer's poem was a now unknown occasion that was generally known to his friends, perhaps even to many of his contemporaries, and that therefore much of the poem's original meaning has been lost because it depends upon a ritualistic world (not unlike the ceremonial aspects of the medieval knight's homage and fealty) whose meanings and ceremonies were not written down.

[1]Albert C. Baugh, *A Literary History of England* (New York, 1948), 253.

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These ritualistic elements are outside the poem, to be sure. After considering them, I shall move to the poem itself and try to suggest in the light of them another reading of it. Though it may be true that the secret of the poem has been lost forever, we cannot ignore any possible clues to the secret; and for this reason the rather oblique allusion of an obscure sixteenth-century writer is of unique importance and offers, I think, a new approach to Chaucer's *Hous of Fame*.[2]

Let us turn then to Gerard Legh's *Accedence of Armorie*, a work of heraldry first published in 1562 and followed by a half-dozen editions.[3] On folio 118 Legh pictures Pegasus on a "scutcheon of renown" and beside it writes as follows:

> He beareth Azure, a Pegasus Argent, called the horse of honour whose condition Sorares the xxiii. Emperour of Assiria honored so much for his swift course, as he judged him not framed of the gross mass of common horses. And therefore S. Geffreye Chaucer buylte unto him (after of his owne nature & condition, a house called Fame, a place mete for the horse of honour) whose original the Poetes faine was, when valiant Perseus the soldier of the goddess Pallas, in dangerous fight, achieved by help of her glittering shield, the battle against Medusa. . . .

Now it was formerly generally assumed that the Pegasus was suggested by Legh and adopted by the Inner Temple as their badge or coat-of-arms in the year 1563, until F. A. Inderwick pointed out in his introduction to the Inner Temple records that though Legh wrote on heraldry he "was not a herald, nor a member of the College of Arms, and there is no trace of his ever having been a member of the Inner Temple."[4]

But in this *Accedence of Armorie* Legh also describes the grand and solemn Christmas which was kept at the Inner Temple in 1561. Lord Robert Dudley, the Queen's favourite, was the chief performer or personage of the pageant, being Constable-Marshal, Palaphilos the Prince of Wisdom, and patron of the honourable order of Pegasus. Among his aides at this feast and revels were Roger Manwood (afterwards Lord Chief Baron), and Christopher Hatton (afterwards Lord Chancellor and co-author of *Tancred and Gismund*, which was acted at the Inner Temple in 1568). The company were summoned to dinner by the sound of double cannons in so great a number that it filled the

[2]Legh's allusion to Chaucer was missed by Caroline Spurgeon but was noted very briefly in one paragraph by E. A. Willoughby in *Notes and Queries*, CLIX, 1930, 367.

[3]The *STC* lists five reprints of Legh's work, but the *Accedence* was also reprinted in the *Workes of Armorie* (1572), collected by John Bossewell and printed by Richard Tottel, who printed mostly law books. In the quotations from Legh that follow, the spelling has been modernized.

[4]F. A. Inderwick, *The Calendar of Inner Temple Records* (London, 1896), lxvi.

whole air, and apparently the feasting lasted two days. During this grand and solemn pageant twenty-four gentlemen of the Inn were dubbed Knights of the Order of Pegasus. All of this was described in considerable detail by Legh,[5] and what is of some moment is that Legh's description of the feast immediately follows the passage quoted above which described Chaucer's building of "a house called Fame."

There is implicit in Legh, I feel, the sense that this celebration is traditional, not just a single occasion. For one piece of evidence we might look on folio 119 v. at the answer to Legh's question about the Constable-Marshal of the Inner Temple, and the province he governed:

> . . . the province [is] not great in quantity, but ancient in true nobility. A place, said he, privileged by the most excellent princes, the high governor of the whole Island, wherein are the store of Gentlemen of the whole Realme, that repair thither to learn to rule, and obey by law, to yield their fleece to their prince and commonweal, as also to use all other exercises of body and mind whereunto nature most aptly serveth, to adorn by speaking, countenance, gesture, and use of apparel, the person of a gentleman, whereby amity is obtained and continued, that gentlemen of all countries in their young years, nourished together in one place, with such comely order, and daily conference, are knit by continual acquaintance in such unity of minds and manners, as lightly never after is severed, than which is nothing more profitable to the commonweal.

Some have thought not only that Legh suggested the device of Pegasus but that he even perhaps arranged or devised the whole Christmas festivity. But, as Inderwick points out in his introduction,

> there is good reason to doubt whether, in fact, Gerard Legh was the author or arranger of this festival, as we find that in 1561–2 one Arthur Broke, a fellow of the Inn, was granted a special admission without payment "in consideration of certain plays and shows at Christmas last set forth by him." From this it would seem that Master Arthur Broke, and not Master Gerard Legh is entitled to the honour of having organized this ceremony.[6] And it is also to be observed that nowhere does Gerard Legh suggest that he was himself the originator of the show, or that he proposed the arms of the Society. It does, however, give rise to this

[5]The description has been reprinted by Sir William Dugdale in his fascinating *Origines Juridiciales* (London, 1680). A list of officers at the 1561–2 Grand Christmas is reprinted in A. W. Greene's *The Inns of Court and Early English Drama* (New Haven, 1931), 167, and on pp. 66–70 he reprints Legh's description, in part.

[6]From the fact that in 1562 Arthur Broke published his *Tragicall Historye of Romeus and Iuliet* (based on the Italian of Bandello, and from which Shakespeare drew), a work which had its second edition in 1567, we may infer that Broke was a promising young man of letters when the Inner Temple selected him to set forth plays and shows. In 1563 Broke published *The Agreemente of Sondry Places of Scripture* (translated out of French).

dilemma. Either the Pegasus was believed to be the badge of the Inn before the time of Elizabeth, and the show was made to revolve round the antient symbol of the Inn, which appears to me to be by far the more probable explanation [or] . . .

And Inderwick conjectures that the Pegasus may go back to the seal of the Knights Templar (who occupied the hall and some of the other buildings of the Inner Templars) with the figure of a horse carrying two knights, symbolizing charity and humility, and he suggests that the ingenuity or ignorance of some local workman altered "the Templar's emblem from a horse with two knights to a horse with two wings." This conjecture would seem confirmed by the implied conjunction in Sir George Buc's discourse on the seals and emblems of the Knights Templar (in his *Third Universitie of England*), and confirmed also by the fact that when the Middle Temple later adopted a badge they appropriated the second emblem of the Knights Templar, the Agnus Dei: thus the two legal societies of the Inner and Middle Temple perpetuate the two emblems of the Knights Templar. Though one need not accept Inderwick's ingenious instrument of an ignorant workman of the fifteenth century, still this explanation of the Pegasus as the arms of the Inner Temple accords with the early history of that house and with the traditions themselves.

What is also of importance is the recognition of the force of ritual (of which I shall speak in a moment) combined with careful attention to social life and entertainment. Writing about 1470, Fortescue gives us this description of the character of the education and life in the Inns of Court:

In these greater inns, indeed, and also in the lesser [i.e., in both the Inns of Court and the Inns of Chancery] there is, besides a school of law, a kind of academy of all the manners that the nobles learn. There they learn to sing and to exercise themselves in every kind of harmonics. They are also taught there to practise dancing and all games proper for nobles, as those brought up in the king's household are accustomed to practise. . . .[7]

And we may perhaps here quote the comment of D. S. Bland:

Bearing in mind our ignorance of what Chaucer was doing between 1360 and 1367, and knowing his subsequent career as a successful civil servant, as well as his fame as a poet whose native genius was reinforced by wide reading, this would seem to be exactly the kind of education he might have received during those unrecorded years, particularly as he was a Londoner of a family which could well afford to send him to an Inn of Court.[8]

[7]Cf. *De Laudibus Legum Anglie* ed. S. B. Chrimes (London, 1942), ch. XLIX.
[8]D. S. Bland, "Chaucer and the Inns of Court: A Re-Examination," *English Studies*, XXXIII, 1952, 3–4.

We must, however, echo Bland's reminder that "although Chaucer's attendance at the Inner Temple has been taken out of the realm of legend, and must now be reckoned with as an attractive possibility, that very attractiveness should not cause us to forget that the legend has become no more than a plausible theory."

What I have offered to this point, then, in bringing Gerard Legh's allusion to Chaucer to bear upon the problem of Chaucer's connections with and possible attendance at the Inner Temple, can be considered only as adding to the convergences of probability. We do not yet have proof of Chaucer's attendance, and it is possible, in the light of Chaucer's friendship with lawyers, that he might have built "a house called Fame" for the Inner Temple without having himself been a member—though I doubt this. I feel that the bit of evidence from Legh makes a "plausible theory" now a probable one.

I have written elsewhere of the force of a long tradition of participation in the revels of the Inns of Court in the Sir Thomas More family, and I have suggested that these revels might have been the occasion for an early Tudor literary effort of some dimensions.[9] Tradition has always dominated the common law, and ritual played its role. Permit me to cite the authority of a learned historian of the common law so that we may have his picture of the force of ritual in the legal system as a setting in which to place our discussion of Chaucer's *Hous of Fame*—for ritual always invites parody. Professor Lévy-Ullman, writing of the professional instruction of moots and bolts, declares:

> Out of those discussions arose Common law in all its audacity and ingenuity, with its subtleties and its formalism, its prejudices, its repetitions, its deliberate obscurities, and its mysticism, in short, with all its qualities and faults. For the judges were selected from among the Serjeants; the Serjeants from the Benchers and Readers; the latter from the Utter-Barristers, etc., by the application of rules which combined co-optation and seniority. Nothing more was needed to create a legal system and to surround it with the atmosphere of a religion.[10]

II

What I am suggesting, then, is that Chaucer wrote his *Hous of Fame* for one of the ritualistic functions of the Inner Temple; the date of December 10 in the poem's first lines might suggest the Christ-

[9]R. J. Schoeck, "Sir Thomas More and Lincoln's Inn Revels," *Philological Quarterly*, XXIX, 1950, 426–30, and "Satire of Wolsey in Heywood's *Play of Love*," *Notes and Queries*, CXCVI, 1951, 112–14.

[10]H. Lévy-Ullman, *The English Legal Tradition* (London, 1935), 84–5.

mas Revels, which by the end of the fifteenth century were the most elaborate of the revels at the Inns. Though this is conjecture, it has the tradition of entertainments and revels to support it. Certainly there is no proof (many records of the Inner Temple were burned in the Peasants' Rebellion of 1381, and even such a record as that which Master Buckley reported he had seen and which permitted him to say at the end of the sixteenth century that Chaucer had been fined for striking a Franciscan friar in Fleet Street has since perished or disappeared), but we do know that apparently Furnivall's Inn, one of the Inns of Chancery, was entertaining external players as early as 1416 and that amateur entertainments at the Inns were traditional early in the fifteenth century.[11] I have cast about in several directions for proof, and have as yet caught no evidence in my rather tentative nets; but I have lived with this conjecture for many months and have found that it throws light upon otherwise dark corners of the poem.

Let us turn now to the poem itself. Quite obviously one of Chaucer's principal intentions must have been to prepare his audience for *tidings*. We find this preparation anticipated as early as line 1027, where the eagle speaks of "Fames Hous, full of tydynges, Bothe of feir speche and chidynges. . . ."[12] From line 1987 to the end of the poem at line 2158, there are a dozen references to tidings. I would suggest that the "man of gret auctorite" is perhaps the Constable-Marshal of the Christmas revels, these being the most elaborate revels of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. I would suppose from such lines as 1916 and following, that the reader of the poem—and perhaps the poem was read on successive evenings of the revels, thus explaining the elaborate repetition of invocations at the beginning of each book—was in the Great Hall of the Inner Temple and would be able to point to certain rooms or places as the Castle (l. 1917) and the Laboryntus (l. 1921), and that lines 1948-50 were a humorous reference to the roof that was probably thatched with reeds:

> And on the roof men may yet seen
> A thousand holes, and wel moo,
> To leten wel the soun out goo.

[11]Cf. D. S. Bland, "Interludes in Fifteenth-Century Revels at Furnivall's Inn," *Review of English Studies*, III, 1952, 236–8. Revels at Lincoln's Inn are mentioned in the *Black Books* (I, 4) as early as 1431.

[12]The Inns were full of fair speech, certainly, and to judge from the early records there was much of chiding (or reprimands), for fines were imposed freely to maintain discipline. In line 1022 the eagle called out: "Seynt Julyan, loo, bon hostel!" This epithet in Middle English would have meant primarily, I think, an inn. While this kind of allusion is not offered in direct support, it might be pointed out that few of the other readings of the poem explain such allusions.

(One may easily suppose that in such a society as the Inner Temple the care and maintenance of their buildings was a constant problem, and that the members were continually being reminded of the problems and expense of the maintenance; the early records are full of such entries.[13])

Throughout the third book there are two patterns of recurring imagery, one of the talk which might easily be that of lawyers (examples of which and literary allusions to which might be adduced even in our own times), for example (ll. 1959 ff.):

> And over alle the houses angles
> Ys full of rounynges and of jangles
> Of werres, of pes, of mariages,
> Of reste, of labour, of viages . . .
> Of dyvers transmutacions
> Of estats, and eke of regions;
> Of trust, of drede, of jelousye, ...

The other recurring imagery (appropriate in the hall of a society of professional men whose wealth was everywhere recognized, envied, and exaggerated) is of the richness of the hall, for example (ll. 1341 ff.):

> Loo! how shulde I now telle al thys?
> Ne of the halle eke what nede is
> To tellen yow that every wal
> Of hit, and flor, and roof, and al
> Was plated half a foote thikke
> Of gold, and that nas nothyng wikke,
> But, for to prove in alle wyse,
> As fyn as ducat in Venyse,
> Of which to lite al in my pouche is?

And, finally, such references as "scrippes bret-ful of lesinges" (l. 2123) and "boystes crammed ful of lyes" (l. 2129) would not be irrelevant to professional men of law who were at times sceptical of the truth in some of their sworn documents and other papers. There is especially in such lines the air of improvising on which Professor Baum has commented. This would be most appropriate to the kind of occasion I suggest for the poem. One must of course hasten to say that this reading does not explain everything in the poem—such aspects as the

[13]In lines 1320 ff., the poet noted that there were coats-of-arms: the ancient refectory, as Inderwick describes it (p. xxiv), "was formerly hung round, and its windows were decorated with the shields and armorial devices of the knights, a custom still continued in the present day, when each reader elect, the year before he becomes treasurer, emblazons his coat-of-arms on a panel. . . ."

I have throughout quoted from *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. by F. N. Robinson (Boston and New York, 1933).

dream-vision, or the extensive use of the Bible (as the heavy use of *John* in lines 1201 ff.)—but by suggesting a setting it does offer a point of view for the humorous treatment. It provides a reason for the whole grand playfulness, even for the suggestion of parody (as Speirs puts it) of "intellectual pomposity and pedantic portentousness," for in such ritualistic entertainments Chaucer could so present it that his listeners might well "Tak hit in ernest or in game."

Though my working out in such detail of the allusion in Legh must remain almost entirely conjectural, and mine of necessity must remain a provisional reading of the poem—and necessity here mothers the invented dictum that perhaps all readings of poems are ultimately provisional—yet I would insist upon the high level of play in the poem, and upon the interpretation (whether or not we can ever learn whether the *Hous of Fame* was in fact presented at the Inner Temple) that the poem had for the occasion of its offering some such high ritualistic surrounding that completed its projections of intentions and meanings. This informal poem, as John Speirs writes, must not be read solemnly: for besides being excellent parody, it enforces the recognition of vanity. What better setting for such a parody of ritual could there be than the traditional Christmas games of the Inner Temple? And here I must rest what is avowedly no case, not even a brief for a mooting, but a motion for another reading of Chaucer's poem.

THE VICTORIAN SAGE*

F. E. L. PRIESTLEY

Two generations ago it would hardly have been necessary to describe a book with the title *The Victorian Sage*; its contents would have been safely predictable: potted extract of message, with inspirational quotations. One generation ago the title would have been equally revealing: facetious debunking of Victorian pretensions to moral wisdom. It is a relief to have come to a period in which neither attitude need be mandatory, and in which the Victorian idiom neither dominates nor repels. Mr. Holloway's approach seems to me wholly admirable in its balance; the purpose he defines for himself, "an objective understanding" of what his authors did, is well achieved.

He chooses for his study six authors, three of them obvious "sages": Carlyle, Newman, and Arnold; three of them novelists: Disraeli, George Eliot, and Hardy. The inclusion of the novelists is an important part of Mr. Holloway's design; his analysis of intention and techniques in the novels constantly produces fruitful parallels with the polemical prose of the other three authors.

The activity of the sage, "to give expression to notions about the world, man's place in it, and how he should live," is "a distinctive activity, a unique use of words." The sage offers a special kind of knowledge (or wisdom), presented in a special way: "all of these authors insist on how acquiring wisdom is somehow an opening of the eyes, making us see in our experience what we failed to see before. This unanimity suggests that conviction comes here essentially from modifying the reader's perceptiveness, from stimulating him to notice something to which he was previously blind. This new perception, moreover, is usually allied to ordinary perception by the senses. It is not of some quite new reality; it is seeing old things in a new way." The sage, then, performs the task Browning ascribes in *Sordello* to the highest rank of poets, the task of the "Maker-see." And it is as true of the sage who writes prose as of the poet that "what he has to say is not a matter just of 'content' or narrow paraphrasable meaning, but is transfused by the whole texture of his writing as it constitutes an experience for the reader."

It is this texture, as related to the meaning, which Mr. Holloway's essays examine. For purposes of clarity he treats elements of the texture separately, with however constant reminders of the unity and relation

**The Victorian Sage: Studies in Argument.* By JOHN HOLLOWAY. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada]. 1953. Pp. viii, 301. $4.00

of whole works. The various functions of incident and character in the novel, in historical prose, and in polemical prose are analysed in detail to reveal their place in "the whole weave of a book," their operation in "mediating world views." Very detailed analyses of the structure of the argument in Carlyle, Newman, and Arnold provide some of the most stimulating passages in the book. At a number of points Mr. Holloway sets forth, with varying degrees of formality, the results of his analysis, as when he notes four distinct functions of metaphor in George Eliot (p. 154), to which he adds two others in Newman (p. 185) and Hardy (p. 270). He makes a good deal of the effect of *tone* of a work, and the means by which it is produced, particularly in Disraeli, Newman, and Arnold. His last major category of texture is "control of the sense of words," and here again he usefully distinguishes four varieties (p. 192), adding an ingenious recognition test (pp. 194, 196).

At all points the reader is aware of Mr. Holloway's close and penetrating familiarity with the texts studied, and is bound to be impressed by the felicity of his examples and the skill with which they are related. A single paragraph often brings together sentences from three or four different works, or kindred illustrations from half-a-dozen novels, yet one never feels the presence of the card-index; all seems to proceed from a long and loving acquaintance with the works discussed, and the analyses proceed from thorough contemplation of them as works of art.

The main thesis of the book is, indeed, that writers like these have suffered from the tendency of critics to separate content and style, to reduce "message" to abstractions, and to discuss "prose style" apart from meaning. What Mr. Holloway says of Newman is essentially what he is saying of each author: "The continuous texture of his work modifies our receptivity until we find ourselves seeing the world as he sees it. To this end all the parts of his work act in conjunction. Tone, forms of argument, illustration and example, imagery and manipulating senses integrate to make something which has a single unified impact on the reader; and the impact is not that of a formal argument, but in its fullness and vividness more resembles that of a work of art, something which can make the reader find more in his experience, see it with new eyes, because for a while it constitutes his whole experience." The approach is throughout that of the perceptive literary critic who recognizes that polemical prose is as much a form of literary art as the novel, and who seeks to relate intention to technique, parts to whole, device to unified effect.

This is a refreshing approach, and Mr. Holloway leaves no doubt

that it is the right one. It has led in his book to some of the most delightful and illuminating writing, particularly on Carlyle and Hardy. His comments on improbabilities in Hardy (pp. 248 ff.) and on his use of details of natural description (pp. 251 ff.), and on Carlyle's use of imagery (pp. 28 ff.) occur to me as passages of special excellence, although the relating of Eliot's methods of characterization to her role as sage is perhaps equally good. Some of the judgments offered as emerging from the critical method used here are also original and convincing: I would mention the explanations of the failure of *Daniel Deronda* (p. 140), and the view of *Jude* as an anomaly in Hardy's later novels (pp. 245, 289).

I note two minor slips: on page 20, chapters I and V should read II and VI, and on page 226 the order should be "Menander, Swift and Plato respectively."

THINGS ATTEMPTED YET IN PROSE OR RHYME* — A. E. BARKER

Since the early eighteenth century, particularly since 1749, when William Lauder used passages from a Latin verse translation of *Paradise Lost* to deceive Dr. Johnson into believing Milton guilty of large thefts from certain Renaissance poets, the search for the "sources" of Milton's epic has produced much sound scholarship and a very great deal of rubbish. Lately, apart from some minor "discoveries," the search seems to have been all but given over, partly through the passing from favour of literary genetics but also largely on account of the bad odour of the rubbish and because of the conditions that made it possible. *Paradise Lost* is by no means a merely encyclopedic epic; but it is the work of one of the last encyclopedic minds of the Renaissance. When such a range of knowledge as was Milton's is combined with such a power to select, modify, and recombine according to his great idea, the task of tracing the landmarks on the road to Hell or Eden is staggering. It has invited irresponsible asseveration and dogmatic speculation, particularly with reference to Milton's immediate predecessors, because few of the Renaissance treatments of the matter of Satan and Adam have been readily available as a check on the reports of the sleuths. The subsidence of interest in Milton's "sources" has gone far towards depriving Milton criticism of a valuable instrument. The tendency of much recent and most new criticism of Milton seems to be to take quite literally the statement that his celestial

**The Celestial Cycle: The Theme of* Paradise Lost *in World Literature with Translations of the Major Analogues.* By WATSON KIRKCONNELL. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 701. $7.50.

patroness dictated to him slumbering—and to attempt a critical imitation of his supposed poetic practice. But the study of works which may have influenced Milton's epic and are certainly analogues of it is, in its joining of the critical with the historical, too useful an instrument towards the appreciation of the poem's value to be discarded. If there is one aspect of the poetic process in Milton that is above all others striking, it is the combination of the traditional with highly individual talent; and in both Lilliputian and Brobdignagian criticism, it must always be true that nothing is great or little but by comparison.

To induce such critical comparison is the aim of President Kirkconnell's volume—a monumental piece of Canadian scholarship certainly deserving of the support it received from the Humanities Research Council of Canada. Part I consists of twenty-four analogues of *Paradise Lost*, complete or represented by generous selections, in the original English, or contemporary translations, or in new translations by the compiler, from Avitus' *Poemata* in the sixth century, through the "Caedmonian" *Genesis*, to narratives and dramas by authors closer to Milton—Valvasone, Grotius, Marini, Andreini, Salandra, Vondel, and others. Part II is a descriptive catalogue of 329 treatments of the celestial cycle or its parts (War in Heaven, Creation, Fall, Redemption), from a Sumerian Paradise myth of perhaps the eighteenth century B.C. to Paul Valéry's unfinished *Lust, la demoiselle de Cristal* of 1946.

As the compiler says, the catalogue could not of course be exhaustive. "In the case of the hexamera, the chronicles and the mirror literature, where the relationships to *Paradise Lost* is one of subject-matter, rather than of artistic form, it seemed enough to list only a few typical examples. The *Hermetica* and the *Zohar* have been omitted for the same reason." Obviously the principle of selection will not be entirely acceptable to all students of the material. It may seem strange to some that Heywood's *Hierarchie of the Blessed Angels* should have been included while the pseudo-Dionysius and Colet's commentary on it (which remained, it is true, in manuscript till the nineteenth century) are not; and the relation between Milton and the *Zohar* is perhaps still a subject worth sober academic discussion. Such differences of opinion about so large an undertaking are inevitable. But the catalogue provides at once an immensely useful record of past scholarship and a great deal of additional material collected by the compiler himself. With its indication of the accessibility of the items and its brief descriptions of their character and contents, it will prove an important aid to research for students of the genesis and influence of Milton's poem and students of the celestial cycle itself. And it is to be hoped that

the presidential office at Acadia may still be regarded as a clearing-house for additional items and the source of a supplement, if that should prove desirable.

The analogues of Part I, with the commentary on their relation to the epic at appropriate points in the catalogue, will of course be of more immediate interest. No doubt some severe scholars would here have preferred to have all the originals or at least literal rather than verse translations of those not originally in English. It is certainly of very great use to have the Latin of Grotius' *Adamus Exul* made at long last accessible. But scholars who need to do so may check the accuracy of the translations for themselves—if they possess the translator's large linguistic powers. To one who does not, they seem to arrive at a happy combination of closeness with appropriate literary tone and spirit. Thus in the case of the "Caedmonian" *Genesis* "an attempt has been made to adapt the old alliterative line to the much less inflected character of Modern English"; *ottava rima* has been used for Valvasone, free alexandrines for the Latin senarius of Grotius, blank verse for the loose canzone-measure of Andreini, and so on. The virtuosity suggested here needs no comment; and the taste and distinction of the verse, combined with patient scholarship, will put students not only of Milton but of Renaissance narrative and drama very much in the translator's debt.

For the works made available here represent the best products of a principal effort of the Renaissance mind, the effort to give renewed significance to traditional Christian material through literary techniques more or less closely copied from the ancients. The introduction (whose scholarly good sense serves to make one regretfully conscious of its brevity) traces the history of the literary treatment of the parts of the celestial cycle from the Greek epic version of the Old Testament by Apollinaris the Elder in the fourth century A.D., and succeeding Latin and Greek hexamera, through the combination of this tradition with Teutonic epic (and its revolting thanes) in such works as the "Caedmonian" *Genesis* and *Die altdeutsche Genesis* and through various medieval genres, to the epic and dramatic attempts of Milton's immediate neo-classical predecessors. One must agree with the sensitively demonstrated conclusion of the introduction, that "Milton's epic towers above this nondescript array of forerunners," in the rich unity of its structure in particular and in the appropriateness of incident and style. Students of Milton will be led by the introductory critical comments, and by the more detailed comparative commentaries provided for the analogues in the catalogue, to consider how and why this should be so; and President Kirkconnell's enthusiasm for *Paradise*

Lost—undiminished by eighteen years of scholarly patience and academic fortitude—will induce them to consider the superiority of Milton's poem in the terms appropriate to poetry. But he will also induce them to meditate on the long tradition and the immediate historical process without whose failures and partial successes even Milton's genius would not have been able to raise an argument to a height above the Aonian mount while it pursued "things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme."

THE BRITISH POLITICAL TRADITION* — A. BRADY

Whatever the names of movements and parties during the past century, there have been two principal strands in the British political tradition: the conservative, emphasizing a sane continuity in society and the state, and the progressive, emphasizing prompt change in order to achieve a more rational and humane order. Rarely are the two traditions sharply differentiated. There are conservative elements in Britain's liberalism, and liberal elements in its conservatism. Macaulay on one occasion told the House of Commons: "I am at once a Liberal and a Conservative politician."

Most politicians, like Macaulay, stage their battles in the intervening territory between the two political poles, and all more or less adopt a characteristic British empirical attitude. Religious ideas and sentiments have abundantly fed both traditions, and with diminishing power continue to feed them. Adherents of the Dissenting sects and the Established Church are present in both camps, either contending for reform or retarding it. Confusing interactions of attitude are sometimes discerned in the same individual. With evangelical zeal Lord Shaftesbury sought factory laws to protect women and children against a harsh industrial exploitation, but at the same time he was prompt to oppose state education because, as he remarked, "a scheme for local rates to maintain the education of the people is a death warrant to the teaching of the evangelical religion." Matthew Arnold commented on the fact that many Nonconformists distrusted the state because of its former restrictions on their own religious freedom, and their distrust hampered the development in England of a healthy collectivism. On the other hand some zealots for the Liberal and Labour causes came from the Nonconformist ranks. Keir Hardie, founder of the Independent Labour

**A. J. Mundella, 1825–1897: The Liberal Background to the Labour Movement.* By W. H. G. ARMYTAGE. London: Ernest Benn Limited. 1951. Pp. xii, 386. 30*s.*
British Working Class Movements: Select Documents 1789–1875. By G. D. H. COLE and A. W. FILSON. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1951. Pp. xxii, 629. $8.50.

party, was a lay preacher, who, with others like himself, brought the fervour of the Nonconformist chapel to the political platform.

The two British political traditions have also been profoundly shaped by transformations in the social structure and their influence on the attitudes of the social classes. In nineteenth-century England the most significant social fact was the maintenance of a bridge between the middle classes and the workers. To it were partly due the triumphs of liberalism in the late nineteenth century as well as those of Labour in the twentieth. The sharp collision of classes, issuing in a social revolution like that predicted by Marx and Engels, was prevented by the stability of the bridge. Here we are not concerned to examine the forces involved in this circumstance, but merely to note how two different volumes under review throw light on them.

In *A. J. Mundella, 1825–1897*, Mr. W. H. G. Armytage illustrates not merely what he calls "the Liberal background to the Labour movement" but no less significantly the Labour background to the Liberal party during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. Mundella was a self-made man who achieved success as a hosiery manufacturer. In early youth he experienced the uncertain employment and meagre earnings of the lace-makers, shared some of the aggressive enthusiasms current among the Chartists, sought later as a successful manufacturer to harmonize relations between workers and employers by the device of arbitration, and devoted the last twenty-nine years of his life to parliamentary and ministerial activity in the interests of Gladstone's Liberal party and of reforms beneficial to the masses, such as factory laws and free education. Like many other progressive manufacturers of the time he had contempt for aristocratic government and its methods, and appealed for a compact of the workers and the middle classes in order to transform the aristocratic character of the state. To our knowledge of the latter theme in particular Mr. Armytage significantly contributes. With abundant details, marshalled from painstaking research in contemporary manuscripts, he depicts the contending pressures within the Gladstonian party, and indicates how, under the suasion of men like Mundella, it moved slowly but definitely along the path of collectivist legislation, dropping en route its more conservative and whiggish members. Lord Wemyss once described the Irish land legislation as "the upas-tree of Socialism planted by Mr. Gladstone in Ireland." The land laws were then an innovation which shocked conservative minds, but the "new liberalism" was no less illustrated in the industrial and educational reforms on which Mundella concentrated. Mr. Armytage needlessly overloads some of his chapters with minor personal details of Mundella's career, and his

subject's place in history would stand out more clearly if he had included less of such trivia. Nevertheless this blemish does not seriously impair the value of an informative and thorough study.

In *British Working Class Movements: Select Documents, 1789–1875*, Professor G. D. H. Cole and Mr. A. W. Filson illuminate the same and earlier developments. Their documents are drawn from varied sources, including the Home Office Papers at the Record Office, the Place and other collections in the British Museum, the George Howell collection at the Bishopsgate Institute, London, and many special monographs on the period.

The selections are grouped into twenty-one chapters which combine a topical and chronological treatment, with appropriate annotations on the contents. The main aim throughout is to illustrate, less the economic facts of the time, than the social movements and the ideas behind them, and, as we might expect from the editors, what is included on politics has a profound social interest. One extract from a labour journal aptly pronounces that "Social and political reforms are so intimately interwoven that it is extremely difficult to distinguish one from the other" (pp. 544–5). But, where necessary, the more factual type of document is included. Thus the opening chapter has extracts from Sir F. M. Eden's *State of the Poor* (1797) and *A Report on the State of the Woollen Manufacture* (1806). Here as in the former book is clearly shown, especially after the failure of Chartism, the close nexus between the workers and the middle class. The argument for democracy which after the middle of the century came to prevail among the influential leaders of the unions was one that repudiated a narrow class doctrine and class rule. George Howell, a spokesman for the unions in 1865, pleaded that "we seek not to overbalance political power by the substitution of one class influence for another. We seek it for all men without distinction; for on the principle of manhood suffrage, protected by the ballot, class legislation as well as class representation will be no more" (p. 537). The documents also abundantly illustrate how much after 1867 both the Liberal and Conservative parties became anxious to satisfy through the statute book the requests of labour organizations. Collectivism was the price paid for the combined political action of labourers and middle class.

A READING OF GEORGE HERBERT[1]

MILLAR MACLURE

Modestly, carefully, Professor Rosemond Tuve here provides, in two essays, a corrective to the approach to poetry, and particularly to metaphysical poetry, of the more intransigent practitioners of the "New

[1] *A Reading of George Herbert.* By ROSEMOND TUVE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: W. J. Gage and Company Limited]. 1952. Pp. 215. $5.00.

Criticism." The first essay[2] is a full-scale attack on Mr. William Empson's analysis of Herbert's "The Sacrifice" in *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, and the line of argument followed there is repeated throughout the book, but, says Miss Tuve, "I decline to consider myself at war with this critic—or with "The New Criticism," except where it asks what-is-truth? and will not stay for an answer." The "New Critics" (no one is named but Empson, and it is clear that Miss Tuve thinks of them, and with some justice perhaps, as a kind of faceless marching phalanx) are not, then, the enemy, but allies; allies who persist in using an invariable battle plan under all circumstances. Miss Tuve, who is an able research scholar, suggests at least one variation.

This is what she does. She shows that many of the images in Herbert's poems, which Empson finds, and others who follow his method are likely to find, "conceited," far-fetched, witty in the early seventeenth-century manner, are actually not the inventions of a mind "jumping like a flea," but derived from the traditional images of liturgies, the iconography of books of hours and stained-glass windows, medieval hymns, sermons, glossed Bibles, etc. All of these figures derive ultimately from the typological interpretation of the Scriptures inherited from the Church Fathers and elaborated by the glossators and schoolmen. Because her book is not just a source-study but a mild polemic, Miss Tuve is excessively anxious to demonstrate the availability of these sources to any Anglican of the period and particularly to Herbert. She proves her point, but in proving it rather misses another. Herbert, like many of his predecessors and contemporaries, did not exactly learn, or memorize types and "mysticall senses," he thought in them. That manna is a type of the eucharist, for instance, is not just a fact to be remembered, and set beside another fact, that the little sister with no breasts in the Canticles is a type of the church of the Gentiles, but rather a text or microcosm of the whole system. Typological interpretation is a quality of inspiration more than an extension of knowledge. "Thou art a masse/Of strange delights," so Herbert addresses the Scriptures,

> Oh that I knew how all thy lights combine,
> And the configurations of their glorie!

The fact is that once you start glossing the Scriptures in this way you simply cannot stop.

But this is cavilling, and after all, as Miss Tuve points out, these matters must be spelled out (and some very beautiful plates used as illustrations too) for an age which has lost the art of thinking in the

[2]Part of this essay first appeared in *Kenyon Review*, XII (1950), 51–75; Mr. Empson's reply appeared in the same journal, XII, 735–8.

"symbolical mode." We have, then, not only a pretty convincing demonstration of the sources of the mordant ironies of "The Sacrifice" in the Good Friday Reproaches and collateral liturgical materials, but a review of several other figures and sets of typical correspondences in some of Herbert's poems which might strike the twentieth-century reader as "witty" or simply incomprehensible: for example, Christ as a bunch of grapes, as a lyre, as "pure red and white," as prefigured by Aaron's rod, by Samson with the gates, by Melchisedek, by Joseph and his coat. The chief and common sources and analogues described are the *Biblia Pauperum*, the *Speculum humanae salvationis*, and the *glossa ordinaria*.

On these findings Miss Tuve bases two general conclusions, which, because of the nature of some contemporary criticism, are by no means unrelated. The first, which she repeats in a variety of ways, is that "a poem is most beautiful and most meaningful to us when it is read in terms of the tradition which gave it birth," and, therefore, good criticism depends equally upon knowledge and "sensibility." The second is that scholarship of this kind must qualify our decisions about the nature of metaphysical poetry, make us perceive that "metaphysical wit and concord of unlikes in an image is precisely the operation, much condensed, of the old (and maligned) allegorical mode of writing."

Each of these observations deserves a little discussion, even in a brief review.

Apropos of the function of research in swelling the critical vein, it seems to me that, whatever the (self-conscious) limitations of Miss Tuve's approach, she has not reduced Herbert's poetry to "cultural anthropology," Professor Brooks' term for poetry of the past when it is not viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. That poor overworked tag is most misleading. Actually, in what one might call the routine application of the "New Criticism," poems are not surveyed *sub specie aeternitatis* at all, but rather wheeled along in sequence to the operating theatre to have their ambiguities taken out. A poem is, after all, an episode or *inscription*, as well as an object or *description*, and in this fact lies the true ambiguity which all works of art exemplify, and which is one of the bases of the study of genres. Time makes puns of poems.

Miss Tuve's characterization of the poetry of the metaphysicals as condensed allegory is, I suppose, another stage in her enterprise of fixing the poetry of the earlier seventeenth century firmly in its setting. Among all the modern theories which have been set out more or less as footnotes to Eliot's "The Metaphysical Poets," this is nearest to that of J. A. Mazzeo,[3] derived from Bruno's definition of the poet as one

[3]"A Critique of Some Modern Theories of Metaphysical Poetry," *Modern Philology*, L(1952), 88–96.

"who discovers and expresses the universal analogies binding the universe together." This is possibly helpful, but these are suggestions about the conceivable intention of the images rather than about their creative power. Conclusions of this kind serve, in spite of—or because of—their solid documentation, as barriers to the informed but free apprehension of the poetry of this period, and may cause the reader almost as much exasperation in their way as the neo-scholastic quiddities of "philosophers" of criticism like Kenneth Burke and Wayne Shumaker. If we pursue Miss Tuve's conclusion to a larger application, as she invites us to, we shall not see the "conceit" for the "correspondences" which it is supposed to imply.

One grows a little tired of these attempts to keep poems "meaningful" by attributing to them the complexity of an electronic calculator, or, on the other hand, of a library catalogue. There is a strain in post-Romantic aesthetic theory, dominant in our time, a theory of art perhaps most gracefully and absurdly set out in Hawthorne's "The Artist of the Beautiful," which assumes that the finest art is elusive, and above all *complicated*. Hence the favourite metaphor of the "new critics": criticism is "strategy." A poem is an enemy installation, to be besieged by an elaborate technique (reminiscent of those ballet-like evolutions which Uncle Toby loved to recall) and, if possible, taken. Miss Tuve has her own strategy too; Herbert is knobby in places, she thinks; she will soften him by exhibiting his use of once-common-place types.

Where, after all this, stands Herbert? Just where he was. It will take more than a storm in a critical teapot to diminish one dowle that's in his plume. Only a few of the architectural oddities of *The Temple* are explained in this book; it is the criticism of second thoughts, not of master impressions. Critics need to be reminded of the extraordinary economy, the almost trig quality of Herbert's genius. Most of his poems are neat as a surplice, and turn smoothly in our minds, pivoted on a diamond phrase.

MEDIEVAL PILGRIMAGE* — MICHAEL R. POWICKE

This is one of those books which most educated persons will want to possess, though it may add more dignity and dust to their shelves than learning to themselves. It will take its place beside the "Complete Works of Shakespeare" and Gibbon and other unread masterpieces. For it is a masterpiece of a kind itself—a masterpiece of scholarly con-

**The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History.* By C. W. PREVITE-ORTON. In two volumes. I. *The Later Roman Empire to the Twelfth Century.* II. *The Twelfth Century to the Renaissance.* Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada]. 1952. Pp. xxii, 1–644; xx, 645–1202. $10.00.

densation, of marshalled facts, of digested knowledge. Into these 1202 pages, broken up into two volumes, eleven books, and thirty-eight chapters, the author has distilled the essence of the eight volumes of learning which make up the *Cambridge Medieval History.*

To read through these two volumes is to engage on a kind of penitential pilgrimage of the mind. One sets off along the interminable narrow trackway, often hot and dusty, running now through dark valleys where fact looms upon fact out of the medieval gloom, now over high mountains of genealogy and dynastic conflict, and now through tortuous ways of negotiation and war—where to wander for a moment is to sink into the morass. Yet along this way there loom many inns of quiet refreshment, as when the author pauses to sum up the meaning of what he has described, or to point out the general lie of the land to his reader-pilgrim. Further refreshment is to be had from the rich and surprising illustrations—for Dr. Steinberg, who provided them, has mercifully spared us the conventional views of castle and cathedral which figure in the average text-book.

It is a pilgrimage worth undertaking—let the idle loiter for a while in the inns, at least—if only because of the great learning of the author, and the complete humility with which he has fulfilled his arduous task. He has subordinated himself very fully to the material and his personality makes itself known only in the lucidity, the exactitude, the fine compression of the style. Nevertheless, it is no mere *précis* of the larger work which results. Quite apart from the fact that nothing could sum up the profuse variety of the full history, it is Mr. Previté-Orton's own scholarship which gives its unity and purpose to the new book.

There is no debate in these volumes. The path along which we are directed may be forbidding, but it is firm. We may not like the facts, but at no point are we invited to discuss them, or to dissent from them. On the whole, what is attempted is a modern, but conservative and moderate approach to the material. There is no startling resolution of the "great problem" why the Roman Empire in the West collapsed, no term put to the discussion between Brunner's and Dopsch's disciples. Such "new" views as those of Mitteis on feudal law in Germany, Lousse on the system of "Estates" have no place in this account. The reader, in fact, will have no inkling of the work done or being done on the subjects about which he is being informed. This may seem a great fault to the medievalist, but to many readers it will probably be no drawback. The narrative is in itself a testimony to what has been done. An ocean traveller does not wish to spend all his time in the boiler-room.

A more serious criticism is that questions are rarely raised in the reader's mind. One is not led to wonder, to press on. The pilgrimage

is too well conducted. True, this is not closed history in that vicious sense in which everything is explained. All our questions are by no means answered. The real trouble is that they are rarely raised. A really good general history should surely leave one anxious to go on—to go on thinking if not reading. It is on these grounds that this book is open to the most serious criticism.

Less important, perhaps, is the lack of attention to what is generally known as *Kulturgeschichte*. The narrative keeps to the central theme of political and institutional development, with occasional pages devoted to literary, artistic, and intellectual history. One must be cautious with this criticism, however. Quite apart from the professed purpose of the book—which is to make available to a wider circle the learning of its greater namesake—it can be argued, I think convincingly, that *Kulturgeschichte* has not yet "arrived." For the student of a community or group of communities—their internal organization and development, their growth and decline—no substitute has yet been found for the close discipline of political and constitutional history. The historian of general culture tends to be a man of guess-work, speculation, or propaganda. Mr. Previté-Orton, one need hardly say, is none of these, and the *Cambridge Medieval History* would be a strange vehicle for him, if he were. Against the main burthen of this charge of narrowness, then, a strong defence can be made. Nevertheless, this absence of broad, cultural vistas is bound to lessen its attractiveness and usefulness in this modern age.

Given all these qualifications, it is still true to say that at the price this is the best work available on the subject of Medieval Europe. Its high distinction of format, its authoritativeness and exactitude, its helpful tables and excellent index, all mean that it will be useful to many besides professional historians. It is not likely to be satisfactory as a text-book, but there are many passages which students will be expected to read. Those with strong minds and staying power will read it through. But it is, above all, to the educated layman, as a kind of political Baedeker to medieval history, that this book will prove most useful.

THE THEATRICAL RECORD REVIEWED* — R. S. KNOX

Professor Allardyce Nicoll is recognized as the authoritative historian of English dramatic literature during its course from the Restoration to the close of the nineteenth century. Thirty years ago he

**A History of English Drama 1660–1900.* Volume I, *Restoration Drama, 1660–1700* (4th ed.), pp. vi, 462; $6.75. Volume II, *Early Eighteenth Century Drama* (3rd ed.), pp. viii, 467; $7.50. Volume III, *Late Eighteenth Century Drama, 1750–1800* (2nd ed.), pp. vi, 423. By ALLARDYCE NICOLL. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1952.

published his *History of Restoration Drama*, which was followed by volumes on the first and second halves of the eighteenth century. He has now brought out new editions of these books, each in varying degree revised and expanded; and revised editions of his volumes on the history of nineteenth-century drama are due to be published soon.

Perhaps the most striking quality of Professor Nicoll's work has been its methodical thoroughness. The volumes are planned alike. For each period he initially considers the influence on the drama of the audience, the playhouse, and the actors and actresses. Only by reference to these, he holds, can the nature of the drama be understood. Each dramatic category—tragedy and comedy with their sub-types, and for the later periods such miscellaneous forms as opera, pantomime, and burlesque—is in turn examined, and the multitude of plays docketed and described. Professor Nicoll is, as he claims to be, primarily the historian rather than the critic. His own views and evaluations, by no means always orthodox, are given trenchantly if briefly, but his main aim has been to let the full theatrical record speak for itself and to chronicle the variations of fashion and taste within the period and from one age to the next. While the significant trends in drama, as we now assess them, issue very clearly, he makes evident what is not surprising, the frequent discrepancy between our later appraisals and the likes and dislikes of the audience of the time. This is convincingly brought home by the examples cited of the seasonal repertoires of the theatres with the length of run of each play performed. One notes, for instance, the popularity of the Restoration heroic drama well into the eighteenth century, the comparative neglect of the pseudo-classical plays on the stage when they were being extolled by the Augustan critics, the refutation from the evidence of the repertoire lists of the often stated notion that after Lillo and Moore the domestic play immediately became popular. One further feature of Professor Nicoll's work calls for special mention, the invaluable hand-lists of plays which he has collected and appended to the text of each volume.

The new editions of the histories, we have said, vary in the measure of their revision and expansion. In the foot-note references and more comprehensively in the supplementary sections added to each chapter full count has been taken of recent books and articles on the drama of the periods. The original hand-lists have been augmented and here and there corrected from the researches of scholars who have followed in Professor Nicoll's wake. The volume on Restoration drama seems to show most rewriting, probably because there has been of late more scholarly attention devoted to this period. And here one finds an occasional interesting change of view. So in the introductory chapter to

the first edition he had taken an almost scolding attitude to some aspects of the drama: "They [the audience] had not sufficient aesthetic sense to hiss the heroic tragedy off the stage; they had not sufficient moral probity to condemn the utter filth which dramatists, small and great, flung before their jaded senses in the playhouse." This indignation has now been omitted, and a more tolerant note is struck: "Neither are we likely now to neglect the solid virtues of the heroic drama and the delicacy of the comic." As Professor Nicoll in his histories has himself shown us, our artistic judgments are largely conditioned by the temper of the time.

There is no doubting the welcome that these new editions of an indispensable work will receive, but one trivial complaint may be permitted. We have to wait for the fifth and final volume before we can consult an index of the plays mentioned in the texts or catalogued in the hand-lists.

THEOLOGY AND THE ARTS* — H. M. McLuhan

This is a group of essays originally given as lectures at the Institute for Religious and Social Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Despite the range of topics and the distinction of many of the contributors, the effect of this volume is somewhat limp and spiritless. Perhaps the diversity of intellectual fare provided during the first three decades of this century has produced a post-prandial somnolence. At mid-century we seem, temporarily at least, to be intellectually disengaged—a fact which is suggested by the tone rather than the topics of current discussion.

The theme of these essays is the relation between theology and the arts. Most of the writers assume that art is theology. Art, says Denis de Rougemont in one of the best essays, is "an oriented trap": the work of art is a calculated trap for meditation on the highest matters. For that reason great art in our time has ignored beauty as the East has always done. Art has set itself the aim of describing the highest realities "even at the price of ugliness, if necessary. The academic artists alone, the false artists, still try to make something beautiful or flattering." The cult of the creative, says de Rougemont, has resulted from loss of belief in a Creator God. Writing on the use of myth in Kafka and Mann, Harry Slochhower considers "myth and religion along with other cultural forms" as techniques "to get at basic reality

**Spiritual Problems in Contemporary Literature: A Series of Addresses and Discussions.* Religion and Civilization Series. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, for the Institute for Religious and Social Studies [Toronto: Musson Book Company Ltd.]. 1952. Pp. xviii, 298. $3.75.

seen in symbolic transformation." Taking up the problem of myth in another connection, Hopper and Kenneth Burke see it in the guise of paradox and ambivalence as these matters are discussed by Empson and Brooks: "the characteristic expression of this double-pointedness of the mythic image is in terms of the oxymoron—the figure combining contradictory elements in a single expression. . . . Images so employed both reveal and conceal. The poetic objects are not just empirical but are also to a degree enigmatical, and a certain amount of mystery will arise precisely where there is communication between levels."

Delmore Schwartz on "The Vocation of the Poet in the Modern World" considers the poet's problems vis-à-vis language in our multi-languaged world. And then he turns to assess the role of the poet in the class-room now that the modern university has assumed the function of artistic patronage.

Albert Solomon has some interesting remarks on the novel as a sociological form. But first he makes a sharp distinction: "The sociologist, therefore, stands in total contradistinction as social engineer to the poet who is concerned with the maintenance, preservation, and continuation of the truth about the whole, the truth of the unity of God, world and man." Armed with this formidable definition, Solomon turns to the novel which "emerges as a new literary form, not because bourgeois, patrician and people as such are different from the knights of chivalrous romance, but because sociological awareness, the totally new factor, becomes the focussing element of plot. In the simplest possible terms, society is now the destiny of the individual; the horizon under which the individual lives is determined by the pressure, power, and control of society. The novel, from *Don Quixote* on, is the manifestation of this new outlook."

This is typical of the genre criticism in the Hegelian tradition which today is very active again. For the most part English literature has been spared these stern categories and the furious appetite to tidy up the world of letters in the spirit of what Freud called "anal eroticism."

Such, however, is the scope of variety of this collection that it contains something to please and displease every taste.

WHITEHEAD AND DEFINITION* — MARCUS LONG

The mark of a genius, according to Bosanquet, is the number of enduring new words he adds to the language because each new word represents a new insight, a finer discrimination, and an advance in

**Whitehead's Theory of Reality.* By A. H. JOHNSON. Boston: The Beacon Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd. 1952. Pp. xiv, 263. $5.50.

knowledge. There is no need to quarrel with this criterion. The quarrel comes when an ambitious scientist or philosopher fallaciously converts the proposition and assumes that if he coins a new word or redefines an old he is thereby marked as a genius.

The late Professor A. N. Whitehead coined more words and altered more familiar meanings than any other philosopher of the twentieth century. This has made an understanding and appraisal of his work extremely difficult. Whitehead insisted technical language was essential to express the new insights and discriminations of his philosophy. Many critics have disagreed. Some have even charged that the technical language is only a device for concealing the philosophic poverty of his system.

In this book, *Whitehead's Theory of Reality*, Professor Johnson is concerned to show that the strange language of Whitehead is both meaningful and useful, and to establish his own faith that "the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead will provide, for the twentieth century, the answers to those ultimate questions which confront reflective men in all ages." It is only fair to say that he has done an excellent job in defending the reputation of Whitehead within the limits he set for himself. The defects of the book (I suspect) arise more from the limitations of space than from the intentions or capacities of the author.

The first half of the book offers interpretations of the basic terms in Whitehead's mature philosophy based on a survey of Whitehead's own definitions and usages. Students who have been discouraged by the barbarous language will appreciate the relatively simple statement of what Whitehead means by such expressions as actual entity, prehension, subjective aim, the primordial nature of God, etc.

Unfortunately Whitehead was not always clear about his own definitions and far from consistent in their use. Professor Johnson, therefore, is forced to select what he believes was the meaning really intended. This leaves many controversies unsettled. Since Professor Johnson had the advantage of a close association with Whitehead at Harvard and has never wavered in his loyalty to the master his interpretations may be properly called the orthodox interpretation. As such his book is an indispensable handbook for students of Whitehead but will fail to convince or silence the critics.

The second half of the book concentrates more on stating the basic philosophic position of Whitehead. It is very uneven. The chapter on Whitehead's relation to other philosophers is much too brief to be useful. Since Whitehead was proud of the eclectic nature of his system this sketchy and, at times, inaccurate account of his relation to

others is unfortunate. Philosophers will be astonished to find that his relation to Leibniz is dismissed in a single paragraph whereas it takes over three pages to discuss his relation to William James. It seems to me the agreements and disagreements with Leibniz are a much more fruitful historical approach to Whitehead. The philosophy of Whitehead is essentially a monadic philosophy which escapes, among other things, the substance–attribute doctrine which plagued Leibniz. The reasons for this go far to illuminate what Whitehead was trying to say.

The next chapter gives a sound, but sketchy, statement of Whitehead's relation to science, the apparent paradox that an idealist in metaphysics was a realist in epistemology, the meaning of organic mechanism, and the impact of evolutionary theories on the formation of his system. The book ends with an evaluation which consists largely of a concise statement of the criticisms of Whitehead which Professor Johnson feels merit careful consideration.

This is not the place to quarrel with Professor Johnson on his treatment of some phases of this very difficult subject. It is more fitting to congratulate him on the general merit of his work. This introduction to the philosophy of Whitehead will prove invaluable to those seeking some understanding of a system of thought which may very well be, as Professor Johnson believes, the most important philosophic contribution of our century.

POPE AND HOMER* F. E. L. PRIESTLEY

The process of rehabilitation so justly undertaken on Pope's behalf by modern critics is given noble support by Mr. Knight's wholly excellent book. Not long ago Mr. Maurice Baring, himself a translator of great versatility and skill, bluntly asserted that, next to the original Homer, Pope's Homer was best, but the dominant taste in our time has preferred prose versions of ever increasing informality. One highly popular version of the *Odyssey* blandly offers Odysseus' nurse to us speaking the North Country dialect of the music hall; this, we are assured, is more faithful to the original epic poetry than poetic translation. The assumptions about the nature of epic poetry, and particularly about Homeric epic, and about the nature of translation which allow an undistinguished and uneven prose to be put forward as adequate representation of great poetry obviously need re-exami-

**Pope and the Heroic Tradition: A Critical Study of His Iliad.* By DOUGLAS KNIGHT. Yale Studies in English, BENJAMIN CHRISTIE NANGLE, Editor, 117. Published on the Kingsley Trust Association Publication Fund established by the Scroll and Key Society of Yale College. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press [Toronto: The Ryerson Press]. 1951. Pp. x, 124. $4.25.

nation. It seems especially anomalous in an age which reads little poetry and less Greek to suggest that prose can convey the effect of Greek poetry; a prose translation may mean something to a reader who has some halting acquaintance with the effect of the original, or some familiarity with the tone and manner of epic poetry in other tongues, but the prose alone can surely not in itself create a sense of epic style. Modern prose versions of Homer usually place emphasis upon literal accuracy, and one longs at times for a counter-Bentley who will cry, "Very painstaking, but you must not call it Homer."

Mr. Knight starts with a full awareness of these matters. He disposes of a few myths at the outset: that Pope knew little Greek and that he was unaware of the problems of translation. Some evidence and argument for the adequacy of Pope's knowledge of the Homeric language and text are given in an appendix; fuller discussion is to come in an edition of Pope's Homer, but what is given is convincing. Pope's critical approach to the task of translation, as given in his many notes as well as in the Preface, takes up the first third of Mr. Knight's book. Here we are given a thorough and most illuminating exposition of Pope's aims, his attempt to interpret the *Iliad* "in terms of its total significance," as "one coherent structure," to prevent "a misreading of the *Iliad* which will put its splendor and inevitable exoticism in the center of interest to the exclusion of the moral tragedy which actually provides the structure of the poem's action as well as the meaning of its characters and ultimately of its imagery." Working within a tradition of heroic poetry which is for him alive and continuous, which includes not only Homer and Virgil but Spenser and Milton, Pope is concerned with a kind of re-creation: "While he knows and states that he cannot reproduce Homer in English, he also insists that he must do the one kind of justice possible—he must attempt in the translation to show Homer in terms of poetic qualities which received their primary impetus from him and in terms of other formal qualities of the living language which may, like a Biblical style, for particular reasons give a vigorous and yet disciplined equivalent to the Greek."

It is this formal style which Mr. Knight next goes on to examine, with very skilful analysis of the effects created by stylized language, by the interplay of abstract and concrete, of metaphorical and literal terms, by a natural syntax enclosing formalized vocabulary. What he has to say here is extremely valuable, not simply in relation to Pope's Homer, but to much of eighteenth-century poetry. In fact, this part of the book offers some of the most perceptive detailed criticism of heroic poetry, and of poetry in the heroic couplet, that I have read. The remarks show a rare understanding of the verbal texture of Pope's

poetry, of the actual function in its context of "poetic diction," and of the varied structure and effects of passages in couplets. The wide application of the critical remarks is suggested by excellent illustrations drawn from Chaucer, Shakespeare, Spenser, Milton, Tennyson, and even Frost and Auden. These serve, of course, also to remind us of the living tradition, and to lead us gently away from what Mr. Knight calls "the spinal-shudder school of criticism."

Where Pope departs from the literal meaning of the text, he is either clarifying or interpreting. "He manipulates the stock epithets so that they will not be stumbled over, and he often provides information which is implicit in the poem or explicit at another point from the one where he includes it." "The similes, for instance, are shaped so as to bring out the function which we have already noticed in the Greek—a simultaneous sharpening of the precise nature of an event and also of its significance for the larger order of the poem. But the emphasis in the English is on . . . the relevance of an event rather than on its detail." "Achilles for Pope's audience is somewhat like Lear for Turgenev's; his basic significance is clear, but he must be directed so as best to evoke it for an informed but still alien audience." Pope, in short, is a poet well aware of what Homer as a poet is about; he is concerned "to be true to the primary fact that Homer writes heroic poetry" by a proper use of the heroic tradition, which will allow us "to penetrate the past, but not . . . to escape the present."

In his final section, "Tradition and Meaning," Mr. Knight elaborates the central theme, or "statement" of the *Iliad* in relation to the epic tradition, discussing by way of comparison *Beowulf*, the *Song of Roland*, the *Aeneid*, and *Paradise Lost*, with emphasis upon the developing conception of heroic morality, and of the significance of the hero. This study elaborates one of his main contentions throughout: that "the learned Homeric tradition and the continuing heroic tradition are not, after all, the same thing," although the latter stems originally from Homer. Pope, writing as poet and not simply as scholar, takes Homer's poem and "re-orders it from within in order to make it an instrument of insight for his own society. It becomes a philosophical poem, a poem which in the course of its action meditates on the meaning of the action as Homer never does." Since he is writing for an audience familiar with the tradition, an audience that has read at least Virgil and Milton, he can reinforce his meaning at various points by deliberate echoes which operate as allusions. And since he is working "to maintain . . . the objective significance of poetry rather than its mere romance or decorative value," he is bound, in developing Homer's idea, to introduce certain concepts in his own intellectual tra-

dition. Specifically, he sharpens "the sense of a cosmic moral judgment"; "he has developed heroic morality beyond the Greek, while in doing so he has extended the symbolic quality latent in the Greek." "Seen in these terms many objections to the translation assume their proper position of irrelevancy; Pope's *Iliad* is so demonstrably not Homer in one sense that we are free to consider another and perhaps even more important sense in which it 'is' Homer."

It is perhaps too much to hope that this conclusion of Mr. Knight's, with its amiable concession and provocative claim, will convert all our Greek-less Bentleys, but his work should at least lead to the suppression of some of the irrelevancies, and also clarify the causes which led generations of readers with poetic taste and some knowledge of Greek to enjoy Pope's version. It is so able a piece of criticism that it ought to send modern readers in haste to read and appreciate Pope; certainly every student of eighteenth-century English poetry should be required to read this book.

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
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